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Abstract
Modern economic and social activities are dependent on a complex network of
infrastructure systems that are highly interdependent. Electric power systems form the
backbone of such complex network as most civil infrastructure systems cannot function
properly without reliable power supply. Electric power systems are vulnerable to extensive
damage due to natural hazards, as evident in recent hazard events. Hurricanes, earthquakes,
floods, tornados and other natural hazards have caused billions of dollars in direct losses
due to damage to power systems and indirect losses due to power outages, as well as social
disruption. There is, therefore, a need for a comprehensive framework to assess and
mitigate the risk posed by natural hazards to electric power systems. Electric power
systems rely on various components that work together to deliver power from generating
units to customers. Consequently, any reliable risk assessment methodology needs to take
into account how the different components interact. This requires a system-level risk
assessment approach. This research presents a framework for system-level risk assessment
and management for electric power systems subjected to natural hazards. Specifically, risk
due to hurricanes and earthquakes, as well as the combined effect of both is considered.
The framework incorporates a topological-based system reliability model, probabilistic and
scenario-based hazard analysis, climate change modeling, component vulnerability,
component importance measure, multi-hazard risk assessment, and cost analysis. Several
risk mitigation strategies are proposed; their efficiency and cost-effectiveness are studied.
The developed framework is intended to assist utility companies and other stakeholders in
making a risk-informed decision regarding short- and long-term investment in natural
hazard risk mitigation for electric power systems. The framework can be used to identify
certain parts of the system to strengthen, compare the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of
various risk mitigation strategies using life-cycle cost analysis, compare risks posed by
different natural hazards, and prioritize investment in the face of limited resources.

xvi

1. Introduction
Civil infrastructure systems such as electric power systems, water distribution systems,
transportation networks, gas supply systems, etc. are the backbone of modern economies
and essential for public wellbeing. For safety, security, prosperity, and social welfare, such
critical infrastructure systems need to be reliable, robust, and resilient. Most civil
infrastructure systems cannot function properly without reliable power supply. Emergency
response units, telecommunication networks, traffic control systems, healthcare facilities,
etc., all depend on the electric power system to function. As such, the electric power system
is among the most critical of all the civil infrastructure systems. Thus, the loss of electricity
can cause billions of dollars in direct and indirect economic losses.
Electric power systems are subjected to numerous disturbances ranging from small
disturbances caused by common cause failures to major disturbances caused by natural
hazards. Natural hazards that threaten power systems include hurricanes, earthquakes,
floods, severe thunderstorms, and tornadoes. In the event of natural disasters, continuous
supply of electricity is essential not only to critical buildings such as hospitals and fire
stations but to the public as a whole. Hurricanes and earthquakes are among the most
devastating natural hazards that can cause extensive damage and prolonged power outages
(Stewart, 2004; Pasch et al., 2005; Blake et al., 2013; Romero et al., 2015; Noda, 2001b).
The extensive damage potential of hurricanes on power systems has been well documented
historically. From the four major hurricanes that hit Florida in 2004 to the 2008 hurricane
season in Texas, the cost of hurricane damage to power systems is in the billions (USDOE,
2005; Hoffman et al., 2009). In 2004, four major hurricanes struck Florida causing a
combined economic loss of over $20 billion and damaging every segment of Florida’s
electricity infrastructure which resulted in a power outage to over 9.6 million customers
combined (USDOE, 2005). In 2005, hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma struck the U.S.
causing extensive damage to power systems across several states (Knabb et al., 2005;
NOAA, 2005; Pasch et al., 2006). Recently in 2012, hurricane Sandy caused severe damage
1

to the power system of several coastal states causing over 8.5 million customers to lose
power for weeks and even months in some areas (Blake et al., 2013). When it comes to
damage due to hurricanes, the distribution part of the power system is the most vulnerable
(Davidson et al., 2003). For example, between 1998 and 2009, electric utility companies
in Texas incurred about $1.8 billion in restoration costs due to hurricanes with 80% of the
costs attributed to the distribution system (Brown, 2009).
Investment in the power sector is considered a long-term investment due to the service life
of the assets, which can be as long as 100 years (Mendiluce, 2014). It is, therefore,
imperative for utility companies to consider the uncertainties inherent in such long-term
investments that will impact return on investment as well as customer satisfaction. One
such uncertainty is the potential impact of climate change on hurricane hazard. In a
National Climate Assessment report which summarizes the impacts of climate change on
the United States, it is stated that “the intensity, frequency, and duration of North Atlantic
hurricanes, as well as the frequency of the strongest (Category 4 and 5) hurricanes, have
all increased since the early 1980s… Hurricane-associated storm intensity and rainfall rates
are projected to increase as the climate continues to warm” (Walsh et al., 2014). With the
potential increase in the intensity of hurricanes in the long-term due to climate change, the
cost of damage to power systems is expected to rise.
Electric power systems are also vulnerable to damage due to earthquakes. For example, the
1994 Northridge earthquake caused over 2.5 million customers to lose power and resulted
in direct losses of about $138 million to Los Angeles Department of Water and Power
(Dong et al., 2004; Schiff et al., 1995). Similarly, the 1995 Great Hanshin earthquake, 2008
Wenchuan earthquake, as well as the 2010 Chile earthquake caused various levels of
damage to electric power systems (Noda, 2001a; Eidinger, 2009; Romero et al., 2015).
When it comes to damage due to earthquakes, brittle substation components with
considerable weight are the most vulnerable (Vanzi, 1996; Eidinger & Kempner, 2012).
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The extent of damage to electric power systems due to natural hazards depends not only
on the frequency and intensity of such hazards but also on the number of different types of
hazards that the systems are exposed to. Most parts of the world are vulnerable to multiple
hazards that can be concurrent/non-concurrent and dependent/independent (Li et al., 2012).
Over the lifespan of electric power systems located in regions affected by more than one
hazard, such systems can be affected by multiple hazards that differ in nature and can occur
simultaneously or otherwise. For example, hurricanes and earthquakes have a very low
probability of occurring simultaneously and are considered independent non-concurrent
hazards. However, the life cycle cost of systems located in areas vulnerable to both
hurricanes and earthquakes depends on the combined effect of both hazards. Therefore,
long-term risk mitigation strategies need to consider the effect of multiple independent
hazards as certain mitigation strategies for one hazard might be ineffective or even increase
the risk for other hazards (Bell & Glade, 2004).
Aging infrastructure has also been determined to be one of the main issues facing the power
system (ASCE, 2013). Aging of components increases the vulnerability of the system in
cases of natural disasters such as hurricanes. Wood distribution poles, for example, are
susceptible to decay as they age which causes a reduction in strength. This is of particular
concern as most of the distribution poles in the U.S. are wood poles (Gustavsen &
Rolfseng, 2000).
Damage to infrastructure such as electric power systems due to natural hazards needs to be
reduced as recovery period is longer when the system is severely damaged which in turn
can exponentially increase losses (Tierney et al., 1999). As such, cost-effective risk
mitigation strategies need to be identified. This requires a comprehensive risk assessment
framework that incorporates hazard identification and characterization, consequence
analysis, risk evaluation, and risk mitigation. Such framework can be used for pre-disaster
preparation, mitigation, and post-disaster response planning. Additionally, such framework
is required to guide decision makers to prioritize investment on risk mitigation strategies
in the face of limited resources.
3

Studies have been conducted towards risk assessment for electric power systems subjected
to natural hazards. The effectiveness of various mitigation strategies such as targeted
hardening has also been studied (e.g. Han et al. (2013), Shafieezadeh et al. (2014a),
Bjarnadottir et al. (2013), Ryan et al. (2014b)). Brown (2009) studied the hardening of 10%
of distribution poles in Texas and estimated the net benefit derived from it. Bjarnadottir et
al. (2014) studied targeted hardening of distribution poles in Florida using four strategies:
(i) replacement of poles that reach threshold of strength; (ii) replacing failed poles with
poles that are one class stronger; (iii) replacing poles that fail with stronger poles plus
replacing poles that reach strength threshold; and (iv) proactive measures for foreshore
locations by using stronger poles. The above studies, however, focused on componentlevel risk assessment.
Similarly, studies on the potential impact of climate change on risk of power system
subjected to hurricanes are limited to component-level performance (e.g. Francis et al.
(2011), Bjarnadottir et al. (2013), Bjarnadottir et al. (2014)). Francis et al. (2011) presented
a hybrid economic input-output life cycle cost analysis method for evaluating the costeffectiveness of climate change adaptation strategies of distribution systems. Failure of
distribution poles, spans, and pad-mounted transformers was considered in the study. The
effect of climate change was modeled through the use of count regression analysis and data
mining techniques that describe the relationship between climate variability and North
Atlantic tropical cyclone counts in the U.S.
Multi-hazard assessment and mitigation were investigated for residential construction (Li
& Ellingwood, 2009), bridges (Kameshwar & Padgett, 2014), and commercial buildings
(Wen & Kang, 2001). While development of multi-hazard risk analysis framework for
buildings and bridges have been ongoing in recent years, risk analysis of spatiallydistributed civil infrastructure systems such as electric power and water systems have so
far been limited to mostly single-hazard considerations (e.g. Adachi and Ellingwood
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(2010), Winkler et al. (2010), Song and Ok (2010), Duenas-Osorio and Hernandez-Fajardo
(2008), Kim and Kang (2013), Ryan et al. (2014a)).
Davis and Clemmer (2014) suggested shifting to renewable energy sources to diversify the
electric system and make it more resilient. This is because the use of renewable energy can
turn the power system to smaller-scale and more distributed system. Renewable energy
sources can be used for smart grid systems where generation and transportation of
electricity can be decentralized and failure in one part of the system will not affect other
parts. However, though the use of renewable sources of energy can help in improving the
resilience of power systems, the current extensive system needs upgrading and
strengthening as it is likely to stay in place for years to come before the gradual adaptation
of smart grid systems.
Based on the review of existing literature, the following observations can be made:
1.

While component-level risk assessment methodologies have been well established,
efficient utilization of limited risk mitigation resources requires identifying critical
parts or components of a system that when strengthened, will have a greater impact
on overall system reliability. To determine the critical parts or components of a
system, some form of component importance measure is required. This, in turn,
requires system reliability modeling that relates structural components failure and
power delivery.

2. Previous research on climate change impact did not couple climate change
modeling and system reliability. Decision making regarding appropriate climate
change adaptation strategies based on component-level risk analysis might not be
accurate.
3. Damage to electric power systems can lead to significant indirect monetary loss to
residential, commercial, and industrial customers. However, most existing studies
5

did not consider indirect losses in the form of societal economic losses due to power
outages.
4. Risk analysis of electric power systems has so far been limited to mostly singlehazard considerations. As these systems usually cover large areas and can be
subjected to multiple hazards within their lifetime, there is a need to develop a
framework to study the impact of multiple hazards on such systems. This is
essential for decision making regarding investment in long-term mitigation of risks
due to all possible hazards that can affect the system over its entire lifespan. There
is also a need to investigate the cost-effectiveness of mitigation strategies in
reducing the overall risks to infrastructure that are vulnerable to multiple hazards.
This requires a comprehensive multi-hazard risk-based approach.

1.1 Research Objectives
The main objective of this dissertation is to develop a system-level risk-based framework
for assessment and strengthening of electric power systems subjected to natural hazards.
The focus of the framework is on the distribution as well as the transmission parts of the
electric power system. The natural hazards considered are hurricanes and earthquakes, as
well as the combined impact of both on the life cycle cost of systems located in areas
vulnerable to both hazards. Specific objectives include:
1. Develop a probabilistic system reliability approach that relates structural
components failure with power delivery for radially operated distribution systems
as well as networked transmission systems.
2. Develop and demonstrate a framework for risk-based assessment and strengthening
of distribution systems subjected to hurricanes.
6

3. Incorporate climate change model to risk assessment of power systems subjected
to hurricanes to study the impact of variation in both intensity and frequency of
future hurricanes.
4. Develop and demonstrate a framework for multi-hazard risk assessment of electric
power systems subjected to independent non-concurrent hazards through their
lifespan.
5. Propose and investigate the cost-effectiveness of various risk mitigation strategies
for distribution and transmission systems considering both direct and indirect costs.
The developed framework can be utilized in decision making regarding the design of new
electric power systems, investigating the effectiveness of various mitigation in terms of
system reliability improvement and monetary benefit, comparing various mitigation
strategies, as well as prioritizing investment in instances of competing hazards and limited
resources.

1.2 Organization of Dissertation
This dissertation has been organized into nine chapters. The content of each chapter is
outlined below:
Chapter 1 introduces the subject, discusses the need for risk assessment of electric power
systems subjected to natural hazards, reviews existing literature on the subject, and
highlights the motivation for the research. Finally, the objectives of the research are
presented.
Chapter 2 gives a general background on electric power systems and discusses the
different sub-systems that work together to deliver power to customers. Natural
7

hazards, specifically hurricanes and earthquakes, are introduced together with a
discussion of different regions of the U.S. vulnerable to such hazards. Finally, the
concept of infrastructure risk assessment is introduced.
Chapter 3 develops a topological-based system reliability approach for distribution and
transmission systems. This includes discussion of system reliability theory, modeling
accessibility of system components in radial and networked systems, and line failure
models.
Chapter 4 presents a framework for studying the effectiveness of targeted hardening
strategies for distribution systems subjected to hurricanes. The framework includes
probabilistic and scenario-based hazard modeling, time-dependent component fragility
model, component importance evaluation, and cost analysis. The framework is
demonstrated using a notional distribution system assumed to be located in Florida.
Chapter 5 extends the framework from chapter 4 to integrate the potential impact of
climate change on hurricane risk. Several climate change scenarios are integrated into
a hurricane simulation model to investigate the impact of variation in both intensity and
frequency of hurricanes on risk. Cost-effectiveness of adaptation strategies is also
evaluated using a notional distribution system.
Chapter 6 evaluates the effectiveness of adding redundancy to distribution systems to
reduce hurricane risk by constructing additional distribution lines with normally open
(NO) switches to connect various independent substations. A system consisting of 20
independent distribution systems in central Florida is used.
Chapter 7 presents a framework for multi-hazard risk assessment of electric power
systems subjected to hurricanes and earthquakes. The framework includes probabilistic
and scenario-based hazard modeling and different methods of multi-hazard risk
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assessment. A notional electric power system assumed to be located in Charleston, SC,
New York, NY, and Seattle, WA, is used to demonstrate the proposed framework.
Chapter 8 extends the framework in Chapter 7 to investigate the effectiveness of various
multi-hazard risk mitigation strategies. Probabilistically weighted deterministic hazard
scenarios approach is also introduced. Finally, a new component importance measure
appropriate for networked systems such as transmission systems is developed. A
notional electric power system is used to investigate the cost-effectiveness of the
proposed mitigation strategies.
Chapter 9 summarizes findings of the previous chapters, states conclusions from this
study, and suggests future avenues for research in the area of risk assessment of
infrastructure systems subjected to natural hazards.

9

2. Background
2.1 Electric Power Systems
The electric power system can be broadly divided into three subsystems: generation,
transmission, and distribution. The basic structure of a power system showing these subsystems is shown in Figure 2.1. Electric power is produced by generating units which
convert mechanical energy into electricity. The generation plants produce electricity by
using fossil fuels, nuclear energy, wind, hydro, or solar energy. Power plants produce
electricity at a line-to-line voltage of between 11 kV and 30 kV (Brown, 2008). However,
this range of voltage is not sufficiently high to transport electricity over long distances.
Hence, generation substations are used to step up the voltage to transmission levels.
Electric power from generating units is carried by the transmission system over long
distances to the distribution system. The voltage levels for the transmission system ranges
from 69 kV to as high as 1100 kV in the transmission and sub-transmission lines in the US
(Brown, 2008). The sub-transmission system carries electric power at lower voltages and
over shorter distances than the transmission system and is used to connect the transmission
system to multiple distribution systems (Kassakian et al., 2011). The transmission system
is composed of power lines and substations. The conductors in the power lines are
supported by structures that can be lattice steel towers or H-frames for transmission
systems and single pole structures for sub-transmission systems.
Topologically, the transmission and sub-transmission systems have mesh-like designs to
provide multiple paths from one node (substation) to another. This increases flexibility and
improves reliability so that power can be delivered to loads even when a transmission line,
substation, or generating unit goes offline. Transmission security assessment is routinely
carried out to determine whether a system can deliver peak demand after one or more pieces
of equipment or components are disconnected (Brown, 2008). After removing a piece of
10

equipment, power flow is run to check if all voltage levels are within limits and equipment
are not loaded above emergency ratings. This ensures that the transmission system is at
least N-1 secure at all times.
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Generation
Plant
Generation Substation

Transmission Substation

Distribution Substation

Distribution
transformer

Figure 2.1 Schematic of an electric power system
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The distribution system starts from a distribution substation that is fed by one or more subtransmission lines (Kersting, 2012). The main function of the distribution substation is to
step down the voltage to distribution level by utilizing a transformer. The stepped down
power leaves the substation through feeders that can be either overhead or underground
system. The feeders eventually branched off to smaller lateral lines that deliver power
directly to customers. Overhead distribution systems utilize wires that are carried by wood,
steel or concrete poles that are 30 to 40 ft high and spaced 100 to 150 ft in the suburbs and
300 to 400 ft in rural areas (Short, 2006). The voltage is usually between 4.16 kV to 34.5
kV in the distribution system and is mostly carried by Aluminum Conductor Steel
Reinforced (ACSR) and All Aluminum Conductor (AAC) wires (Brown, 2008).
Unlike the transmission and sub-transmission systems, the topology of the distribution
system is mostly radial or radially operated in the U.S. (Kersting, 2012; Brown, 2008).
Radial implies there is a unique path for power flow from a substation to each customer.
Radially operated distribution systems have ring (or loop) topology where there is more
than one path from the power source to customers. The radial nature of the system is
maintained by using normally open (NO) switches which can be closed to provide an
alternative path in the case of a fault. This increases reliability by allowing customers
downstream of a fault to receive power using a combination of NO switches and
sectionalizing switches.
Electric power grids are among the most extensive and complex engineering systems in
modern societies. The generation, transmission, and distribution systems work together to
supply electricity to millions of different types of customers ranging from residential,
commercial, and industrial customers. Table 2.1 gives a summary of some of the
characteristics of the U.S. electric grid.
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Table 2.1 General information on the U.S. electric grid
Description

Approximate value

Source

Total number of customers

147 million

EIA (2016b)

Number of residential customers

128 million (37% of consumption)

EIA (2016b)

Number of commercial customers

17.8 million (36% of consumption) EIA (2016b)

Number of industrial customers

839,000 (27% of consumption)

EIA (2016b)

Number of transportation customers

79 (0.2% of consumption)

EIA (2016b)

Total revenue (2014)

$393 million

EIA (2016b)

Revenue from residential customers

45% of total

EIA (2016b)

Revenue from commercial customers 37% of total

EIA (2016b)

Revenue from industrial customers

18% of total

EIA (2016b)

Revenue from transport customers

0.2% of total

EIA (2016b)

High voltage transmission lines

200,000 miles

NERC (2015)

Low voltage distribution lines

6 million miles

Primary energy consumed

40% of total

Kassakian et
al. (2011)
EIA (2016a)

2.2 Natural Hazards
Natural hazards that threaten the power system include hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, ice
storms, severe thunderstorms, tornadoes etc. Each of these hazards causes failure in a
different way and to different parts of the power system. The duration of the resulting
interruption also usually depends on the type of hazard with some causing considerably
long interruptions. Utility companies are required to submit reports to both U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE) and the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC)
when there is a sufficiently large disturbance in their territories. Between 1984 and 2006,
there were 438 events that resulted in interruptions of more than 300 MW or affected at
least 50,000 customers. A summary of the causes of such interruptions is given in Table
2.2 (Hines et al., 2009).
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Table 2.2 Summary of causes of major power outages in the U.S.
(1984 – 2006)

Wind/rain

31.4

Mean MW
lost
679

Equipment failure

19.9

767

248,643

Ice storm

11.1

1664

431,184

Hurricane/tropical storm

10.1

2684

912,870

Other cold weather events

8.8

1045

271,924

Lighting

8.8

794

200,617

Operator error

8.5

1226

358,440

Fire

5.6

972

294,994

Other external cause

3.6

1518

823,691

Tornado

3.6

721

227,073

Supply shortage

2.3

600

896,432

Earthquake

1.6

1124

526,260

Intentional attack

0.7

2154

165,000

Cause of outage

% of events

Mean number of
customers affected
235,840

It can be seen from Table 2.2 that even though hurricanes and tropical storms constitutes
only about 10% of the total number of events, they resulted in the highest damage in terms
of mean megawatts (MW) lost and mean number of customers affected. While earthquakes
constitute only about 1.6% of events, which is second to last, they are 4th in terms of
average number of customers affected and 6th in terms of mean MW lost. Considering only
natural hazards, earthquakes are only second to hurricanes/tropical storms in terms of
number of customers affected and third in terms of MW lost. Generally, natural hazards
result in relatively widespread damage to electric power systems and longer repair times.
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2.2.1 Hurricanes
All circulating weather systems over tropical waters are generally referred to as tropical
cyclones. There are three classes of tropical cyclones: tropical depressions, tropical storms,
and hurricanes. Tropical depressions have maximum sustained winds ≤ 38 mph while
tropical storms have maximum sustained winds of 39 to 73 mph. Hurricanes are intense
systems with a well-defined circulation and maximum sustained winds ≥ 74 mph (NOAA,
2016a). In western pacific, hurricanes are referred to as “typhoons”. All Atlantic and Gulf
coastal areas of the US are prone to hurricanes. On average, the US coastline is hit by five
hurricanes in a typical 3-year period, of which two will be major (≥ category 3) (NOAA,
2016a).
The Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale is used to categorize hurricanes into five categories
based on their 1-minute sustained wind speeds. Table 2.3 shows the five categories of
hurricanes and their range of wind speeds as well as the total number of hurricanes that
directly hit the U.S. between 1851 and 2015 (NOAA, 2016c, 2016b; Jarrell et al., 2001).

Table 2.3: Saffir-Simpson hurricane scale and summary of hurricanes that hit the U.S.
Category

Sustained wind speed
mph
m/s

Number of hurricanes
(1851 – 2015)

1

74 – 95

33 – 42

117

2

96 – 110

43 – 49

76

3

111 – 129

50 – 58

76

4

130 – 156

58 – 70

18

5

≥ 157

> 70

3
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Hurricanes are among the major causes of power outages in the U.S. Since 2002, 58% of
power outages and 87% of outages affecting 50,000 or more customers were caused by
severe weather such as hurricanes, thunderstorms, and blizzards (DOE, 2016). Table 2.4
summarizes hurricanes that damaged the U.S. electric power system and the number of
customers affected (DOE, 2016). Hurricanes rarely affect power generation stations and
cause little to moderate damage to the transmission system. This is because generation and
transmission systems are designed to withstand high wind loads. The distribution system,
however, can be significantly affected by hurricanes. Much of the damage to the
distribution system is done by high winds which can uproot distribution poles and damage
distribution lines due to flying debris or falling trees. For example during the 1989
Hurricane Hugo, falling trees knocked out thousands of distribution poles and lines cutting
power to over 1 million customers (NOAA, 1990).

Table 2.4 Summary of damage to power systems caused by hurricanes
Approximate number

Approximate MW

of customers affected

lost

Hurricane Lily

242,000

Not Reported (NR)

2003

Hurricane Isabel

3.9 million

15,000

2004

Hurricane Charley

2 million

4,200

2004

Hurricane Frances

4.2 million

14,700

2004

Hurricane Ivan

1.3 million

2,000

2004

Hurricane Jeanne

1.2 million

4,300

2005

Hurricane Dennis

278,000

96

2005

Hurricane Katrina

2 million

NR

2005

Hurricane Ophelia

60,000

215

2005

Hurricane Rita

2 million

3,200

2005

Hurricane Wilma

3.7 million

10,800

2008

Hurricane Gustav

1.3 million

NR

2008

Hurricane Ike

5.9 million

NR

2012

Hurricane Isaac

1.4 million

NR

2012

Hurricane Sandy

5.9 million

NR

Year

Hurricane

2002
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2.2.2 Earthquakes
Earthquakes are among the most devastating natural hazards. The extent of damage from
earthquakes depends on population density and level of development of infrastructure such
as power systems in an area. Most of the US has some seismic risk with some areas being
more prone than others. Figure 2.2 shows the U.S. seismic hazard map with PGAs having
a return period of 2475 years (USGS, 2016). As discussed in the previous section, the entire
east coast of the U.S. is vulnerable to hurricane hazard. It can be seen from Figure 2.2 that
some areas on the east coast such as South Carolina are also vulnerable to seismic hazard.
Multi-hazard risk analysis approach is therefore required for such areas.

Figure 2.2 U.S. seismic hazard map (PGA, 2% in 50 years)
[Image courtesy of USGS (2016). See Appendix A]

Earthquakes can cause damage to power generation facilities depending on the intensity of
the earthquake and size of the power plant. Most power plants are usually designed to have
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good seismic resistance. The 1989 San Francisco earthquake caused damage to the Moss
Landing Facility which is a large generating plant located about 20 miles from the epicenter
(U.S. Congress, 1990). Transmission towers are rarely damaged by the actual shaking of
the ground during earthquakes. This is because the towers are designed for severe loads
such as combined wind and ice, extra loads due to the collapse of adjacent towers and so
on. Instead, the damage is mostly due to foundation failures caused by landslides, ground
fracture and liquefaction (Shinozuka et al., 2005).
Substations have several brittle components that have considerable mass which makes
them prone to earthquake damage (Vanzi, 1996; Eidinger & Kempner, 2012). Unanchored
rail-supported transformers in substations can fall from elevated platforms which can result
in severe damage. Lack of adequate slack in conductors connecting equipment is another
source of damage in substations. Current design guidelines require anchoring of substation
equipment to the foundation or first-support, either by welding or bolting. There are,
however, a large number of existing substation equipment across the US that are not
retrofitted and anchored (Knight & Kempner Jr, 2009b). The 1971 San Fernando
earthquake, for example, damaged many high-voltage substations causing power outages
(U.S. Congress, 1990). The 2011 Christchurch earthquake in New Zealand also caused
severe damage to substations due to ground shaking and liquefaction causing a power
outage for several days (Massie & Watson, 2011). Earthquakes usually cause little damage
to distribution lines because of their sizes and nature. A summary of some earthquakes and
resulting damage to electric power systems is shown in Table 2.5.
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Table 2.5 Summary of damage to power systems caused by earthquakes
Year

Earthquake

1989

Loma Prieta earthquake

Approximate number of
customers affected
1.4 million

1994

Northridge earthquake

2.5 million

Dong et al. (2004)

2001

Nisqually earthquake

217,000

Creager et al. (2001)

2003

San Simeon earthquake

109,000

DOE (2016)

2010

Eureka earthquake

28,000

Valencia et al. (2010)

Source
NRC (1994)

2.3 Infrastructure Risk Assessment and Management
In general terms, risk is defined as a measure of probability and severity of harm or adverse
effects (Lowrance, 1976). In the context of infrastructure risk assessment, risk can be
defined as the potential for loss or damage to infrastructure due to exposure to uncertain
hazards. Uncertainties are inherent in both the occurrence of future hazard events as well
as the consequent losses. Prediction of occurrence of hazard events is usually based on
available historical data. Therefore risk analysis is prospective, anticipating scientifically
credible future scenarios (Cardona et al., 2012). Due to uncertainties in both hazard
occurrence and consequent losses, risk analysis of infrastructure is usually based on
probabilistic formulations that incorporate the uncertainties into the risk analysis. In simple
mathematical form, risk can be expressed as (Ayyub et al., 2009):
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 × 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 × 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐

(2.1)

The probability of event is a measure of the likelihood of occurrence of hazard event of a
given intensity and in a given area and time period. It is, therefore, a function of hazard
source, location, and intensity. Vulnerability is the susceptibility of exposed components
or systems to damage. For structures and infrastructure system components, this can be
quantified through fragility analysis. Consequence is the potential loss due to damage
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caused by the hazard. It can be measured in monetary terms, casualties, downtime, or
power outage and duration in the case of electric power systems.
Assessment of risk involves asking three basic questions (Kaplan, 1997):
1. What can go wrong?
2. How likely is it to go wrong (probability/frequency)
3. What are the consequences?

To answer the above three questions in the context of civil infrastructure risk assessment,
the framework in Figure 2.3 is developed. The first stage of any risk assessment involves
identification of any or all hazards that can impact a system and quantifying the hazard in
terms of intensity and frequency. The second stage is exposure analysis which involves
identifying assets that are exposed to the identified hazards. The likelihood of damage and
the consequence of such damage is then quantified. The final stage of the framework
involves evaluating whether the level of risk is within acceptable/tolerable limits. This last
stage of the risk assessment framework leads to the decisions regarding mitigation and
management of risk.

Hazard
identification &
characterization

Identification of
systems and
elements at risk

Vulnerability of
exposed systems
and elements

Consequence
analysis

Risk evaluation:
is level of risk
acceptable?

Figure 2.3 Risk assessment methodology

Risk mitigation involves reducing one or more of the three components of risk in Equation
(1). For infrastructure subjected to natural hazards, reducing the probability of occurrence
of the hazard events is not feasible. Hence, mitigation strategies usually involve reducing
vulnerability and/or consequence. Vulnerability can be reduced by improving the
21

reliability of infrastructure systems through hardening of existing components, introducing
redundancy in the system etc. One way to reduce consequence is to provide alternative to
the exposed infrastructure. For example, microgrids and distributed generation can reduce
power outage during or after natural disasters in case of damage to the main power grid.
Risk management can be summarized in three questions (Haimes, 2015; Ezell et al., 2000):
1. What can be done?
2. What options are available and what are their corresponding cost, risks, and
benefits?
3. What will be the impact of current risk management decisions on future options?

Risk management involves four main steps as shown in Figure 2.4: (1) estimating the level
of risk under the status quo (without mitigation); (2) identifying possible risk mitigation
strategies and their associated cost; (3) re-evaluating risk to estimate reduction in losses
due to mitigation strategies; and (4) calculating the cost-effectiveness of mitigation
measures. The risk management framework shown in Figure 2.4 forms the basis for all the
frameworks developed in this dissertation for different sub-systems of the electric power
system subjected to different natural hazards.

Hazard analysis:
Source
Frequency
Intensity
Vulnerability:
Exposed elements
Likelihood of
damage

Risk
analysis

Mitigation
strategies
selection

Risk
re-evaluation

Consequence of
damage

Figure 2.4 Risk management framework
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Economic
efficiency
calculation

3. System Reliability Model
Civil infrastructure systems are made up of components that work together to serve a
specific purpose. Electric power systems, for example, rely on components in the
generation, transmission, and distribution sub-systems to deliver electricity to customers.
The functionality of the system at any particular time depends on the state of the
components. Therefore, risk analysis of such a system requires consideration of the
interaction among its components.
A critical part of any system-level risk analysis process is quantifying the consequence of
damage to the system. This can be done using various performance measures such as
system reliability. System reliability is defined as the ability of a system to perform a
required function for a stated period of time under given environmental and operating
conditions (Rausand & Høyland, 2004). System reliability theory can be used to assess the
risk to infrastructure systems subjected to natural hazards, evaluate the efficiency of
disaster mitigation methods, design maintenance plans, and design layout of system
components.
For electric power systems, models of performance measure can range from purely
topological-based models to complex alternating current (AC) power flow models.
Topological- or connectivity-based models only consider the manner in which system
components are arranged (topology) to describe the behavior of the system. Physical
constraints that govern power flow within the system is ignored. Power flow-based models,
on the other hand, take into account the physics of power flow, power capacity limits of
components and other engineering details of the system (LaRocca et al., 2014).
Topological-based models have two main advantages: (i) they are computationally
efficient especially for complex systems or in a case where system performance under
various scenarios is desired, and (ii) significantly less data about a system is required to
evaluate reliability. While power flow-based models provide more accurate description of
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system performance, they are computationally complex and often impractical (LaRocca et
al., 2014; Duenas-Osorio & Hernandez-Fajardo, 2008; Kim & Kang, 2013; Cavalieri et al.,
2014; Albert et al., 2004). Furthermore, detail information about engineering properties of
system components is required for such analysis. As this study focuses mainly on structural
components of the power system, which define the topology, the topological-based method
will be used.

3.1 Review of Existing Topological-Based Methods
While topological-based system performance models have not been applied to distribution
systems, few models for transmission (networked) systems have been proposed. Albert et
al. (2004) proposed a measure of system performance termed connectivity loss (CL) for a
grid-like system. The method was developed to investigate the impact of removing nodes
(generators and substations) from the North American power grid and to determine whether
the grid is reliant on a small set of hubs whose removal will cause large-scale breakdown
of the power grid. Nodes are modeled with binary functions, i.e., either functioning or
failed. The connectivity loss is given by Equation (3.1). The connectivity loss measures the
decrease in the ability of a distribution substation to receive power from the generators.
𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷

1
𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖
𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿 = 1 −
�
𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷
𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺

(3.1)

𝑖𝑖

where 𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺 is the total number of generators; 𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷 is the total number of distribution

substations; and 𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 is the number of generators connected to substation i.

LaRocca et al. (2014) introduced a topological-based system performance measure termed
efficiency, which is calculated based on the shortest path between a pair of nodes in a
network. The method was demonstrated by randomly removing nodes and edges from the
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network and studying the impact on efficiency. The efficiency of a network is given by
Equation (3.2).

𝐸𝐸 =

1
𝑁𝑁(𝑁𝑁 − 1)

�

𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹 ,𝑗𝑗∈𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿

1
𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(3.2)

where 𝑁𝑁 is the total number of nodes in the network; 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹 is the set of in-feed nodes; 𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿 is
the set of load nodes; and 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the length of the shortest path between node i and node j.

In another approach, Johansson et al. (2007) used power connection loss (PCL) to evaluate
system performance. PCL, given by Equation (3.3), is defined as the aggregate load at
nodes that do not have any connection to a power source.

𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿 = � 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁

(3.3)

where 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 is the set of nodes that do not have any connection to a power source and 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖

is the load at node i.

The vulnerability of structural components subjected to natural hazards is usually evaluated
using fragility curves. Fragility curves give the probability of failure between 0 and 1 for a
component given a specific hazard level. The probability of failure is, therefore, a
continuous random variable. However, the above methods assigned a probability of failure
or probability that power will not be supplied to customers of either 0 or 1. As such, the
above topological methods fail to capture the true stochastic nature of risk assessment
under natural hazards. In the following two sections, a topological-based method that
overcomes this limitation is presented.
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3.2 Accessibility of System Components
The ability of a component in a system to perform its function depends invariably on its
reliability as well as the reliability of other components. Even if a system component is not
physically damaged after a hazard event, damage to other components can prevent it from
performing its intended function. Accessibility of a component is therefore defined here as
the probability that commodity (power) will be supplied to the component.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the topology of distribution and transmission systems differ
significantly. Most distribution systems have radial topology such as the one shown in
Figure 3.1(a). Power delivery starts from the substation through main feeder lines. The
feeders eventually branched off to smaller lateral lines that deliver power directly to
customers. Transmission systems, on the other hand, have a networked topology with
several paths from one node to another. The accessibilities of the two different topologies
are formulated below.
Substation
Substation

Feeder
(b)

(a)

Figure 3.1 Topology of electric power sub-systems
(a) Distribution system (radial or tree-like) (b) Transmission system (networked or gridlike)
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3.2.1 Radial Systems
In radial distribution systems, a line is defined as a switchable section with one or more
isolator elements at its ends. Isolator elements, commonly known as sectionalizers, are
usually installed at several points within a system so as to allow parts of the system to be
isolated in case of any disturbance at any point along a line (Brown, 2008). The presence
of isolator elements within a distribution system allows each line to be considered
individually as a ‘switchable section’. All components in a switchable section have the
same reliability characteristics and failure of any component have the same impact
regardless of the location of the failed component. Consequently, switchable sections can
be reduced to single component equivalent. A failed line is assumed to be isolated from the
rest of the system by activating the isolator element upstream of the line.
Due to the radial nature of most distribution systems, the accessibility of lines in the system
can be modeled as a series system in which the failure of any line or component along a
path can lead to failure of power delivery to lines downstream of the failed line. Consider
the simple radial system shown in Figure 3.2. The failure probability of power delivery to
each lateral line is calculated by considering power flow. For example, considering line 7,
power will be cut off to the line if line 1, 3, 5, 6 or 7 itself fails. The accessibility of line 7
can, therefore, be represented with the reliability block diagram in Figure 3.3.
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Line 2
Line 1
Line 3

Substation
Sectionalizer
Feeder line
Lateral line

Line 4

Line 5

Line 7
Line 6

Figure 3.2 Schematic of a radial distribution system

1

3

5

6

7

Figure 3.3 Reliability block diagram for power delivery to line 7

The probability that power is not delivered to line 7 (complement of accessibility) is
therefore given by Equation (3.4).
𝑄𝑄𝐿𝐿7 = 1 − ��1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿1 ��1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿3 ��1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿5 ��1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿6 ��1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿7 ��

(3.4)

where 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿1 , 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿3 , 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿5 , 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿6 , and 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿7 are probabilities of failure of lines 1, 3, 5, 6, and 7
respectively. Note that in Equation (3.4), the failures of the lines are independent due to
the isolator elements.
In a situation whereby a line can be supplied by more than one substation as will be seen
in Chapter 6, all paths from source to the line are considered in formulating the
accessibility. In systems with more than one power source, normally open (NO) switches
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are used to maintain the radial nature of the system. If one path of power delivery fails, the
NO switch can be closed to initiate the flow of electricity through alternative paths. For
example, considering the simple schematic in Figure 3.4, power will be cut off to lateral
line 4 if line 3 fails, or both lines 1 and 2 fail, or if line 4 itself fails. Failure of power
delivery to line 4 can be represented with the fault tree diagram in Figure 3.5.

Substation
Sectionalizer
Normally open switch
Line 2
Line 1
Line 3

Line 4
Line 5

Figure 3.4 Simple schematic of distribution system with redundancy

Power not delivered to Line 4
OR gate

Failure of Line 4

Failure of Line 3

Power not delivered to Line 3
AND gate

Failure of Line 1

Failure of Line 2

Figure 3.5 Fault tree diagram for failure of power delivery to Line 4
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The probability that power is not delivered to Line 4 is then calculate using Equation (3.5).
𝑄𝑄𝐿𝐿4 = 1 − ��1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿4 ��1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿3 ��1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿1 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿2 ��

(3.5)

where 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿1 , 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿2 , 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿3 , and 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿4 are probabilities of failure of lines 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively.

3.2.2 Networked Systems
Consider the simple schematic in Figure 3.6 with 2 supply stations (gate stations) and 3
demand substations (low voltage substations). Whether substation S1 remains functional
depends not only on its own reliability but on the reliability of gate stations G1 and G2,
substation S2, as well as transmission lines T1, T3, T4, and T5.

G2
T3

S2

T5

T6

T4

S1

S3
T1
G1

T2

Gate Station
Low voltage substation
Transmission lines

Figure 3.6 Schematic of a networked power system

Now consider a situation where only the edges (transmission lines) are assumed to be
vulnerable to failure. The problem of calculating the probability that power is not delivered
to any node (substation) reduces to a terminal-pair reliability problem. A terminal-pair
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reliability problem aims to determine the probability of successful communication between
any pair of nodes in a network, given the reliability of each edge in the network. In such a
case, the accessibility or terminal-pair reliability of any node (which is the complement of
the probability that power is not delivered to that node) is the union of the reliability of all
the minimal cut sets from supply nodes to the node in question.
A cut set here is defined as the set of components such that if these components fail, the
system fails (i.e., power is not delivered to the intended node). A cut set is minimal if, when
any component is removed from the set, the remaining components collectively are no
longer a cut set.
Considering power delivery to S1 and only edge failure, there are three paths for power
flow to S1: (i) through T1, (ii) through T3, and (iii) through T5 and T4. Failure of a
combination of one element from each path will result in power not being delivered to S1.
The minimal cut sets are, therefore:
1. T1, T3, and T4
2. T1, T3, and T5
In other words, the system will fail if T1, T3, and T4 fail OR if T1, T3, and T5 fail.
Defining the probabilities of failure of T1, T3, T4, and T5 as 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1 , 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3 , 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓4 , and 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓5 ,

respectively, and assuming failure of the lines to be independent, the probability that power
will not be delivered to S1 is then:
𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆1 = �𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓4 � ∪ �𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓5 �
Denoting �𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓4 � as P(A) and �𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓5� as P(B),
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(3.6)

𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆1 = 𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴 ∪ 𝐵𝐵) = 1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴 ∪ 𝐵𝐵)

(3.7)

𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆1 = 1 − 𝑃𝑃�𝐴𝐴̅ ∩ 𝐵𝐵� = 1 − [1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴)] ∙ [1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝐵𝐵)]

(3.8)

From de Morgan’s rule,

A and B (minimal cut sets) in the above equation are assumed to be independent. This will
be clarified later. Substituting A and B with the original probabilities,
𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆1 = 1 − �1 − �𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓4 �� ∙ �1 − �𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓5 ��

(3.9)

The terminal-pair reliability of S1, which is the complement of 𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆1 is then
𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇 = 1 − 𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆1 = ��1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓4 ��1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓5 ��

(3.10)

Considering a situation where only the nodes (substations) are assumed to be vulnerable to
failure, power will not be delivered to S1 when S1 itself fails or when both G1 and G2 fail.
The probability that power is not delivered to S1 is then given by Equation (3.11) based
on the minimal cut sets from source nodes to S1.
𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆1_𝑠𝑠 = 1 − ��1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1 ��1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2 ��

(3.11)

In a situation where both the nodes and edges are vulnerable to failure, the minimal cut sets
for power delivery to S1 are:
1. S1
2. G1 and G2
3. G1, T3, and T5
4. G1, T3, and S2
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5. G1, T3, and T4
6. T1 and G2
7. T1, T3, and T5
8. T1, T3, and S2
9. T1, T3, and T4
The probability that power will not be delivered to S1 is then given by:
𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆1 = �𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1 � ∪ �𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2 � ∪ �𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓5 � ∪ �𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2 �

∪ �𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓4 � ∪ �𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1 � ∪ �𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓5 �

(3.12)

∪ �𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2 � ∪ �𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓4 �

where 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1 and 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2 are the probabilities of failure of S1 and S2, respectively; 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1 and

𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2 are the probabilities of failure of G1 and G2, respectively. Using the same steps as
before, it can be shown that 𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆1 is given by Equation (3.13) considering both node and

edge failure.

𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆1 = 1 − ��1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1 ��1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2 ��1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓5 ��1

− 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2 ��1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓4 ��1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1 ��1

(3.13)

− 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓5 ��1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2 ��1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓4 ��
Note that in formulating Equations (3.10), (3.11) & (3.13), it was assumed that the failure
of minimal cut sets occurs independently. This is not always true as one component may
appear in several minimal cuts. Therefore, system reliability evaluated using the formulated
accessibilities (probability of power being delivered) in Equations (3.10), (3.11) & (3.13),
will be the lower bound of the actual reliability. It has been shown that for coherent systems
with components that have small probabilities of failure, which is often the case in practice,
the lower bound of the reliability is very close to the actual reliability (Esary & Proschan,
1963). Coherent systems are defined as systems in which (i) if all components are
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functioning, the system is functioning, (ii) if all components are in a failed state, then the
system failed, and (iii) higher components’ reliability implies higher system reliability.

3.3 Topological-Based System Reliability Formulation
Given the accessibilities of system components, a single measure of system reliability is
required. A simple topological-based approach is to use the weighted reliabilities of system
components (Volkanovski et al., 2009). The system reliability is thus given by Equation
(3.14).
𝑁𝑁

𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 = 1 − � 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖=1

𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖
𝐶𝐶

(3.14)

where 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 is the probability that power is not delivered to the ith component (lateral lines

or demand substations); 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 is the load served by ith component (kVA, kW, or number of
customers); 𝐶𝐶 is the total load served by the system (kVA, kW, or number of customers);

and 𝑁𝑁 is the total number of demand components in the system. 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 as evaluated in the

previous section explicitly considers the actual probability of failure of each component in
a system.
If detailed information about customer power consumption is available, then 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 and 𝐶𝐶 can

be defined as the average power supplied by ith component and the average total power
supplied by the system, respectively. Doing this will ensure that a line that supplies one
customer for example with high power consumption will have a relatively similar effect on
system reliability with a line that serves several customers with low power demand.
However, due to the varying nature of power consumption, the reliability can only be
evaluated using average power consumptions or at a particular time instant.
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3.4 Line Failure Model
Failure of distribution and transmission lines here is defined as service failure which is the
inability of a line to deliver power to the intended target. Service failure is assumed to occur
when the conductor wires are dropped to the ground. For distribution lines, the failure
model proposed by Taras et al. (2004) is adopted and is explained here. A distribution line
is defined as a switchable section with isolator elements at its ends.
Consider the distribution line shown in Figure 3.7, service failure is defined as the failure
of two consecutive poles in a system of three poles. Failure of 2 consecutive poles in any
line constitutes service failure regardless of the total number of poles in the line. In the
model, a ‘system of 3 poles’ in a line of n poles is considered because the failure of a central
pole, i, can cause the failure of either of the adjacent poles (i+1 or i-1). The failure of the
adjacent poles is conditional on the failure of the central pole.

i-1
Adjacent

i
Central Pole

i+1
Adjacent

Figure 3.7 Distribution line model
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To determine the probability of service failure in a system of three poles, the following are
defined Taras et al. (2004):

•

Probability of service failure of a system with three poles is defined as 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼

•

Probability of failure of the central pole “i” is defined by 𝑃𝑃(𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ) ≡ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖

Probability of failure of an adjacent pole conditional on the failure of the central

•

pole is defined by 𝑃𝑃(𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖−1 |𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ) = 𝑃𝑃(𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖+1 |𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ) ≡ 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎

•

The conditional probability of failure of the adjacent poles is evaluated by
increasing their applied load by 50% to account for load sharing after the failure of
the central pole. Note that increasing the load means increasing the wind pressure
area or the ground line moment, rather than increasing the wind speed.

The probability of service failure in the system with three poles is:
𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 = 𝑃𝑃(𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ) ∙ 𝑃𝑃[(𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖−1 ∪ 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖+1 )|𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ]

(3.15)

𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 = 𝑃𝑃(𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ) ∙ {𝑃𝑃[𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖−1 |𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ] + 𝑃𝑃[𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖+1 |𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ] − 𝑃𝑃[(𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖−1 ∩ 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖+1 )|𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ]}

(3.16)

𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 = 𝑃𝑃(𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ) ∙ {𝑃𝑃[𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖−1|𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ] + 𝑃𝑃[𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖+1|𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ] − 𝑃𝑃[(𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖−1 |𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 )] ∙ 𝑃𝑃[(𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖+1 |𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 )]}

(3.17)

𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 = 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ∙ {2𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 − 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎2 }

(3.18)

Assuming that the failures of the adjacent poles are independent of each other, then

The above equation can be rewritten as:

Equation (3.18) is applied to each pole along a line. The number of all possible failure
modes in a line is the same as the number of poles in the line. Assuming all failure modes
are fully independent, the overall failure probability of an entire line is given by Equation
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(3.19). This is also the upper bound of the probability of failure. If all the failure modes are
fully dependent, the probability of failure is the lower bound given by Equation (3.20).
Note that the exact failure probability of a line lies between the given bounds.
Determination of the exact failure probability requires a knowledge of the correlation
coefficient between poles in a line which can vary depending on the location of each pole
relative to a failed pole. In subsequent life cycle cost analysis in this study, the upper bound
of the probability of failure of the lines is used so as to be conservative.

𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏:

𝑚𝑚

(3.19)

𝑖𝑖=1

(3.20)

𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 = 1 − �[1 − 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 ]

𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏:

𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 = max[𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 ]

where 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 is the probability of failure of an entire line and m is the total number of poles

in the line. Using the above concept, the probabilities of failure of the lines in a power

system can be calculated. The reliability of a line is the complement of the probability of
failure.
Transmission line ends are assumed to be between two substations, between a substation
and a branching point, or between any two branching points. The span between support
structures of transmission lines is usually long enough that the failure of one support
structure will lead to service failure of the line. This is unlike in distribution system where
the spans are relatively short and the failure of one pole may not necessarily lead to service
failure of the line. If a transmission line is modeled as a series system, the lower bound of
the probability of failure of the line is obtained by assuming that the failure modes are fully
dependent. The upper bound, on the other hand, is obtained by assuming that the failure
modes are fully independent. The lower and upper bounds of the probability of failure are
given by Equation (3.21).
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𝑁𝑁

𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚[𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 ] ≤ 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿 ≤ 1 − �[1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 ]

(3.21)

𝑖𝑖=1

where 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 is the probability of failure of the line; 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 is the probability of failure of a single

support structure; and N is the total number of support structures in the line. In this research,

full independence is assumed between the modes and hence the upper limit in Equation
(3.21) is used for evaluating transmission line failure. This is reasonable due to the long
span between structures.
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4. Targeted Hardening of Distribution Systems Subjected to
Hurricanes 1
4.1 Introduction
Over the years, several methods of hardening the distribution system have been studied.
One of the methods studied extensively is undergrounding the system (e.g. Francis et al.
(2011), Brown (2009), Xu and Brown (2008b), CVSCC (2004), FPSC (2005), LIPA
(2005), TDA (2006)). However, most of these studies concluded that undergrounding is
not cost-effective. Another method being currently studied is targeted hardening of current
overhead distribution systems. Targeted hardening involves strengthening important
support structures as well as structures with very high probability of failure. Important
structures include distribution poles that serve a large number of customers, poles that serve
critical customers (hospitals, fire stations, police stations, economic centers) and poles that
are difficult to access. Brown (2009) studied the hardening of 10% of distribution poles in
Texas and estimated the net benefit derived from it. Bjarnadottir et al. (2014) studied
targeted hardening of distribution poles in Florida by replacing poles that fail with poles
that are one class higher.
The above studies did not attempt to identify risk-critical parts of the system to be
strengthened or evaluate the effect of the targeted hardening on overall system reliability.
To determine the critical parts or components of a system, some form of component
importance measure is required. This, in turn, requires evaluating the reliability of the
whole system. However, previous studies (e.g. Han et al. (2013), Shafieezadeh et al.
(2014a), Bjarnadottir et al. (2013), Ryan et al. (2014b)) conducted on the vulnerability of
distribution systems to hurricane and extreme wind damage focuses on evaluating the
reliabilities of individual poles rather than the whole system.
1
A version of this chapter was previously published in Reliability Engineering & System Safety and is reused herein with permission from Elsevier. The permission is presented in Appendix B.

39

This chapter presents and demonstrates a framework that can be used to evaluate the
effectiveness of targeted hardening measures. The framework includes fragility analysis
considering decay of poles, hurricane hazard analysis, system reliability evaluation,
component importance measure, and cost analysis. The flow chart of the general
framework is shown in Figure 4.1. The framework is explained and demonstrated at the
same time using a notional power distribution system.
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Define Distribution System

Hurricane Hazard Analysis

Evaluate Fragility of Poles Considering Decay

Select Probabilistic- or Scenario-Based
Analysis

Evaluate System Reliability
Evaluate Component Importance Index

Define Required Improvement in
System Reliability

Select Targeted Hardening Measure

Re-evaluate System Reliability

No

Required
Improvement Met?

Yes
Perform Cost Analysis

No

Strategy Cost
Effective?

Yes
Yes

Compare with Other
Strategies?

No
FINISH

Figure 4.1 Flowchart of proposed framework
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4.2 Power Distribution System Model
The power system model adopted for demonstrating the framework is shown in Figure 4.2.
It is the power system of a virtual city called “Micropolis” developed at Texas A&M
University for use in infrastructure risk research and planning (Brumbelow et al., 2007;
Bagchi, 2009; Bagchi et al., 2009). The city has approximately 5000 residents in a
historically rural region. The city is assumed to be located on the east coast of Florida, with
the middle of the city located at 27.6oN and 80.4oW. The city has one substation supplied
by a sub-transmission line (138 kV rating) running through the city. Two three-phase
feeders emanate from the substation to deliver power to the entire city by branching off to
smaller three-phase sub-branches and single-phase laterals. The dots in Figure 4.2 represent
the poles while the conductor wires are represented by solid lines. Most of the left side of
the city is served by an underground system. However, in this research, the underground
system is transformed to an overhead system so that the entire system can be considered.
Figure 4.2 only shows poles carrying distribution transformers and directly serving
customers. However, the city is approximately 2 miles by 1 mile. Therefore, there are a lot
more poles in the city than shown in Figure 4.2. The number of poles in each line is found
based on the span of the poles which is taken as 46 m as will be discussed subsequently.
The total number of poles in the city is approximately 661. The total circuit line is
approximately 30.3 km. There are an estimated 434 residential, 15 industrial, and 9
commercial/institutional customers in the city including 3 schools and 3 churches
(Brumbelow et al., 2007). Figure 4.3 shows the line diagram of the power distribution
system. The system is assumed to be radially operated at all times. Radially operated
implies there is a unique path from the source of power to each component or customer.
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Figure 4.2 Micropolis power distribution system
[© IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from Bagchi et al. (2009). Modeling the impact of fire
spread on the electrical distribution network of a virtual city. Paper presented at the North
American Power Symposium (NAPS), 2009. See Appendix C]

Figure 4.3 Micropolis power distribution system line diagram
[© IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from Bagchi et al. (2009). Modeling the impact of fire
spread on the electrical distribution network of a virtual city. Paper presented at the North
American Power Symposium (NAPS), 2009. See Appendix C]
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4.3 Design of Poles
The poles supporting the distribution lines are assumed to be southern pine wood poles as
they are the dominant used in the U.S. (Gustavsen & Rolfseng, 2000; Wolfe & Moody,
1997). The poles are designed using the reliability-based method recommended by ASCE111 (2006). Figure 4.4 shows the distribution poles layout. A typical distribution pole that
is 13.7 m high is considered. The three-phase main feeder poles are assumed to support
three Aluminum Conductor Steel Reinforced (ACSR) conductor wires with diameters of
18.3 mm. They are also assumed to support one all-aluminum conductor (AAC) neutral
wire with a diameter of 11.8 mm. The single-phase laterals are assumed to support two
ACSR conductor wires and one AAC neutral wire. All the poles are assumed to have a
span of 46 m for wind pressure calculations (Short, 2006).

0.3 m

3 Conductors

1.2 m

0.3 m

1 Neutral

11.4 m
10.2 m

Ground line

Ground line
2m

(b)

(a)

Figure 4.4 Distribution poles layout
(a) three-phase line poles (b) single-phase line poles
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The poles are designed for NESC (2002) grade C construction for weather-related loads
which are often the controlling conditions (ASCE-111, 2006). The design equation that
controls reliability of weather-related events is given by (ASCE-111, 2006):
𝜙𝜙𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛 > 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 [1.1𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝛾𝛾𝑄𝑄50 ]

(4.1)

where ϕ is strength factor, Rn is the nominal strength, DL is dead loads, γ is load factor, and
Q50 is 50-year return period wind load. The design 50-year return period 3-sec gust wind
speed for the chosen location is about 52 m/s based on ASCE-7 (2010). Based on the wind
speed, the wind force acting on the pole and the wires can be calculated using Equation
(4.2) from ASCE-74 (1991). ASCE-111 (2006) recommends the use of this equation for
both transmission and distribution support structures.
𝐹𝐹 = 𝑄𝑄𝐾𝐾𝑧𝑧 𝐾𝐾𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 (𝑉𝑉)2 𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓 𝐴𝐴

(4.2)

where F is force (N), Q is air density factor, Kz is exposure coefficient, V is basic 3-sec
gust wind speed, G is gust response factor, Cf is force or drag coefficient, Kzt is topographic
factor, and A is the area projected on a plane normal to the wind direction (m2). To account
for P-Δ effect, ASCE-111 (2006) recommends using the method developed by Gere and
Carter (1962). The method involves determining an amplification factor to account for the
P-Δ effect. The amplification factor is given by Equation (4.3).

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 =

1

(4.3)

𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉
1 − �𝑃𝑃 �
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐

where VL is total factored vertical load, Pcr is buckling load given by Equation (4.4).
2.7

𝜋𝜋 2 × 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 × 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝐷𝐷𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = �
��
�
[2𝐿𝐿]2 × 144
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
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(4.4)

where MOE is the mean modulus of elasticity, Itop is the moment of inertia at top of pole,
L is the distance from the ground line to centroid of horizontal loads, Dbottom and Dtop are
the bottom and top diameters, respectively. Class 4 and class 5 southern pine poles are
initially assumed to be sufficient for the three-phase and single-phase lines respectively.
The values of the variables in Equation 4.2 are given in Table 4.1 while the parameters
related to the poles are given in Table 4.2. Note that the initial strength and geometry of
the poles are found in ANSI-O5.1 (2002). Comparing the required and actually ground line
circumferences from Table 4.2, it can be seen that the class 4 and class 5 southern pine
poles are adequate for the three-phase and single-phase lines, respectively as assumed.

Table 4.1 Design variables
variable

Mean values for pole

Mean values for wires

G

0.948

0.85

Cf

0.9

1.0

Kz

0.951

1.029

Q

0.613

0.613

Kzt

1.0

1.0

A (m2)

2.644 for class 4 and 2.439 for 0.842 per conductor
class 5

and 0.543 for neutral
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Table 4.2 Poles parameters
Three-phase

Single-phase

poles

poles

Strength, Rn (MPa)

55.2

55.2

Strength factor, 𝜙𝜙

0.79

0.79

Top circumference (m)

0.53

0.48

Circumference at 1.8 m from butt (m)

0.89

0.83

Total ground line moment (N-m)

69,212

55,760

Amplification factor

1.1

1.1

Parameter

Design ground line moment (N-m) (Amp factor * total GLM) 76,133

61,336

Required section modulus (m3)

0.00175

0.00141

Required circumference at ground line (m)

0.82

0.763

Actual circumference at ground line (m)

0.884

0.824

4.4 Decay of Wood Poles
Wood poles are susceptible to decay due to fungal attack and are also vulnerable to attack
by insects and woodpeckers. Decay usually occurs at the ground level or just below the
ground. The rate of decay of wood depends on several factors such as timber species,
climatic conditions (temperature, rainfall, and humidity), initial preservative treatment, and
nature of fungal/insect attack. This means that any decay model can only be an
approximation. The decay model from Li et al. (2005) and Shafieezadeh et al. (2014b) is
adopted in this research. The strength of poles as a function of time is given by Equation
(4.5).
𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜 [1 − min(max(𝑎𝑎1 𝑡𝑡 − 𝑎𝑎2 , 0) , 1) × min(max(𝑏𝑏1 𝑡𝑡 𝑏𝑏2 , 0) , 1)]

(4.5)

where R(t) is the strength at time t, Ro is the initial strength. The values of 𝑎𝑎1 , 𝑎𝑎2 , 𝑏𝑏1 , and
𝑏𝑏2 were found from regression analysis as 0.014418, 0.10683, 1.3 x 10-4, and 1.846
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respectively by Li et al. (2005) and Shafieezadeh et al. (2014b). Figure 4.5 shows the
residual strength remaining as a function of time for southern pine poles calculated using
Equation (4.5). According to the NESC (2002), wood poles should be replaced or
reinforced when their strength falls below 67% of the initial strength. From Figure 4.5, this
will happen when the poles are around 73 years old. The long service life of the poles from
the decay model might be because the poles used to develop the model are in-service poles

% of strength remaining

that have undergone periodic maintenance.
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Figure 4.5 Residual strength of poles as a function of time

Shafieezadeh et al. (2014b) also used the data from Li et al. (2005) to plot the variation of
c.o.v of southern pine poles with age. The plot showed that as the poles age, the uncertainty
in the strength increases. The figure developed by Shafieezadeh et al. (2014b) is used to
obtain the c.o.v of the pole strength at different ages in this study. The above decay model
has shortcomings because it does not incorporate variation in soil properties as well as
variation in decay rate due to wood specie. Due to these shortcomings, location-specific
models can be developed by utility companies to obtain more accurate results.
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4.5 Fragility Analysis
Fragility analysis is required to calculate the probability of failure of the power lines.
Fragility is the probability of failure of a structure subjected to a given load. Monte Carlo
simulation is used to calculate the probabilities of failure of the poles while varying the
basic 3-sec gust wind speed. For each random variable with uncertainty, 1,000,000 random
values were generated. Only flexural failure due to wind load is considered in the analysis.
It is acknowledged that other failure mechanisms such as foundation failure and failure
caused by falling trees and flying debris are also important in practice. However, there is a
lack of data to include these failure mechanisms in the structural reliability formulation. If
such data become available, these failure mechanisms can be easily included.
The probabilities of failure were calculated by counting the number of cases where the
stress demand at the ground line exceeds the corresponding stress capacity. Even though
the poles are tapered, the critical stress for short poles, such as the ones normally used in
distribution systems, is commonly at the ground line (ASCE-111, 2006). The limit state
function for the fragility analysis is given by:
𝐺𝐺(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑆𝑆

(4.6)

where R(t) is the strength of the poles at any time t and S is the stress demand at the ground
line caused by wind speed. The steps of the fragility analysis are summarized in the flow
chart of Figure 4.6.
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System Component Definition:
Define failure mode, probability distribution of
random variables, and moments

Select number of simulations, n.
For simulation i, generate random numbers
for each random variable related to both
strength and applied load

Evaluate strength and applied load
i = i+1
Evaluate limit state function,
G = capacity - load

No

i = n?

Yes
Sum all instances where G < 0.
Evaluate probability of failure
= Sum (G<0)/n

End MCS

Figure 4.6 Fragility analysis flowchart

The initial strength of the poles is determined from ANSI-O5.1 (2002) while the strength
as the system ages is determined by considering decay of the poles as described previously.
The stress due to applied wind load is determined using the force from Equation ((4.2). The
uncertain parameters related to the pole strength and applied stress and their c.o.v are
summarized in Table 4.3.
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Table 4.3 Strength and load parameters and their statistics
Random variable

Probability
distribution

c.o.v

Source

Fiber Strength (kPa)

Lognormal

Varies with time

Shafieezadeh et al. (2014b)

Pole Height above ground (m)

Normal

0.03

Assumed

Wind Area (m2)

Normal

0.06

Wolfe and Moody (1997)

G

Normal

0.11

Ellingwood and Tekie (1999)

Cf

Normal

0.12

Ellingwood and Tekie (1999)

Kz

Normal

0.06

ASCE-111 (2006)

The fragility curves of the poles at different ages are shown in Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8.
It can be seen that because of decay, the probabilities of failure given wind speed increases
as the poles age. It can also be seen that compared to the three-phase poles, the singlephase poles have slightly lower probabilities of failure even though they have a slightly
smaller ground line diameter. This is because the single-phase poles carry fewer conductors
as shown in Figure 4.4.
Overhead lateral lines use pole-mounted distribution transformers (DTs) to serve
customers. Typical 25kVA rated DTs are assumed to serve most of the customers in
Micropolis and each DT is assumed to serve an average of four customers (Gonen, 2014).
It is acknowledged that higher rated transformers are required for few of the customers in
the city such as churches and industrial buildings. For a lateral line like line 20 in Figure
4.2 and Figure 4.3 which serves 48 residential customers and is about 1.4 km long, it has
12 poles carrying DTs out of a total of about 30 poles. Based on information from
commercially available pole mounted DTs, the DTs on the poles are assumed to be 0.39 m
in diameter, 0.61 m in cylinder height, and weighing about 160 kg.
Fragility curves of new and 60-year-old single-phase poles carrying DTs are shown in
Figure 4.8. It can be seen that the presence of DTs slightly increases the probabilities of
failure at different wind speeds. For example, at a wind speed of 60 m/s, new lateral line
poles without DTs have a probability of failure of 0.19 compared to 0.22 for new poles
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with DTs. For poles that are 60 years old, the probability of failure at 60 m/s with and
without DTs is 0.56 and 0.60, respectively.
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Figure 4.7 Fragility curves of three-phase line poles at 0, 20, 40, and 60 years
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Figure 4.8 Fragility curves of single-phase line poles at 0, 20, 40, and 60 years
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The lognormal distribution is assumed to describe the fragility models as recommended by
Bjarnadottir et al. (2013). A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was carried out to confirm this
assumption. The lognormal CDF is given by:

𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅 (𝑣𝑣) = 𝛷𝛷 �

𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑣𝑣/𝑚𝑚)
�
𝜁𝜁

(4.7)

where m is the median of the fragility function, and ζ is the logarithmic standard deviation
of intensity measure.

4.6 Hurricane Risk Assessment
There are two ways to assess hurricane risk (Li, 2012). The first method is probabilistic
hurricane analysis where historical hurricane records are used to develop probability
density function for key hurricane parameters such as the location of origin, translation
speed, heading angle, central pressure, and radius to maximum wind location. Monte Carlo
simulation is then performed to simulate future hurricanes which can be used to estimate
maximum wind speeds as demonstrated by Vickery et al. (2000b). The wind speed from
the above simulation is then modeled as a random variable and convolved with fragility
model to assess the risk of structures or components as demonstrated by Li and Ellingwood
(2006).
The second method is a scenario-based approach where the effect of a specific simulated
or historical hurricane is studied rather than the aggregated effect of all possible hurricanes
as in the previous approach. Another difference between the two methods is that
probabilistic analysis considers the probability of occurrence of different levels of
hurricanes while scenario-based analysis assumes a selected level of hurricane (e.g. 200year return period hurricane or category 4 hurricane).
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4.6.1 Probabilistic Analysis
Using the probabilistic analysis, the annual probability of failure of the poles is estimated
by convolving the structural fragility with a hurricane wind speed model as proposed by Li
and Ellingwood (2006). The annual probability of failure is given by:
∞

𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 = � 𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅 (𝑣𝑣)𝑓𝑓𝑣𝑣 (𝑣𝑣)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
0

(4.8)

where FR(v) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the structural fragility and
fv(v) is the probability density function (PDF) of the hurricane wind speed. Vickery et al.
(2000b) conducted simulations of hurricanes and proposed that the Weibull distribution is
appropriate for hurricane wind speed prediction. The PDF of the Weibull equation is given
by:

𝑓𝑓𝑣𝑣 (𝑣𝑣) =

𝛼𝛼 𝑣𝑣 𝛼𝛼−1
𝑣𝑣 𝛼𝛼
� �
exp �− � � �
𝑢𝑢 𝑢𝑢
𝑢𝑢

(4.9)

where v is the wind speed, and u and α are the parameters of the Weibull distribution. The
wind speed v, is related to the return period (T) of the hurricane by:
1

1 𝛼𝛼
𝑣𝑣 = 𝑢𝑢 �− ln � ��
𝑇𝑇

(4.10)

The 50, 100, 250, and 500-year return period 3-s gust wind speeds for the chosen location
are estimated to be 56, 60, 67, and 72 m/s, respectively from Vickery et al. (2009b). The
Weibull parameters are then calculated using Equation (4.10) as u = 26.7 and α = 1.85.
The annual probabilities of failure of the poles considering decay over time are calculated
and plotted in Figure 4.9. It can be seen from the figure that the annual probabilities of
failure increase with age due to decay of the poles. It can also be seen that the presence of
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distribution transformers (DTs) has little effect on the annual probability of failure of the
single-phase poles. For subsequent analysis, the fragility results of lateral line poles without
DTs will be used as they are the dominant network vulnerability.
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Figure 4.9 Annual probability of failure with age

4.6.2 Scenario-Based Analysis
Hurricane Jeanne has been selected for demonstrating the proposed framework. Hurricane
Jeanne became a tropical storm on 14 September 2004 and made landfall on the east coast
of Florida on 26 September as a category 3 hurricane (Lawrence & Cobb, 2005). Hurricane
track data and recorded wind speeds are obtained from the North Atlantic Hurricane
Database (HURDAT) from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA, 2015b) website. The database provides the location (latitude and longitude) as
well as the maximum wind speed and central pressure of the hurricane mostly at 6-hour
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intervals. However, accurate analysis of a relatively small area such as the study area, in
this case, cannot be done considering 6-hour intervals as the hurricane can cover a long
distance within this period.
To obtain finer records of the hurricane wind speeds and central pressure, the 6-hour
records are interpolated linearly to obtain 30-minute interval records. Linear interpolation
has been shown to produce accurate results (Jayaram & Baker, 2010). At every time instant,
the wind speed at any location from the hurricane eye can be determined using the windfield model developed by Holland (1980) as:
1�
2

𝐵𝐵
𝑅𝑅
⎡ 𝑅𝑅
𝐵𝐵 𝐵𝐵∆𝑝𝑝 exp �− � 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 � �
𝑟𝑟 2 𝑓𝑓 2 ⎤
𝑟𝑟
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
⎢
⎥
𝑉𝑉𝐺𝐺 = �
� �
�+
𝜌𝜌
4 ⎥
⎢ 𝑟𝑟
⎣
⎦

−

𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
2

(4.11)

where Rmax is the radius to maximum wind speed, r is the distance from hurricane eye to
point of interest, determined using the Haversine formula, B is the Holland parameter, Δp
is the central pressure difference, ρ is air density (1.15 kg/m3), and f is the Coriolis
parameter. Rmax, B, and f are given by (FEMA, 2011; Powell et al., 2005):
ln 𝑅𝑅max. = 2.556 − 0.000050255∆𝑝𝑝2 + 0.042243032𝜓𝜓

(4.12)

𝑓𝑓 = 2Ω sin 𝜑𝜑

(4.14)

𝐵𝐵 = 1.881 − 0.00557𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 0.010917𝜓𝜓,

𝜎𝜎𝐵𝐵 = 0.286

(4.13)

where ψ is the storm latitude, Δp is the central pressure difference, Ω is the earth’s angular
velocity (7.292 x 10-5 rad/s), and φ is the local latitude. The HURDAT data provides the
central pressure for the hurricanes at each time step. The central pressure difference, Δp, is
found by subtracting the central pressure from atmospheric pressure at a distance beyond
the effect of the hurricane which is typically 1,013 millibars (Xu & Brown, 2008b; Wang
& Rosowsky, 2012).
56

The gradient wind speed above is converted to surface wind speed using a factor of 0.8
(Vickery et al., 2009a; Vickery et al., 2000a). However, structural damage is more related
to peak gust wind speed which is the maximum instantaneous wind speed. Therefore, a
gust factor is needed to convert the surface wind speed. The gust model developed by
Engineering Sciences Data Unit (ESDU, 1982, 1983) has been shown to be adequate for
modeling gust factors (Xu & Brown, 2008b). Xu and Brown (2008b) conducted a 1000year simulation to estimate the 3-sec gust factor using the ESDU model and found that the
distribution of the calculated values of the factor is highly concentrated around 1.287 with
a standard deviation of 0.002. This value has been adopted for use in this research.
The study area, in this case, is relatively small compared to the size of the hurricane.
Consequently, the variation of wind speed across the study area is very minimal. Therefore,
only the maximum wind speed at the middle of the power distribution system is considered
and all the poles are assumed to be subjected to this particular wind speed. Figure 4.10
shows the variation of the surface wind speed at the middle of the distribution system at
various time intervals as the hurricane travels along its track.
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Figure 4.10 Surface wind speed variation at the center of study area
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4.7 System Reliability Evaluation
The system reliability model presented in Chapter 3 is used here. The reliability of line 33
(which has 19 poles) in Figure 4.3 over time is plotted in Figure 4.11 as an example using
the lower and upper bounds of the probabilities of failure of the line from probabilistic
hurricane analysis. As expected, the reliability decreases over time as the poles in the line
decay. The lower and upper bounds of the probabilities of failure of line 33 for the scenariobased hurricane analysis are 0.53 and 1.00 respectively, calculated assuming the hurricane
strikes when the poles are new. It should be noted that failure of cross arms is neglected in
the above analysis. The probabilities of failure of end poles are also ignored since they are
an order of magnitude smaller than the probabilities of failure of intermediate poles.
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Figure 4.11 Reliability of line 33 with age using probabilistic hurricane analysis

As stated earlier, there are an estimated 434 residential, 15 industrial, and 9
commercial/institutional customers in the Micropolis including 3 schools and 3 churches.
Industrial customers are served by line 9 while commercial centers are concentrated around
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line 44 as can be seen from Figure 4.2. Three-phase feeder lines branched off to singlephase laterals to deliver power to the customers through ‘service drops’ from distribution
transformers. For simplicity sake, Bagchi et al. (2009) categorized the amount of load
consumed by customers in Micropolis into few distinct profiles with all customers
belonging to each profile having a fixed load demand (kVA) all through the year. However,
in this research, new average demand has been assigned to each customer group based on
the average power consumption of customers of a utility company in Florida obtained from
EIA (2013). It is assumed that all customers have a fixed demand shown in Table 4.4
throughout the year. Based on the fixed consumption, the load served by each line is the
sum of all loads downstream of the line.

Table 4.4 Load profiles for consumers across Micropolis
Customer type

Consumption

Residential

1.5kW/h

City churches

5kW/h

City schools

10kW/h

Industrial (Feeder 1)

39.4kW/h

Central business district (Feeder 2)

10.1kW/h

Feeder 1 total

1,334kW/h

Feeder 2 total

394kW/h

System total

1,728kW/h

The system reliability is plotted in Figure 4.12 using the annual probabilities of failure
calculated using probabilistic hurricane analysis. The system reliability is calculated using
both the upper and lower bounds of probabilities of failure of the lines evaluated
previously. The system reliability using the upper bounds is 97.8% and 60.2% at 0 and 70
years respectively. Using the lower bounds, the reliability is 99.6% and 96.8% at 0 and 70
years respectively. The system reliability for the event-based analysis was calculated to be
15.3% and 3.2% for the lower and upper bounds of line failures respectively.
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Figure 4.12 System reliability with age using probabilistic hurricane analysis

4.8 Component Importance Index
In a given system, some components are more important for the reliability of the system
than others. Determining the relative importance of all components/lines in the distribution
system is essential for targeted hardening. The component importance index is usually used
in probabilistic risk assessment to identify components and subsystems whose reliability
need to be improved to reduce risk to the whole system (Rausand & Høyland, 2004). One
of the methods of evaluating the relative importance of system components is risk
achievement worth (RAW). RAW is a measure of the “worth” of component i in achieving
system reliability. It is defined as the ratio of the conditional system unreliability if
component i has failed to the actual system unreliability. RAW of component i is defined
as (Rausand & Høyland, 2004):

𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) =

1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 (𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 = 1)
1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆

𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛𝑛
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(4.15)

where 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 (𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 = 1) is the system reliability when component (line) i has failed while 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 is
the reliability of the original system. The risk achievement worth of all the lines in the
system is calculated using the upper bounds of line failures when the poles are new and
presented in Figure 4.13.
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Figure 4.13 Risk achievement worth of lines

It can be seen from Figure 4.13 that as expected, lines with higher loads have higher risk
achievement worth. The main feeder lines have higher RAW than the laterals because the
delivery of power to the laterals depends on the reliability of the feeder lines. For example,
line 1 has the highest RAW because the delivery of power to all the laterals on feeder 1
depends on the reliability of line 1. Line 9 on the other hand, have a relatively high RAW
because it serves an industrial area with high power consumption. This will guide decisionmaking when selecting the part of the system to be strengthened.
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4.9 Targeted Hardening Strategies
Three strategies will be considered to demonstrate the proposed framework. These are:
i.

Strategy 1: Hardening only the main feeder lines

ii.

Strategy 2: Hardening all lines with RAW ≥ 2.5

iii.

Strategy 3: Hardening all lines

In all the above three cases, hardening means using a pole that is one class higher than that
designed previously. This means using class 3 and 4 poles instead of class 4 and 5 for the
three-phase main feeder lines and single-phase laterals, respectively. Both strategies 1 and
2 are considered as targeted hardening measures. Strategy 1 is chosen because power
delivery to all the laterals lines depends on the reliability of the main feeder lines. However,
some lateral lines serving heavy loads have higher RAW than some feeder lines as can be
seen from Figure 4.13. Hence, strategy 2 is chosen and RAW set at ≥ 2.5 so as to harden
both feeder and lateral lines that have a significant effect on system reliability. Strategy 3
is chosen to investigate the difference between targeted hardening and hardening the whole
system.
Figure 4.14 shows the improvement in system reliability using all three strategies for
probabilistic hurricane analysis. The system reliability is evaluated using the upper bound
of line failure probability. System reliability at 0 years is improved from 97.8% to 99.1%,
99.2%, and 99.5% using strategies 1, 2, and 3 respectively. At 70 years, i.e. with poles that
are 70 years old, the system reliability is improved from 60.2% to 73.4%, 75.2%, and
79.6% using strategies 1, 2, and 3 respectively.
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Figure 4.14 System reliability improvement after targeted hardening

For the scenario analysis, the system reliability improvements are shown in Table 4.5.
There is no specific requirement on the level of reliability required for a power distribution
system. Each utility company can assign a required level of reliability based on which the
level of hardening can be selected.

Table 4.5 System reliability comparison for scenario-based analysis
State of System

Reliability using lower bounds

Reliability using upper bound

Original system

15.3%

3.2%

Strategy 1

36.8%

3.2%

Strategy 2

40.3%

3.2%

Strategy 3

47.3%

3.2%
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4.10 Cost Analysis
Utility companies and governments are concerned about the monetary costs and benefits
of any hardening or disaster mitigation strategy. Decisions are usually made by considering
the cost effectiveness of hardening methods. To evaluate the cost-effectiveness of the three
proposed strategies above, cost analysis is performed for both probabilistic and scenariobased hurricane analysis. The net benefit, defined as benefit minus cost, is evaluated for
each hardening strategy. The benefit of a hardening strategy is the reduction in damages
associated with the hardening strategy while the cost is the cost of implementing the
hardening strategy.

4.10.1 Probabilistic Hurricane Analysis
Life cycle cost analysis is performed for the probabilistic hurricane analysis. The method
proposed by Chang (2003) has been adopted for the cost analysis as it considers indirect
costs. The various costs considered are explained below.
i.

Mitigation cost (CM): this is the cost of hardening the system using the 3 proposed
strategies. It includes the cost of buying new stronger poles and installation cost.

ii.

Maintenance cost: this is the cost of periodic maintenance carried out by utility
companies. This includes cost of preventive maintenance, tree trimming, wildlife
protection, and so on. The maintenance cost for the entire life span of a system is
given by:

𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚 = � � 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝑡𝑡) ∙ (1 + 𝑦𝑦)−𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡

𝑖𝑖
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(4.16)

where 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 is the annual maintenance cost for element i which depends on material

properties 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 and the year of analysis t; 𝑧𝑧(𝑡𝑡) is a discount factor; and y is the

discount rate.

iii. Repair cost: this is the cost of repairing the damage to the system due to hurricanes.
In this case, it is the cost of replacing failed poles. Failed poles are replaced with
new poles of the same class. Consequently, the age distribution of poles in the
system changes every year. The repair cost for the entire lifespan of the system is
given by:

𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟 = � �[𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝑡𝑡) ∙ 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 ] ∙ 𝑧𝑧(𝑡𝑡)
𝑡𝑡

𝑖𝑖

(4.17)

where 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 is the annual probability of failure of element i, and 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 is the unit repair
cost of element i.

iv. Revenue loss: this is the cost incurred by the utility company due to interruptions
in power supply to the customers caused by damage due to hurricanes. The total
loss in revenue is given by:

𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 = � 𝑉𝑉 ∙ 𝑝𝑝 ∙ 𝑧𝑧(𝑡𝑡)
𝑡𝑡

(4.18)

where V is the annual demand not met; and p is the unit price of electricity. V is a
function of time to completely restore the system which in turn depends on the
amount of damage (number of failed poles) and the number of repair crew units.
Ouyang and Dueñas-Osorio (2014) assumed the restoration time for each failed
pole to follow a normal distribution with a mean of 5 hours and standard deviation
of 2.5 hours. Brown (2009) estimated the mean time to restoration for overhead
line failure to be 4 hours. Here, it is assumed that the mean time to restore a failed
line due to pole failure is 4 hours. It is also assumed that on average, there will be
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1 repair crew unit allocated to the city throughout a year. It is acknowledged that
the number of repair crews varies between disaster and non-disaster periods. This
will be better reflected in the scenario-based hurricane analysis.
The average annual outage hours for each line is found by multiplying the number
of failed poles by the time to restore each pole. The number of failed poles is the
product of the annual probability of failure for each pole group and the total
number of poles for that age group. Finally, the annual unmet demand for each
line is the product of average annual outage hours and total hourly consumption in
the line.
v.

Societal economic loss: this is the direct economic loss resulting from the
interruption in power supply. The total economic loss over the lifespan of the
system is given by:

𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒 = � 𝐸𝐸 ∙ 𝑧𝑧(𝑡𝑡)
𝑡𝑡

(4.19)

where E is the expected annual direct economic loss. E for each line is the product
of average annual outage hours and monetary loss per hour. The monetary loss per
hour for each customer category is adopted from LaCommare and Eto (2006) and
shown in Table 6.
The total life cycle cost is then calculated using Equation (4.20).
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 + 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚 + 𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟 + 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 + 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒

(4.20)

To perform the life-cycle cost analysis, the lifespan of the system is required. In this case,
the lifespan of the system is assumed to be the same as the life span of the distribution
poles. The service life of wood poles has been a subject of much discussion. According to
the NESC (2002), wood poles should be replaced or reinforced when their strength falls
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below 67% of the initial strength. Most utilities use 30 to 40 years as an estimated service
life (Mankowski et al., 2002). However, research and several surveys show that the service
life of wood poles can range from 60 to 80 years depending on specie, location, and
maintenance (Morrell, 2008; Stewart, 1996). Datla and Pandey (2006) determined the
approximate life expectancy of wood poles to be 69 years based on a study of 100,000
distribution poles.
The time scale considered for the life-cycle cost analysis is 70 years based on the amount
of time it takes for the poles to degrade to approximately 67% of their original strength as
plotted in Figure 4.5. In carrying out the life-cycle cost analysis, the following assumptions
are made:
i.

Maintenance cost remains constant and is the same for original and hardened
system. Hardening the system might reduce the annual maintenance cost but
there is a lack of data to quantify this potential reduction.

ii.

Demand remains constant over the years

iii.

Cost per unit of electricity remains constant

All the information needed for the life-cycle cost analysis is given in Table 4.6.
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Table 4.6 Life cycle cost analysis parameters
Parameters

Value

Source

Class 3 SP poles (13.7 m)

$544/pole

ATS (2014)

Class 4 SP poles (13.7 m)

$479/pole

ATS (2014)

Class 5 SP poles (13.7 m)

$441/pole

ATS (2014)

Cost of pole replacement under normal condition

$2,500/pole

Taras et al. (2004)

Cost of pole replacement under storm condition

$4,000/pole

Xu and Brown (2008b)

Annual maintenance cost, 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖

$4,000/circuit mile

Francis et al. (2011)
Bastidas-Arteaga

and

Discount rate, y

4%

Unit price, p

$0.11/kWh

Xu and Brown (2008b)

Economic loss (residential)

$2.70/h

LaCommare and Eto (2006)

Economic loss (commercial)

$886/h

LaCommare and Eto (2006)

Economic loss (industrial)

$3,253/h

LaCommare and Eto (2006)

Average consumption (residential)

1.5kW/h

EIA (2013)

Average consumption (commercial)

10.1kW/h

EIA (2013)

Average consumption (industrial)

39.4kW/h

EIA (2013)

Average consumption (schools)

10kW/h

Assumed

Average consumption (churches)

5kW/h

Assumed

Stewart (2015)

Two cases are considered for the life-cycle cost analysis. Case 1 is when the hardening
strategies are carried out at the construction stage of a new system, i.e. the utility company
decided to build a stronger system from the beginning. In this case, the mitigation cost is
the additional cost needed to use stronger poles instead of the poles that have been shown
to be sufficient during the design.
In Case 2, it is assumed the system exist as it is and proactive hardening strategies are
employed. In this case, however, it will illogical to assume the hardening measures will be
carried out few years after the distribution system is constructed. According to Bjarnadottir
et al. (2014), the age of distribution poles in Florida ranges from 0 to 50 years. For Case 2,
it is assumed that the system and all the poles are 20 years old when the hardening measures
are carried out. In this case, the mitigation cost includes the cost of buying new stronger
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poles and the cost of removing and replacing existing poles. The life cycle cost analysis is
then performed considering a life span of 50 years which is how much longer the
unhardened system is expected to last.

4.10.1.1

Case 1: hardening at construction stage

The results of the LCC analysis for Case 1 of the probabilistic hurricane analysis are shown
in Table 4.7. It can be seen from the table that as expected, strengthening measures lowers
the repair cost, revenue loss, and economic loss. It can be seen that all three strengthening
strategies result in lower life-cycle cost compared to the un-hardened system with strategy
3 providing the highest net benefit. The savings as a result of hardening comes mostly from
a reduction in repair cost and societal economic losses which more than made up for the
initial hardening investment. Strategy 3, which entails hardening the entire system, has the
lowest life cycle cost because the difference in the costs of the three classes of poles is
small. For example, a class 3 pole cost about $65 more than a class 4 pole. The effect of
this can be seen in Table 4.7 where it costs an additional $29, 000 to use stronger poles to
construct the whole system from the beginning.
Table 4.7 also demonstrates the importance of various components of the life cycle cost.
For the unhardened system, about 48% of total cost are economic losses suffered by the
customers due to power outages. This dropped to an average of 31% with the 3 hardening
strategies. It can also be noted that routine maintenance costs outweigh repair costs and
revenue losses combined. For example, for the unhardened system, the maintenance cost
constitutes about 39% of the total cost compared to repair cost and revenue loss which
combined constitutes about 13% of the total cost.
From a utility company’s perspective, the total cost excluding the societal economic losses
may be of more interest. All three hardening measures have lower life cycle cost than the
unhardened system even if economic losses are excluded with strategy 3 having the lowest
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cost. Again, this is due to the low additional cost needed to construct a system with stronger
poles.

Table 4.7 LCCA results for probabilistic hurricane analysis – Case 1 ($1,000s)
Cost category

Unhardened

Strategy 1

Strategy 2

Strategy 3

system

Mitigation cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀

-

9

14

29

Maintenance cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚

1,762

1,762

1,762

1,762

Repair cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟

588

514

480

268

Revenue loss, 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣

8

5

4

4

Societal Economic loss, 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒

2,155

1,050

992

978

Total LCC

4,513

3,339

3,253

3,041

Total LCC w/o Ce

2,358

2,290

2,260

2,062

Net benefit

-

1,174

1,260

1,472

Net benefit w/o Ce

-
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98

296

During disasters such as hurricanes, considerable damage can occur to buildings and other
infrastructure systems other than power systems. This usually reduces economic activities
even if the power system is not damaged. It also reduces electricity consumption as
businesses close and residents evacuate. To account for this reduction, the revenue and
economic losses in Table 4.7 are reduced. However, due to lack of literature on the estimate
of the reduction in economic activities and power consumption, four levels of reduction,
10%, 20%, 30%, and 50%, are considered as shown in Table 4.8. It can be seen from Table
4.8 that the pattern of the total life cycle cost after reductions of economic and revenue
losses remains the same as that in Table 4.7. All three strategies resulted in positive net
benefit with strategy 3 having the highest. However, the contribution of the economic loss
to the total life cycle cost reduces as expected.
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Table 4.8 LCCA results with reductions in revenue and economic losses ($1,000s)
Strategy 1

Strategy 2

Strategy 3

Net benefit with 10% reduction in 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 and 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒

1,063

1,144

1,354

Net benefit with 20% reduction in 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 and 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒

952

1,027

1,236

Net benefit with 30% reduction in 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 and 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒

841

910

1,118

Net benefit with 50% reduction in 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 and 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒

620

677

882

Cost

4.10.1.2

Case 2: hardening 20 year-old system

The results of the LCC analysis for Case 2 are shown in Table 4.9. Considering the total
life cycle cost, all three hardening measures have lower total costs than the unhardened
system. Among the 3 strategies, strategy 1 gives the highest net benefit followed by
strategy 2. Strategy 3 gives the lowest net benefit among the three. This shows the
importance of targeted hardening measures for existing systems because it implies that
unlike in Case 1, it is more economical to employ targeted hardening than hardening the
whole system. If societal economic losses are excluded, it can be seen that none of the
hardening strategies is cost effective as implied by the negative net benefit. This is due to
the high cost of carrying out the mitigation strategies because existing poles need to be
removed, and stronger poles need to be purchased and installed.
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Table 4.9 LCCA results for probabilistic hurricane analysis – Case 2 ($1,000s)
Cost category

Unhardened

Strategy 1

Strategy 2

Strategy 3

system

Mitigation cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀

-

424

652

1,978

Maintenance cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚

1,614

1,614

1,614

1,614

Repair cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟

689

580

526

199

Revenue loss, 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣

9

5

4

3

Societal Economic loss, 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒

2,524

821

729

707

Total LCC

4,836

3,443

3,525

4,501

Total LCC w/o Ce

2,312

2,622

2,795

3,794

Net benefit

-

1,392

1,311

335

Net benefit w/o Ce

-

-310

-483

-1,482

When a reduction in overall economic activities and electricity demand due to damage to
buildings and other infrastructure systems is taken into account, the total life cycle costs
with four levels of reductions are shown in Table 4.10. It can be seen that with a reduction
of 10% in both economic and revenue losses, the pattern is the same as in Table 9 with all
three strategies having positive net benefits. However, with a reduction of 20% and higher,
only strategies 1 and 2 are cost effective.

Table 4.10 LCCA results with reductions in revenue and economic losses ($1,000s)
Strategy 1

Strategy 2

Strategy 3

Net benefit with 10% reduction in 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 and 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒

1,221

1,131

152

Net benefit with 20% reduction in 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 and 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒

1,051

951

-30

Net benefit with 30% reduction in 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 and 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒

880

771

-212

Net benefit with 50% reduction in 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 and 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒

539

411

-577

Cost
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4.10.2 Scenario-based analysis
For the scenario-based hurricane analysis, the total incurred costs due to hurricane damage
as well as costs of mitigation are computed. The incurred costs due to hurricane damage
include repair cost, revenue loss, and economic losses. The repair cost is calculated using
the number of poles that fail which is found by multiplying the probability of failure by the
number of poles. The revenue and economic losses are calculated by assuming that the
average time to repair a failed pole is 4 hours. For a category 3 hurricane such as the one
considered here, utility companies drastically increases the number of repair crew units for
affected areas including hiring external crews from other utility companies (Xu & Brown,
2008b). Here, it is assumed that 6 crew units are assigned to the city for speedy restoration.
As in the case of probabilistic hurricane analysis, two cases have been considered here as
well. Case 1 is when the system is constructed initially with stronger poles based on the 3
hardening measures and the hurricane strikes the city in the year the system was
constructed. Case 2 is hardening an existing 20-year old system and the hurricane strikes
the city immediately following the hardening measures.

4.10.2.1

Case 1: hardening at construction stage

The results of the cost analysis for Case 1 are shown in Table 4.11. It can be seen that the
pattern is similar to the results for the probabilistic hurricane analysis. All the three
hardening strategies results in lower incurred cost compared with the unhardened system
with strategy 3 providing the highest benefit followed by strategy 2. However, in this case,
repair costs are considerably higher than economic losses. The repair costs constitute 64%,
75%, 75%, and 60% for the unhardened system, and strategy 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
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Table 4.11 Cost analysis results for scenario hurricane – Case 1 ($1,000s)
Cost category

Unhardened

Strategy 1

Strategy 2

Strategy 3

system

Mitigation cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀

-

9

14

29

Repair cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟

1,594

1,400

1,291

663

Revenue loss, 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣

3

2

2

1

Societal Economic loss, 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒

906

448

421

414

Total Cost

2,503

1,859

1,727

1,108

Total Cost w/o Ce

1,597

1,411

1,307

693

Net benefit

-

645

776

1,396

Net benefit w/o Ce

-

186

290

904

Table 4.12 shows the results of the total life cycle costs with reductions in economic and
revenue losses. It can be seen that the pattern is the same as in Table 4.11 where all the 3
hardening strategies result in savings compared with the unhardened system with strategy
3 giving the lowest cost saving.
Table 4.12 Cost analysis results with reductions in revenue and economic losses
($1,000s)
Strategy 1

Strategy 2

Strategy 3

Net benefit with 10% reduction in 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 and 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒

599

727

1,346

Net benefit with 20% reduction in 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 and 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒

553

679

1,297

Net benefit with 30% reduction in 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 and 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒

507

630

1,248

Net benefit with 50% reduction in 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 and 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒

415

532

1,149

Cost

The implication of the uncertainties in the assumed values of repair time and number of
repair crew units on net benefit of mitigation strategies has also been investigated. Figure
4.15 shows a plot of the net benefit when repair time is varied while the number of repair
crew units is kept constant at 6 as initially assumed. It can be seen that the net benefit
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increases significantly as the repair time increases for all mitigation strategies. This implies
that mitigation strategies are more cost-effective in cases where it takes utility companies
longer to repair failed poles. This is important for decision making especially for areas
where access is usually hindered after hurricanes. In such cases, adopting measures to
reduce the level of damage can be highly cost-effective.
Figure 4.16 shows a plot of the net benefit with varying number of repair crew units while
repair time is kept constant at 4 hours as initially assumed. It can be seen that the net benefit
decreases as the number of repair crew units increases. However, the impact becomes
insignificant as the number of crew units exceeds about 15. This implies that for utility
companies with few repair crew units or for distribution systems with few allocated repair
crew units, deploying mitigation strategies can result in higher monetary benefit.

Strategy 1
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Figure 4.15 Impact of repair time on net benefit of mitigation strategies (Case 1)
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Figure 4.16 Impact of number of repair crew units on net benefit (Case 1)

4.10.2.2

Case 2: hardening 20 year-old system

The results for Case 2 are shown in Table 4.13. It can be seen that if total costs are
considered, only strategies 1 and 2 are cost effective. Strategy 3 results in negative net
benefit due to the high cost of mitigation. If societal economic losses are excluded, none
of the hardening measures are cost effective.
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Table 4.13 Cost analysis results for scenario hurricane – Case 2 ($1,000s)
Cost category

Unhardened system

Strategy 1

Strategy 2

Strategy 3

Mitigation cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀

-

424

652

1,978

1,625

1,425

1,312

663

Revenue loss, 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣

3

2

2

1

922

449

421

414

Total Cost

2,551

2,300

2,387

3,057

Total Cost w/o Ce

1,629

1,851

1,966

2,643

Net benefit

-

251

164

-506

Net benefit w/o Ce

-

-223

-337

-1,014

Repair cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟

Societal Economic loss,
𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒

Table 4.14 shows the total life cycle costs after reductions in economic and revenue losses.
For a reduction of 10%, 20%, and 30%, strategies 1 and 2 are cost-effective as before.
However, for a reduction of 50%, only strategy 1 is cost-effective. Strategy 3 is not costeffective for all reductions.

Table 4.14 Cost analysis results with reductions in revenue and economic losses
($1,000s)
Strategy 1

Strategy 2

Strategy 3

Net benefit with 10% reduction in 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 and 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒

203

113

-557

Net benefit with 20% reduction in 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 and 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒

156

63

-608

Net benefit with 30% reduction in 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 and 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒

108

13

-659

Net benefit with 50% reduction in 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 and 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒

13

-88

-761

Cost

The impacts of repair time and number of repair crew units on net benefit of mitigation
strategies are shown in Figure 4.17 & Figure 4.18, respectively. From Figure 4.17, it can
be seen that the cost-effectiveness of the mitigation strategies depends on the repair time.
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For example, strategy 3 is only cost effective when the average repair time is ≥ 8 hours.
From Figure 4.18, it can be seen that as the number of repair crew units increases, the
mitigation strategies become ineffective. This is because increasing repair crew units
decrease power outage hours which in turn decreases societal economic losses and revenue
losses.

Strategy 1

Strategy 2

Strategy 3

1000
Net benefit ($1,000s)

800
600
400
200
0
-200 1
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8
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10

-400
-600
-800
-1000
Repair time (hrs)

Figure 4.17 Impact of repair time on net benefit of mitigation strategies (Case 2)
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Strategy 1
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Strategy 3

3000
2500

Net benefit ($1,000s)

2000
1500
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0
-500

0
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25

30

-1000
-1500

Number of repair crew units

Figure 4.18 Impact of number of repair crew units on net benefit (Case 2)

4.11 Conclusions
This chapter presented a framework for evaluating the effectiveness of targeted hardening
measures for power distribution systems subjected to hurricanes. The framework
incorporated hurricane hazard analysis, system reliability evaluation, component
importance measure, cost analysis as well as aging of support structures. A notional power
distribution system was used to demonstrate the framework.
The results from the case study considered showed the importance of evaluating system
reliability, component importance as well as targeted hardening of distribution systems. It
was shown that hardening components or lines that have a greater impact on system
reliability can be cost-effective in some cases.
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From the results, it can be concluded that strengthening an entire distribution system is
only cost-effective for new systems. Using stronger poles than required by design for the
entire system at construction stage of new systems resulted in lower life-cycle cost in all
cases. However, for older systems, targeted hardening was shown to be cost-effective
relative to hardening an entire system. The case study also showed that mitigation strategies
can be cost-effective for distribution systems in less accessible areas or areas where fewer
repair crew units are available which usually leads to prolonged repair time.
The results from the considered case study also showed the importance of considering
economic losses in evaluating the cost effectiveness of hardening measures. It was shown
that some hardening strategies that might not be cost effective for a utility company can be
very cost effective if societal economic losses are considered. This is important especially
for municipal utilities which are owned by city governments. In such cases, the high cost
of mitigation measures or additional cost of constructing a stronger system can be easily
compensated by the huge savings in economic losses.
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5. Potential Impact of Climate Change on Distribution
Systems Subjected to Hurricanes 2
5.1 Introduction
Long-term investment and planning in the power sector need to consider uncertainties in
future hazard trends. One such uncertainty is the potential impact of climate change on
hurricane hazard. The Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) noted the variation in weather patterns and projected an increase in the
intensity of storms (Zamuda et al., 2013; IPCC, 2013). With the potential increase in the
intensity of hurricanes in the long-term due to climate change, the cost of damage to
distribution system is expected to rise. Consequently, a report by the members of the
electric utilities project of the World Business Council on Sustainable Development
(WBCSD) called on all utility companies to build expertise in analyzing climate
information to better understand climate change related risks and to develop adaptation and
resiliency strategies to cope with such risks (WBCSD, 2014).
The potential impact of climate change is magnified when aging of power distribution
infrastructure is considered, which has been determined to be one of the main issues facing
the power system in the United States (U.S.) (ASCE, 2013). With the inherent uncertainty
in the prediction of variation in weather patterns as well as the time-dependent strength of
infrastructure components, a better understanding of the potential varied risks is essential
for informed decision making. Therefore, there is a need to investigate the possible impact
of climate change on power distribution systems and come up with economically feasible
adaptation strategies.

A version of this chapter was previously published in Journal of Infrastructure Systems and is re-used herein
with permission from ASCE. The permission is presented in Appendix D.

2
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Bjarnadottir et al. (2013) and (2014) presented a probabilistic framework for evaluating the
potential impact of climate change on hurricane risk assessment of power distribution poles
and proposed various adaptation strategies. The framework incorporated probabilistic
hurricane analysis, age-dependent fragility of poles, and life cycle cost analysis. The effect
of climate change was modeled by assuming a linear change in wind speed of -5% to 25%
over a 100-year period. Francis et al. (2011) presented a hybrid economic input-output life
cycle cost analysis method for evaluating the cost-effectiveness of climate change
adaptation strategies of distribution systems. Failure of distribution poles, spans, and padmounted transformers was considered in the study. The effect of climate change was
modeled through the use of count regression analysis and data mining techniques that
describe the relationship between climate variability and North Atlantic tropical cyclone
counts in the U.S.
While the above studies constitute great strides in studying the impact of climate change
on power distribution systems, they are limited to component-level risk assessment. A
more informed decision on the effectiveness of adaptation strategies can be made when the
reliability of the entire distribution system is evaluated. This will allow determining the
parts of the system with greater impact on reliability which ought to be strengthened.
In this chapter, the framework of Chapter 4 is extended to integrate the potential impact of
climate change on hurricane patterns. A hurricane simulation model is adopted to enable
the variation in both intensity and frequency to be considered. Adaptation strategies are
proposed and their cost-effectiveness investigated. Micropolis power distribution system
is used to demonstrate the framework. Class 4 and class 5 southern pine poles as designed
in Chapter 4 are used for the three-phase and single-phase lines, respectively. All poles are
assumed to be new at the start of the system reliability analysis.
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5.2 Hurricane Risk Assessment
Hurricane simulation is the most widely used method of hurricane risk analysis for design
and assessment of structures and infrastructure (Vickery et al., 2000b). Hurricane
simulation models involve using site-specific statistics of key hurricane parameters and
Monte Carlo simulation for assessing hurricane hazard level. Conducting hurricane
simulation is the best way to account for the potential effect of climate change on hurricane
hazard as it will allow for the modification of parameters such as frequency and intensity
within the simulation model.
The distribution and statistical moments of the basic parameters needed for hurricane
simulation are obtained from records of historical hurricanes. The most complete and
reliable historical data for north Atlantic hurricanes is provided by the North Atlantic
Hurricane Data Base (HURDAT) and compiled by the Oceanographic and Meteorological
Laboratory at National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA, 2015a).
The current HURDAT data contains details for hurricanes from 1851 – 2013. Key
parameters provided in the HURDAT data include approximate landing position,
maximum sustained (1-minute) surface wind speed, Saffir-Simpson category, central
pressure, and affected states. The complete hurricane simulation method is explained
below.

5.2.1 Hurricane Simulation Model
The various parameters, their statistics, and how they are determined are explained below
based on the model developed by Xu and Brown (2008a).

83

i.

Annual hurricane frequency

The number of hurricanes for any given year can be simulated according to a Poisson
distribution (Chen et al., 2004; Huang et al., 2001a; Xu & Brown, 2008b; Mudd et al.,
2014a). The Poisson distribution is modeled as:

𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) =

𝜆𝜆𝑥𝑥 −𝜆𝜆
𝑒𝑒 ; 𝑥𝑥 = 0,1,2, …
𝑥𝑥!

(5.1)

where x is the number of hurricanes per year, λ is the average number of hurricanes in a
given year computed from historical records, and f(x) is the probability of x hurricanes in
a given year.
ii.

Landfall position

The landing position of a simulated hurricane is usually expressed in latitude and longitude.
The landing position is assigned based on the distribution of historical hurricanes landing
in a specific area by assuming uniform distribution or by dividing the coastline into bins as
suggested by Xu and Brown (2008a) and Huang et al. (2001a).
iii.

Approach angle

The approach angle shows the direction a hurricane heads to after making landfall. The
approach angle is measured with North as 0 degrees. Based on historical data, the approach
angle is modeled with a bi-normal distribution (Xu & Brown, 2008a; Toth & Szentimrey,
1990):
(1 − 𝑎𝑎1 )
1 𝜃𝜃 − 𝜇𝜇1 2
1 𝜃𝜃 − 𝜇𝜇2 2
𝑓𝑓(𝜃𝜃) =
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 �− �
� �+
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 �− �
� �
2
𝜎𝜎1
2
𝜎𝜎2
√2𝜋𝜋𝜎𝜎1
√2𝜋𝜋𝜎𝜎2
𝑎𝑎1
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(5.2)

where 𝜇𝜇1 and 𝜇𝜇2 are the means, 𝜎𝜎1 and 𝜎𝜎2 are the standard deviations of the approach angle,

and 𝑎𝑎1 is the weighting factor. The landing position and approach angle determine the path
of a hurricane after landfall. Xu and Brown (2008a) demonstrated that it is reasonable to

assume hurricanes travel along a straight path in Florida due to the narrow shape of the
state.
iv.

Translation velocity

Translation velocity is the forward speed of the hurricane. It can be modeled as a lognormal
distribution as (Vickery & Twisdale, 1995a; Georgiou et al., 1983; Brown, 2009; Huang et
al., 2001a):

𝑓𝑓(𝑐𝑐) =

1

1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 − 𝜆𝜆
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 �− �
��
2
𝜁𝜁
√2𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐

(5.3)

where c is the translation velocity, 𝜆𝜆 is the logarithmic mean, and 𝜁𝜁 is the logarithmic

standard deviation. The translation velocity is assumed to be constant after landfall (Xu &
Brown, 2008a).
v.

Central pressure difference

This is the difference between atmospheric pressure at the center and at the periphery of
the hurricane. The central pressure difference is modeled from historical data using the
Weibull distribution (Georgiou et al., 1983; Vickery & Twisdale, 1995a; Huang et al.,
2001b; Xu & Brown, 2008a) as:
𝛼𝛼 ∆𝑝𝑝 𝛼𝛼−1
∆𝑝𝑝 𝛼𝛼
𝑓𝑓𝑣𝑣 (𝑣𝑣) = � �
exp �− � � �
𝑢𝑢 𝑢𝑢
𝑢𝑢

(5.4)

where ∆𝑝𝑝 is the central pressure difference, and u and α are the parameters of the Weibull
distribution determined from historical data.
85

vi.

Central pressure filling rate

The rise in central pressure (which results in weakening of intensity) of the hurricane after
landfall is modeled as (Xu & Brown, 2008a; Huang et al., 2001a; Vickery & Twisdale,
1995b):
∆𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡) = ∆𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(−𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)

(5.5)

where ∆𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡) is the central pressure difference at time t, ∆𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜 is the central pressure
difference at landfall, 𝑎𝑎 is a decay constant. For Florida, a is given by (Vickery & Twisdale,
1995b):

𝑎𝑎 = 0.006 + 0.00046 ∙ ∆𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜 + 𝜀𝜀

(5.6)

where 𝜀𝜀 is an error term that is normally distributed with a mean of zero and standard
deviation of 0.025.
vii.

Maximum wind speed at landfall

The maximum wind speed at landfall is proportionally assigned based on the simulated
central pressure difference as suggested by Xu and Brown (2008a). Table 5.1 shows the
relationship between hurricane category, minimum central pressure, and maximum
sustained wind speed (NOAA, 2015c).
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Table 5.1 The Saffir-Simpson hurricane scale

1

Saffir-Simpson wind
speed range (mph)
74 – 95

Central pressure range
(mbar)
≥ 980

2

96 – 110

965 – 979

3

111 – 130

945 – 964

4

131 – 155

920 – 944

5

> 155

< 920

Hurricane Category

viii.

Maximum wind speed decay

Hurricane wind speed decays after landfall due to friction by land mass and reduction in
storm’s moisture. The most widely used speed decay model is known as KD95 developed
by Kaplan and DeMaria (1995). The model is based on the assumption that hurricane wind
speeds decay at a rate proportional to their landfall intensity and decay exponentially over
land. The wind speed at any given time is given by (Kaplan & DeMaria, 1995; DeMaria et
al., 2006):
𝑉𝑉(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑉𝑉𝑏𝑏 + (𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉0 − 𝑉𝑉𝑏𝑏 )𝑒𝑒 −𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼

(5.7)

where R is a sea-land wind speed reduction factor with a value of 0.9, Vb = 13.75 m/s and
is a constant “background” intensity, V0 is the maximum sustained 1-min wind speed at
landfall, and α = 0.095 h-1 which is a decay constant.
ix.

Radius to maximum winds

This describes the range of the most intensive hurricane wind speed. FEMA (2005)
developed the equation for the radius of maximum winds Rmax as:
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ln 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 2.556 − 0.000050255∆𝑝𝑝2 + 0.042243032𝜑𝜑

(5.8)

where φ is the storm latitude and Δp is the central pressure difference. A similar model can
also be found in Vickery and Twisdale (1995a).
x.

Radial wind field model

The variation of wind speed from hurricane eye to periphery is modeled by a radial wind
field model. The gradient wind speed (VG) at any location at any time instant is given by
(Holland, 1980; Vickery et al., 2009a):
1�
2

𝐵𝐵
𝑅𝑅
⎡ 𝑅𝑅
𝐵𝐵 𝐵𝐵∆𝑝𝑝 exp �− � 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 � �
𝑟𝑟 2 𝑓𝑓 2 ⎤
𝑟𝑟
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
⎥
𝑉𝑉𝐺𝐺 = ⎢�
� �
�+
𝜌𝜌
4 ⎥
⎢ 𝑟𝑟
⎣
⎦

−

𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
2

(5.9)

where Rmax is the radius to maximum wind speed, r is the distance from hurricane eye to
point of interest, B is the Holland parameter, Δp is the central pressure difference, ρ is air
density (1.15 kg/m3), and f is the Coriolis parameter. The Holland parameter, B, can be
determined from (Holland, 1980):
𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌�𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚 2 �
𝐵𝐵 =
∆𝑝𝑝

(5.10)

where Vm is the maximum wind speed, e is the base of natural logarithm, Δp is the central
pressure difference, ρ is air density.
The gradient wind speed in Equation (5.9) needs to be converted to surface wind speed to
assess the performance of infrastructure systems. The conversion factor can range from 0.8
for weaker storms to 0.86 for intense storms (Vickery et al., 2000a; Vickery et al., 2009a).
Furthermore, the surface wind speed needs to be converted to 3-sec gust wind speed as
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structural damage is more related to peak gust wind speed which is the maximum
instantaneous wind speed. Therefore, a gust factor is needed to convert the surface wind
speed. The gust model developed by Engineering Sciences Data Unit (ESDU, 1982, 1983)
has been shown to be adequate for modeling gust factors (Xu & Brown, 2008a). Xu and
Brown (2008a) conducted a 1000-year simulation to estimate the 3-sec gust factor using
the ESDU model and found that the distribution of the calculated values of the factor is
highly concentrated around 1.287 with a standard deviation of 0.002. This value has been
adopted for use in this research.
The steps for the hurricane simulation are shown in Figure 5.1. The simulation is carried
out for 200,000 hurricane seasons.
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Randomly sample number of hurricanes (n) in a given year
based on hurricane frequency

For hurricane i, randomly sample landing position,
approach angle, translation speed, central pressure
difference

Compute max wind speed at landfall and radius
to max wind

Compute wind speed at pt. of interest using
wind field model

Determine next location of hurricane

Update central pressure and max wind speed using
decay models

i = i+1

Re-compute wind speed at pt. of interest using
wind field model

No

Hurricane
dissipated?

Yes
End of hurricane

No
i = n?

Yes
End hurricane season

Figure 5.1 Hurricane simulation model flowchart
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The required parameters for the hurricane simulation can be obtained from historical
records compiled in HURDAT. For Florida, which is the selected location for this research,
historical hurricane record in HURDAT are provided for four different regions namely
southeast, southwest, northeast, and northwest. The selected study area is assumed to be
located in southeast Florida. Historical hurricanes that made landfall in Florida are
summarized in Table 5.2 (NOAA, 2015a; Xu & Brown, 2008a).

Table 5.2 Hurricane occurrence in different parts of Florida from 1851 – 2014
Hurricane
category
1
2
3
4
5
Total

Southeast
8
9
10
3
1
31

No. of occurrence
Northeast Southwest
3
12
3
7
0
6
0
3
0
1
6
29

Northwest
20
13
13
0
0
46

The statistical parameters of the variables computed from historical records are given in
Table 5.3 for different regions of Florida (Xu & Brown, 2008b; Huang et al., 2001a).
Table 5.3 Statistics of hurricane simulation parameters for different regions of Florida
Variable

Distribution

Annual frequency, λ
Approach angle, θ
(degrees)

Poisson
Bi-normal

Central pressure
difference

Weibull

Translation velocity

Lognormal

Southeast
0.2
𝜇𝜇1 = 310
𝜎𝜎1 = 30
𝜇𝜇2 = 35
𝜎𝜎2 = 15
𝑎𝑎1 = 0.9

Distribution parameters
Northeast Southwest

Northwest

0.039
𝜇𝜇1 = 345
𝜎𝜎1 = 5
𝜇𝜇2 = 285
𝜎𝜎2 = 10
𝑎𝑎1 = 0.5

0.297
𝜇𝜇1 = 35
𝜎𝜎1 = 25
𝜇𝜇2 = 295
𝜎𝜎2 = 40
𝑎𝑎1 = 0.5

𝑢𝑢 = 64.831
𝛼𝛼 = 3.465

0.1871
𝜇𝜇1 = 40
𝜎𝜎1 = 25
𝜇𝜇2 = 300
𝜎𝜎2 = 30
𝑎𝑎1 = 0.63

𝑢𝑢 = 42.751
𝛼𝛼 = 3.929

𝜆𝜆 = 2.3 − 0.00275𝜃𝜃*
𝜁𝜁 = 0.3
*Parameters were found to be correlated with approach angle (Xu & Brown, 2008b, 2008a)
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Figure 5.2 shows the spatial variation of a simulated hurricane at landfall. Note that in the
model above, only hurricanes that landed in Florida are considered for evaluating the
required parameters and the model start at the point of landfall rather than at locations in
the Atlantic Ocean or the Gulf of Mexico. Furthermore, both central pressure filling rate
and maximum wind speed decay discussed in the hurricane simulation model above will
be used as suggested by Xu and Brown (2008a) since there is no empirical equation relating
the central pressure and wind speed after landfall.
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Figure 5.2 Surface wind speed variation for a simulated hurricane
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5.2.2 Hurricane Simulation Model Validation
The simulation model described above is used to estimate the annual maximum hurricane
wind speed for 200,000 years at a particular location (27.6oN, 80.4oW) on the east coast
of Florida which is the assumed location of the case study to be discussed later. The
maximum annual hurricane wind speed can be modeled by an extreme value (EV)
distribution (Yeo et al., 2014; Coles & Simiu, 2003; Jagger et al., 2001; Jagger & Elsner,
2006). All the three types of EV distributions, namely Gumbel, Fréchet, and reversed
Weibull (or simply Weibull), were fitted to the data as shown in
Figure 5.3. It can be seen from the figure that Fréchet distribution provides the best fit for
the data followed by Weibull distribution. On the other hand, Gumbel distribution does
not seem to fit the data. Hence it is not considered for further analysis.
The scale and shape parameters of the Weibull distribution determined using the maximum
likelihood method in MATLAB are 26.24 and 1.88 respectively. The shape, scale, and
location parameters of the Fréchet distribution are found to be 0.19, 8.66, and 16.12,
respectively.
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Figure 5.3 CDF of max annual hurricane wind speed with fitted distributions
To validate the hurricane simulation model, wind speeds corresponding to different mean
recurrence intervals (MRI) for the chosen location are calculated and compared to values
in ASCE-7 (2010) as shown in Table 5.4 and plotted as hazard curves in Figure 5.4. The
wind speeds corresponding to different return periods can be obtained from the fact that,
assuming independent maximum annual hurricane wind speeds, the probability of
exceeding N-year MRI wind speed in t years is given by:
1 𝑡𝑡
𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 (𝑣𝑣 > 𝑉𝑉) = 1 − �1 − � ��
N

(5.11)

From Table 5.4, it can be seen that the wind speeds for different MRIs predicted by the
Weibull distribution are very close to those obtained from ASCE-7 (2010). For the Fréchet
distribution, however, even though it is a better fit to the data than Weibull distribution, it
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resulted in unrealistically high wind speeds, especially for larger MRIs. This anomaly has
been documented in the literature which is why the Fréchet distribution is not
recommended for modeling maximum annual hurricane wind speeds (Yeo et al., 2014).
The Weibull distribution is therefore chosen for modeling the wind speed data. Note that
the ASCE-7 (2010) wind speeds corresponding to different MRI were extracted from ATC
(2015).

Table 5.4 Comparison of wind speeds corresponding to different return periods
MRI (years)
10

ASCE-7 (2010)
values (m/s)
39

Values predicted
by Weibull (m/s)
41

Values predicted
by Fréchet (m/s)
40

25

47

49

54

50

52

54

66

100

58

59

80

300

65

67

108

700

70

71

129

1700

75

76

157

95

180

ASCE 7-10
Weibull
Frechet

160

Wind speed (m/s)
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Figure 5.4 Wind speeds comparison

5.3 Non-stationary Hurricane Wind Model due to Climate Change
The biggest source of uncertainty for future climate prediction is the level of management
of greenhouse gas emissions by society (IPCC, 2013). Consequently, studies on the effect
of climate change on infrastructure are approached by considering various future climate
change scenarios. Different climate change scenarios are adopted to investigate what might
happen in the future under a particular assumption. These scenarios provide starting points
for examining an uncertain future and evaluating the effects such scenarios might have on
civil infrastructure systems.
The most recent climate change scenarios proposed by IPCC (2013) are based on
greenhouse gas concentration pathways (CPs) which are determined by their radiative
forcing at the end of the 21st century. Radiative forcing is defined by ASCE (2015) as the
“change in the balance between incoming and outgoing radiation caused by changes in
greenhouse gas concentrations and other atmospheric constituents, while other aspects of
the atmosphere are held constant”. Four Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs)
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were produced by IPCC (2013) that correspond to radiative forcing levels of 8.5, 6.0, 4.5,
and 2.6 watts/m2 and are termed RCP 8.5, RCP 6.0, RCP 4.5, and RCP 2.6, respectively.
It might be of interest to note that the forcing level in 2005 was estimated to be 1.6 watts/m2
(Bernstein et al., 2007). Older climate change scenarios method used by the IPCC is the
SRES scenarios details of which can be found in IPCC (2000).
The effect of the above scenarios on the frequency and intensity of hurricanes has been a
subject of much discussion. Bender et al. (2010) modeled the effect of one of the SRES
climate change scenarios on the frequency of Atlantic hurricanes and concluded that the
frequency of the most intense hurricanes (category 3-5) is expected to increase through the
year 2100. Knutson et al. (2010) concluded that the global frequency of tropical cyclones
will either decrease or remain unchanged with the authors predicting a decrease between 6 to -34%. Projections for individual basins were reported to be up to ±50% with very low
confidence. It was however reported that the frequency of the most intense storms will
“more likely than not increase by a substantially larger percentage in some basins”.
Knutson et al. (2010) also projected the intensity of tropical cyclones, measured as mean
maximum wind speed, to increase between +2% to +11% globally.
Some studies have also shown a link between an increase in sea surface temperatures (SST)
and hurricane frequency (Mann & Emanuel, 2006; Mann et al., 2007; Elsner et al., 2008).
Mudd et al. (2014a) used the Community Earth System Model (CESM) of the National
Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) to model the increase in sea surface temperature
(SST) at the year 2100 under RCP 8.5 scenario. The resulting SST was then used in a
hurricane simulation model that takes into account changes in SSTs. The authors concluded
that under future climate scenario RCP 8.5 in 2100, the maximum wind speed associated
with Atlantic hurricanes is expected to increase.
Staid et al. (2014) reported the bounding range for change in hurricane intensity from
existing literature to be between -20% to +40%. Landsea et al. (2010) on the other hand
reported the range of future hurricane frequency to be between -30% to +35%. Based on
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these estimates and the above literature review, the following climate change scenarios
(CCSs) at the end of the 21st century are assumed for this study:
i.

CCS1: no change in frequency, +20% change in intensity

ii.

CCS2: +20% change in frequency, no change in intensity

iii.

CCS3: -20% change in frequency, +20% change in intensity

iv.

CCS4: +20% change in frequency, +20% change in intensity

v.

CCS5: +35% change in frequency, +40% change in intensity

vi.

CCS6: +35% change in frequency, -20% change in intensity

The change in frequency and intensity from the present time to the end of the 21st century
is assumed to be linear as suggested by Stewart et al. (2014). It is however noted that
considerable interdecadal and intradecadal variations can occur in the trend (Stewart et al.,
2014; Mudd et al., 2014b). The above climate change scenarios are incorporated into the
hurricane simulation model by altering certain parameters. For frequency variation, the
parameter of the Poisson distribution, λ, is altered. For intensity variation, the randomly
sampled central pressure difference at landfall is increased or decreased by a percentage
depending on the climate change scenario being considered.
The hazard curves for the chosen location on the east coast of Florida are plotted in Figure
5.5 for the baseline scenario (no change) and the six CCSs above. It can be noted from the
figure that changes in intensity have higher effect on wind speeds than changes in
frequency. For example, CCS1 (no change in frequency, +20% change in intensity) results
in higher wind speeds at all return periods than CCS2 (+20% change in frequency, no
change in intensity). The same conclusion can be drawn by comparing CCS2 and CCS3.
Among the six scenarios, only CCS6 (+35% change in frequency, -20% change in
intensity) resulted in a decrease in wind speed at all return periods despite 35% increase in
frequency.
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Figure 5.5 Hazard curves for different climate scenarios

5.4 System Reliability Results
The system reliability results for the no change scenario (baseline) and the six selected
climate scenarios are plotted in Figure 5.6 for the period 2010 to 2100. It can be seen that
the pattern of change in system reliability follows the pattern in Figure 5.5 as expected. All
scenarios except CCS6 (+35% change in frequency, -20% change in intensity) resulted in
a decrease in system reliability over the years. CCS2 (+20% change in frequency, no
change in intensity) and CCS5 (+35% change in frequency, +40% change in intensity)
resulted in the least and highest decrease in reliability over time, respectively. For example,
at 2080, the system reliability decreased from 67% for the baseline case to 63% and 40%
for CCS2 and CCS5, respectively. This implies that climate change can have a significant
effect on system reliability over time.
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According to NESC (2002), wood poles should be replaced or reinforced when their
strength falls below 67% of the initial strength. This will happen when the poles are around
70 years old as seen in Figure 4.5 in the previous chapter. Consequently, in this case, the
poles in the system that survived from 2010 to 2080 will be replaced as part of a periodic
maintenance program which is not considered in Figure 5.6. This will, however, be
reflected in the LCCA section when pole replacement due to both periodic maintenance
and wind-induced failure is considered.
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Figure 5.6 System reliability results for different climate scenarios

5.5 Adaptation Strategies
Increase in hurricane wind speed due to climate change which consequently causes a
decrease in reliability of the system as shown above warrants some form of climate change
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adaptation strategies to be implemented. Three climate change scenarios, CCS2 (+20%
change in frequency, no change in intensity), CCS4 (+20% change in frequency, +20%
change in intensity), and CCS5 (+35% change in frequency, +40% change in intensity) are
selected to demonstrate the life cycle cost analysis procedure for comparing various climate
change adaptation strategies. CCS4 and CCS5 are chosen because they resulted in the
highest decrease in system reliability over time. CCS2 is chosen because it resulted in only
a slight decrease in system reliability. Therefore, it will give an indication of whether
adaptation strategies are cost-effective when the level of climate change is very small. Two
adaptation strategies are proposed below.
Strategy 1: Strengthening entire system
In this strategy, all new distribution systems are to be constructed with poles that are one
class higher than the required pole class determined using the design method recommended
in ASCE-111 (2006). The adaptation cost is then the additional cost needed to use stronger
poles instead of the poles that have been shown to be sufficient during the design. The
distribution system model in this research is assumed to be strengthened during
construction in 2010.
Strategy 2: Strengthening parts of a system
This strategy is similar to Strategy 1 except that here, only the main feeder lines, which
deliver electric power to the laterals, are replaced with poles that are one class higher.
The improvement in system reliability when the two adaptation strategies are applied to
CCS5 is shown in Figure 5.7. Strategy 1 results in higher improvement in system reliability
as expected. At 2080 for example, the system reliability is 40%, 65%, and 56% for the
unhardened system, strategy 1, and strategy 2, respectively. Note that pole replacement is
not considered in the plot of Figure 5.7.
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5.6 Life Cycle Cost Analysis Result
The LCCA is carried out for the years from 2010 to 2100. The LCCA is first performed to
compare the baseline case and the three selected climate change scenarios and the results
are shown in Table 5.5 and Figure 5.8. It can be seen that the LCC increases as the severity
of climate change increases. In this case, the LCC increased by 2%, 6%, and 12% for CCS2,
CCS4, and CCS5, respectively.
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Table 5.5 LCCA results for different scenarios ($1,000s)
No climate
change
Maintenance cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚
1,871
432
Repair cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟
6
Revenue loss, 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣
1,600
Societal Economic loss, 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒
Total LCC
3,909
Percentage Increase in LCC (%)
Cost category

CCS2

CCS4

CCS5

1,867
448
6
1,665
3,986
2

1,857
489
7
1,802
4,155
6

1,846
541
7
1,987
4,381
12

4,500
4,400
4,300
LCC ($1,000s)

4,200
4,100
4,000
3,900
3,800
3,700
3,600
Total LCC

No change

CCS2

CCS4

CCS5

3,909

3,986

4,155

4,381

Figure 5.8 LCC results for different climate scenarios

The results of the LCCA for the selected climate change scenarios and the adaptation
strategies are shown in Table 5.6, Table 5.7, and Table 5.8. For all the three scenarios, the
adaptation strategies lower the repair cost, revenue loss, and societal economic losses. The
total LCC for all three cases is also plotted in Figure 5.9 and it can be observed that strategy
1 results in lower LCC in all cases even though it has higher adaptation cost than strategy
2.
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Table 5.6 LCCA results for CCS2 scenario ($1,000s)
Cost category
Adaptation cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀
Maintenance cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚
Repair cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟
Revenue loss, 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣
Societal Economic loss, 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒
Total LCC
Total LCC w/o Ce
Net benefit
Net benefit w/o Ce

Unhardened system
1,867
448
6
1,665
3,986
2,321
-

Strategy 1
29
1,897
337
5
1,211
3,479
2,268
507
53

Strategy 2
9
1,874
420
5
1,236
3,544
2,308
442
13

Table 5.7 LCCA results for CCS4 scenario ($1,000s)
Cost category
Adaptation cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀
Maintenance cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚
Repair cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟
Revenue loss, 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣
Societal Economic loss, 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒
Total LCC
Total LCC w/o Ce
Net benefit
Net benefit w/o Ce

Unhardened system
1,857
489
7
1,802
4,155
2,353
-

Strategy 1
29
1,889
420
5
1,312
3,655
2,343
500
10

Strategy 2
9
1,864
459
5
1,339
3,676
2,337
479
16

Table 5.8 LCCA results for CCS5 scenario ($1,000s)
Cost category
Adaptation cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀
Maintenance cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚
Repair cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟
Revenue loss, 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣
Societal Economic loss, 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒
Total LCC
Total LCC w/o Ce
Net benefit
Net benefit w/o Ce

Unhardened system
1,846
541
7
1,987
4,381
2,394
-
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Strategy 1
29
1,880
392
5
1,402
3,708
2,306
673
88

Strategy 2
9
1,854
504
6
1,435
3,808
2,373
573
21

Unhardened

Str. 1

Str. 2

5,000

Total LCC ($1,000s)

4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
CCS2

CCS4

CCS5

Figure 5.9 Total life cycle cost

From Table 5.6, it can be seen that even for a slight increase in hurricane wind speed
(CCS2), both strategies 1 and 2 resulted in a net benefit of nearly $500,000. This is mainly
because the cost of upgrading to a pole that is one class higher than the required class is
very low. For example, class 3 poles cost only $65 higher than class 4 poles while class 4
poles cost only $38 higher than class 5 poles.
From the results in Table 5.6, Table 5.7, and Table 5.8, the societal economic cost is shown
to have a significant impact on the total LCC. In all cases, societal economic losses
constitute at least 35% of the total LCC. The net benefit for all cases dropped considerably
if societal economic losses are not considered. For example, in Table 5.6, the net benefit
dropped from $507,000 to $53,000 for strategy 1 if the societal cost is ignored. This is
important because considering societal economic losses or otherwise in LCCA depends on
the entity carrying out the analysis. Utility companies might not include societal economic
losses when making decisions on future investment. However, it might be very important
for governments and communities.
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Figure 5.10 shows a plot comparing the net benefit of the adaptation strategies for the three
selected climate change scenarios. It can be observed that the net benefit of deploying the
adaptation strategies increases with the severity of the climate change scenario especially
for strategy 2. For strategy 1, CCS2 and CCS4 showed similar net benefits while the highest
net benefit is observed for CCS5 which is the worst climate change scenario.
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800
Net Benefit ($1,000s)
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300
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100
0
Strategy 1

Strategy 2

Figure 5.10 Net benefit of adaptation strategies

To account for a reduction in economic activities during disasters, the revenue and
economic losses in Table 5.6, Table 5.7, and Table 5.8 are reduced. However, due to lack
of literature on the estimate of the reduction in economic activities and power consumption,
reduction of 0 to 90% is considered as shown in Figure 5.11. It can be seen from Figure
5.11 that the net benefit decreases linearly with a reduction in revenue and economic losses.
Both adaptation strategies result in positive net benefits for all climate change scenarios
even with a reduction of 90% in revenue and economic losses.
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Figure 5.11 Net benefit considering reduction in revenue and economic losses

It should be noted that the results presented in this paper involve a certain degree of
uncertainties. For example, there is considerable uncertainty in the prediction of variation
of hurricane intensity and frequency. The consideration of six climate change scenarios
that cover a range of possible variations is a simple way of taken such uncertainties into
account. Uncertainties in hurricane simulation parameters such as approach angle and
central pressure difference were accounted for through their corresponding probability
distributions as well as by running 200,000 simulations. Uncertainties in the timedependent strength of the poles were considered using the coefficient of variation of the
strength of the poles which also varies with time. As the literature on climate change impact
on hurricane intensity and frequency as well as the time-dependent strength of poles
continues to grow, new findings that can be used to better quantify the uncertainties can be
easily incorporated into the proposed framework.
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5.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, the potential impact of climate change on distribution systems subjected to
hurricanes is evaluated. The effectiveness of various climate change adaptation strategies
is also investigated. The framework can be used by utility companies and government
agencies for decision making in long-term investment planning and pre-disaster
preparedness in power distribution system infrastructure.
The results of the case study show that climate change can have an impact on system
reliability and life cycle cost of distribution systems depending on the severity of the
potential change. For example, a 35% increase in frequency and 40% increase in the
intensity of hurricanes will reduce the system reliability by 40% in 2080 and lead to a 12%
increase in life cycle cost by the end of the century. The results also show that adaptation
strategies can be cost-effective in improving system reliability to adapt to the impact of
climate change. If the entire system is strengthened at construction stage, the life cycle cost
could be reduced by about 15% by the end of the century for a climate change scenario that
resulted in 35% increase in frequency and 40% increase in the intensity of hurricanes. The
results further demonstrate the importance of considering the cost incurred by society as a
whole due to power outages during hurricane events. The framework can be applied
directly to an existing system if the age distribution of the poles is known.
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6. Reconfigurability Enhancement for Distribution Systems
Subjected to Hurricanes 3
6.1 Introduction
Most distribution systems in the U.S. are radial systems (Brown, 2008). In such systems,
there is a unique path from the source of power to each component or customer.
Consequently, if there is a fault at any point in a line, all customers downstream of the point
will lose power. In a region with several cities, independent distribution systems, each with
its own substation/substations are used for power supply. In such a case, a potentially costeffective method of storm hardening is rerouting of power from one distribution system to
another by constructing additional distribution lines and installing control switches to
improve the redundancy of the systems. This will allow customers downstream of failed
line to be supplied by a feeder from another substation that is not in the vicinity of a storm.
This concept is demonstrated using Figure 6.1 which shows three independent distribution
systems.
Constructing additional distribution lines (dotted lines) with normally open (NO) switches
to connect feeders from the three independent substations can improve their reliabilities.
For example, looking at the hurricane path in Figure 6.1, it is very likely that the upstream
of lines 1 and 2, served by substations A and B, will likely fail and cut off power to all
customers downstream. In such a case, customers downstream of the affected lines can
receive power from feeders 3 and 4 emanating from substation C.

3

A version of this chapter has been submitted to Journal of Infrastructure Systems.
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Figure 6.1 Schematic of proposed storm hardening strategy

While rerouting of power within a single distribution system after minor disturbances has
been studied over the years (e.g. Viswanadha Raju and Bijwe (2008), Enacheanu et al.
(2008), Ramos et al. (2005), Chouhan et al. (2009), Faza et al. (2007)), systematic study of
rerouting between independent systems after a catastrophic event such as hurricane that
takes into account the topography and the spatial nature of distribution system, as well as
hurricane wind has not been carried out. This chapter studies the effectiveness of
constructing new distribution lines with Normally Open switches in improving the
reliability of radially operated distribution systems subjected to hurricanes. Unlike in
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Chapters 4 and 5 where a single distribution system (one substation and its feeders) was
considered, a system of several independent distribution systems is considered here.

6.2 Power Distribution System Model
For the purpose of the proposed study, a GIS model of the distribution system of parts of
Florida is developed as shown in Figure 6.2. It should be noted that only the 3-phase main
feeder lines are shown in Figure 6.2. The region consists of several unconnected networked
distribution systems or ‘islands’. Each island consists of one or more substation with
feeders that are radially operated due to the presence of normally open switches at several
locations within the system. The entire study area has 20 substations and 73 feeders. Each
feeder is divided into lines (switchable sections) using sectionalizing switches. The
distribution system covers an area of approximately 10,000 square miles.
For simplicity, all the laterals lines per feeder mile are lumped as one load point for system
reliability evaluation. Based on feeder customer density for the study area reported by the
utility company serving the area, the average number of customers is assumed to be 200
per feeder mile. The total length of all the feeder lines in the study area is about 1,080 miles
serving approximately 216,800 customers.
Due to lack of data on location of sectionalizing switches in the systems, the following
placement points are assumed for the switches in the system:
i.

Sectionalizer placement at the beginning of each lateral line

ii.

Sectionalizer placement at every branching point of the main feeder lines

iii.

Sectionalizer placement at every mile of the main feeder lines
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To enable power reconfiguration in the event of a hurricane, additional lines with tie
switches will be constructed to connect any two ends of feeders. This is a simple
combinatorial problem where the number of possible combinations is given by
𝑛𝑛!/((𝑛𝑛 − 2)! 2!). This will result in a very high number of possible combinations as some

feeders among the 73 feeders in the area have several ends. To reduce the possible number
of combinations, the following constraints are set:
i.

New lines will only be constructed to connect feeders from different
substations as the aim is to provide additional independent source of power
to feeders

ii.

Only new lines that connect feeders from different distribution islands will
be considered

iii.

New lines should not be more 20 miles long

Among the reduced possible number of new lines, the shortest one is chosen for each feeder
so as to minimize the cost of construction. In all cases, the radial structure of the system is
maintained. Topographical constraints are also considered in the construction of new lines,
i.e. new lines are assumed to follow the road network of the study area just like most of the
existing distribution lines.
17 new lines are proposed for the study area to demonstrate the framework and are shown
in Figure 6.2. Manually-operated Normally Open switches are added to the new lines to
maintain the radial nature of the systems. As the aim of this research is to investigate the
effectiveness of constructing additional lines with switches to connect feeders between
different distribution islands, the optimization of switching operations within each
individual island is not considered in the research.
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Figure 6.2 Notional power distribution system of parts of Florida (3-phase feeder lines)
[Basemap © OpenStreetMap Contributors)

6.3 Hurricane Hazard Analysis
Studying the effectiveness of constructing new distribution lines require consideration of
the path and the spatial variation of wind speeds of hurricanes. Hence, for the hurricane
hazard analysis, a scenario-based approach is proposed in this framework. This entails
selecting historical hurricanes that passed through a selected study area or simulating
synthetic hurricanes. Three historical hurricanes are selected for this study. These are
Hurricane Jeanne, Hurricane Charley, and Hurricane Wilma. Hurricane Jeanne made
landfall on the east coast of Florida on 26 September 2004 as a category 3 hurricane
(Lawrence & Cobb, 2005). Hurricane Charley made landfall on the southwest coast of
Florida on 13 August 2004 as a category 4 hurricane (Pasch et al., 2005). Hurricane Wilma
made landfall on 24 October 2005 as a category 3 hurricane.
The paths of these hurricanes are shown in Figure 6.2. The variation of gradient wind speed
with distance from hurricane eye for the three historical hurricanes as they made landfall
is shown in Figure 6.3. The study area is divided into 10 mile x 10-mile grids. For each
hurricane, the gradient wind speed at any location at every time instant is calculated and
then converted to 3-sec gust wind speed using methodology discussed in Chapter 4.
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Figure 6.3 Vortex shape of gradient wind speed for the 3 historical hurricanes at landfall

6.4 Component Vulnerability
The poles supporting the distribution lines are assumed to be southern pine wood poles as
it is the dominant material used in the U.S. (Gustavsen & Rolfseng, 2000; Wolfe & Moody,
1997). According to Florida Power & Light, the company serving the selected study area,
class 2 wood poles are used to support main feeder lines as part of their storm hardening
plan. It is therefore assumed herein that all the poles supporting the distribution feeder lines
are class 2 southern pine wood poles.
A typical distribution pole that is 13.7 m high is considered. The poles are assumed to
support three Aluminum Conductor Steel Reinforced (ACSR) conductor wires with
diameters of 18.3 mm as well as one all-aluminum conductor (AAC) neutral wire with a
115

diameter of 11.8 mm. All the poles are assumed to have a span of 46 m for wind pressure
calculations (Short, 2006). It is acknowledged that the span can vary with location and
between urban and rural areas. For the purpose of demonstrating the framework, however,
the span is assumed to be constant. The fragility curve of the poles is shown in Figure 6.4.
Note that in this study, the poles are assumed to be new, i.e. no decay.
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Figure 6.4 Fragility curve of main feeder line poles

6.5 Cost-Benefit Analysis
To investigate the cost-effectiveness of constructing additional lines for power rerouting,
cost-benefit analysis is performed. The cost is the money spent in constructing the new
lines to connect feeders from different substations, while the benefit is the reduction in
revenue loss and societal economic losses due to power rerouting. The net benefit is
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calculated by subtracting the cost from the benefit. If the net benefit is positive, then
constructing additional lines is considered cost-effective. The various costs considered are
discussed below.

i.

Mitigation cost: this is the cost of constructing additional distribution lines with
NO switches to connect feeders from different substations.

ii.

Repair cost: this is the cost of repairing failed distribution lines due to hurricane
winds. In this case, it is the cost of replacing failed distribution poles with new
poles of the same class. The repair cost is given by Equation (6.1).
𝑛𝑛

𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = � 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 ∙ 𝑁𝑁 ∙ 𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟

(6.1)

𝑖𝑖

where 𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 is the repair cost for line i; 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 is the probability of failure of a pole;

𝑁𝑁 is the number of poles in a line, 𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟 is the unit repair cost of poles; and 𝑛𝑛 is

the number of lines in a system.
iii.

Revenue loss: this is the cost incurred by the utility company due to the
interruption in power supply. The loss due to unmet demand caused by the
failure of distribution lines is given by Equation (6.2).
𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟

𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷 = � 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡) ∙ 𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

(6.2)

𝑡𝑡=0

where 𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷 is the loss due to unmet demand; 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡) is the average hourly demand

on line i at time t; 𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡) is the unit price of electricity at time t; 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟 is the time to
restore service to a line. 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟 depends on the number of failed poles in a line as
well as in lines upstream of the line being considered. The total revenue loss is
then given by Equation (6.3).
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𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟

𝑛𝑛

1
= �(𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷 |𝑄𝑄𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ) ∙ Pr(𝑄𝑄𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 )
𝑅𝑅

(6.3)

𝑖𝑖

where 𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 is the total revenue loss for a system; (𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷 |𝑄𝑄𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ) is the loss due to

unmet demand given that power is not delivered to line i; Pr(𝑄𝑄𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ) is the
probability that power is not delivered to line i; R is the number of repair crew

iv.

units; and 𝑛𝑛 is the number of lines in a system.

Societal economic losses: this is the direct economic loss to customers due to
the interruption in power supply. The economic loss for a line after a hurricane
event is given by Equation (6.4).
𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟

𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿 = � 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

(6.4)

𝑡𝑡=0

where 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡) is the monetary loss per hour; 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟 is the time to restore power to a
line. The total societal economic loss is then given by Equation (6.5).
𝑛𝑛

1
𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸 = �(𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿 |𝑄𝑄𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ) ∙ Pr(𝑄𝑄𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 )
𝑅𝑅

(6.5)

𝑖𝑖

where 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸 is the total societal economic loss for a system; 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿 is the economic

loss for a line; R is the number of repair crew units; and 𝑛𝑛 is the number of lines
in a system.

The various costs, restoration times, power consumption, and economic loss for various
customer types are given in Table 6.1. Due to lack of data on the number and specific
locations of customer types in the study area, it is assumed that 2 customers per feeder
mile, or 1% of all customers per feeder mile, are commercial customers while the rest are
residential customers.
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Table 6.1 Cost analysis parameters
Value

Parameters

Source

Cost of constructing new lines (switches included) $350,000

Gregory et al. (2006)

Cost of pole replacement under storm condition

$4,000/pole

Xu and Brown (2008b)

Unit price of electricity

$0.11/kWh

Xu and Brown (2008b)

Economic loss (residential)

$2.70/h

LaCommare and Eto (2006)

Economic loss (commercial)

$886/h

LaCommare and Eto (2006)

Average consumption (residential)

1.5kW/h

EIA (2013)

Average consumption (commercial)

10.1kW/h

EIA (2013)

Number of repair crew units available

10

Assumed

Restoration time of failed pole

4 hours

Brown (2009)

Discount rate

4%

Bastidas-Arteaga

and

Stewart (2015)

6.6 Results
6.6.1 System Reliability Results
The results of the system reliability analysis are shown in Figure 6.5, Figure 6.6, and Figure
6.7. As mentioned earlier, due to the radial nature of distribution systems, each substation
is considered as a separate system. For each line in a system, the maximum wind speed
experienced by the line as each hurricane passes through the study area is used in the
evaluation of system reliabilities shown in Figure 6.5, Figure 6.6, and Figure 6.7.
It can be observed from Figure 6.5, Figure 6.6, and Figure 6.7 that constructing new lines
with NO switches improved the reliabilities of the systems. However, the level of
improvement depends on the path of the hurricane, number of new lines connected to a
system, and length of the new lines. For example, the reliability of system 9 only improves
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by about 30% when hurricane Jeanne passes through even though there are 3 new lines
supplying the system from 3 different substations. This is because both the alternative
sources of energy, as well as the new lines, are in the path of the hurricane. Considering
system 10, however, which also has 3 new lines connected to it, its reliability improved by
about 79% because two of the three new lines, as well as the substations feeding them, are
further away from the path of hurricane Jeanne. The length of the new lines affects the
level of improvement in system reliability because the longer the lines, the higher the
probability of failure during hurricanes. In this case, most of the new proposed lines are
more than 10 miles long. This drastically limits the effect these lines will have in improving
system reliability.
Figure 6.7 shows that hurricane Charley mostly affected systems 1 – 5 as can be inferred
from the path of the hurricane in Figure 6.2. Among these 5 systems, only systems 1, 3,
and 5 have new additional lines. The reliability of system 3 increased from about 1% to
3% due to the additional lines.
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Figure 6.5 System reliability results for Hurricane Jeanne
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Figure 6.6 System reliability results for Hurricane Wilma

121

18

19

20

Original System

Improved System

100
90

System Reliability (%)

80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

System

Figure 6.7 System reliability results for Hurricane Charley

6.6.2 Cost Analysis Results
The results of the cost analysis are shown in Table 6.2. It can be seen that in general,
constructing the new distribution lines for the system considered is not cost-effective. This
is due to the high cost of constructing the new lines which, in this case, is over $50 million
as seen in Table 6.2. This is mainly due to the long distance between the ends of the feeders
connected by the new lines. Additionally, some poles in the new lines will fail especially
for a new line in the path of the hurricane. This leads to increase in repair cost for the
modified system as compared to the original system. The repair cost increased by about
17%, 11%, and 11% for the modified system after Hurricanes Jeanne, Wilma, and Charley,
respectively.
The addition of new lines did not significantly reduce revenue loss and societal economic
losses. Revenue loss decreased by about 2.6%, 1.5%, and 0.4% for Hurricanes Jeanne,
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Wilma, and Charley, respectively. Societal economic losses decreased by 3.7%, 1.4%, and
0.2%, for Hurricanes Jeanne, Wilma, and Charley, respectively. In fact, the increase in
repair cost is greater than benefit from the decrease in revenue loss and societal economic
losses combined. This implies that in this case, repair cost should be the main concern for
utility companies.

Table 6.2 Cost analysis results ($1,000s)
Hurricane Jeanne

Hurricane Wilma

Original

Modified

Original

Modified Original

Modified

system

system

system

system

system

system

Mitigation

-

50,190

-

50,190

-

50,190

Repair

1,471

1,722

2,059

2,289

3,004

3,329

Revenue loss

76

74

136

134

232

231

Societal economic loss 5,049

4,864

8,972

8,849

15,317

15,291

Net benefit (NB)

-

-50,254

-

-50,295

-

-50,489

NB w/o societal cost

-

-50,438

-

-50,418

-

-50,515

Cost Category

Hurricane Charley

6.7 Conclusions
This chapter studies system reliability improvement due to power reconfiguration through
the construction of additional lines with normally open (NO) switches to connect systems
supplied by different power sources. Cost analysis to study the cost-effectiveness of the
proposed risk mitigation strategy is also performed. The case study used indicate that
constructing new lines to connect feeders from different substations can improve the
reliability of the systems. However, the level of improvement depends largely on hurricane
path, the number of new lines constructed as well as the length of the new lines.
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In the case study considered, construction of additional lines is not cost-effective mainly
due to the high cost of constructing the lines. It can be concluded that the cost-effectiveness
of such strategy will largely depend on the length of the new lines that need to be
constructed. While the mitigation strategy might not be attractive economically, the
improvement in system reliability can improve customer satisfaction and help maintain
power supply to critical facilities during natural disasters. Additionally, increase in repair
cost due to the addition of new distribution lines can outweigh savings from both revenue
loss and societal economic losses. Consequently, mitigation strategies that lower the repair
cost might be more attractive, economically, for utility companies. This includes using
stronger poles for the lines or shortening the spans of the lines.
In this study, a topological-based method of evaluating system reliability was used. This
method only takes into account the topological constraint in distribution system
reconfiguration and does not incorporate the engineering or physical aspects of the system
which will require performing complex power flow analysis. To account for electrical
constraints such as voltage drop and equipment overload, a complete power flow analysis
based on the physical and engineering details of the system is recommended for future
research.
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7. Multi-Hazard Risk Assessment Framework4
7.1 Introduction
Natural hazards can be concurrent/non-concurrent and dependent/independent. For
example, high winds, waves, and storm surge during hurricanes are dependent and
concurrent hazards. Earthquakes can cause tsunamis, landslides, and fires which make
them dependent hazards. Seismic and hurricane hazards can be described as independent
and non-concurrent hazards. Regardless, within the life span of infrastructure systems
located in regions vulnerable to both hazards, there is a possibility of such infrastructure
being subjected to such independent hazards that are different in nature. Therefore,
effective mitigation of risks to infrastructure due to natural hazards requires understanding,
evaluation, and interaction of (a) all hazards that can cause significant threats and, (b) the
vulnerability of infrastructure subjected to the hazards. Consequently, the United Nations
(UN) in its Johannesburg Plan called for increased effort in integrated, multi-hazard risk
assessment as part of a comprehensive disaster management plan (UN, 2002).
Hazard events differ in nature, intensity, return periods, and magnitude measurement
method. Therefore, the first challenge of multi-hazard risk analysis is comparability of
hazardous events (Carpignano et al., 2009; Li et al., 2012; Marzocchi et al., 2012). Hazards
with different probabilities of occurrence, such as earthquakes and hurricanes, are difficult
to compare. For example, a low probability/high consequence earthquake can cause as
much damage as recurrent high probability/low consequence hurricanes. The second
difficulty in multi-hazard risk analysis is the comparison of vulnerabilities of exposed
elements (Carpignano et al., 2009). Different hazards can affect different elements in a
region or different components of a system. For example, substations and transmission
lines can be more vulnerable to different hazards and the parameters used to measure their
vulnerabilities are not the same.
4

A version of this chapter has been submitted to ASCE Journal of Structural Engineering.
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Multi-hazard risk assessment pertaining dependent concurrent hazards is approached in
two ways. One way is to analyze each single hazard independently and then calculate multihazard risk by weighted summation of single-hazard risk results or indices (Bell & Glade,
2004; Mosquera-Machado & Dilley, 2009). The other approach is a truly integrated
analysis of hazards, exposure, and vulnerability through joint probability distribution of
hazards, multi-dimensional vulnerability, and integration of vulnerability surface with joint
hazard distribution (Ming et al., 2015). Multi-hazard risk assessment of independent nonconcurrent hazards is usually carried out through comparative approach using a common
index. This is feasible because risk is not measured in hazard-specific units but in damage
or loss-specific units such as damage to properties or disruption to economic activities
(Kappes et al., 2012).
While development of multi-hazard risk analysis framework for buildings and bridges have
been ongoing in recent years, risk analysis of spatially-distributed civil infrastructure
systems such as electric power and water systems have so far been limited to mostly singlehazard considerations (e.g. Adachi and Ellingwood (2010), Winkler et al. (2010), Song and
Ok (2010), Duenas-Osorio and Hernandez-Fajardo (2008), Kim and Kang (2013), Ryan et
al. (2014a)). As these systems usually cover large areas and can be subjected to multiple
hazards within their lifetime, there is a need to develop a framework to study the impact of
multiple hazards on such systems. This is essential for pre-disaster decision making
regarding mitigation strategies as certain mitigation strategies for one hazard might be
ineffective or even increase the risk for other hazards.
Ouyang et al. (2012) conducted a multi-hazard study of electric power systems subjected
to concurrent hazards as part of a multi-stage resilience framework. The concurrent hazards
considered are hurricane hazard and random hazards (equipment failure, trees, animals,
human errors) whose co-occurrence was modeled by a Poisson process. Multi-hazard effect
of concurrent hurricane and random hazards was also studied in the context of cascading
failure of interdependent infrastructure systems by Ouyang and Dueñas-Osorio (2011). The
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hazards considered in the above studies differ greatly in terms of frequency and
consequence. Whereas hurricanes usually cause large disruptions and widespread damage
to infrastructure systems, damage due to random hazards is usually localized and relatively
short in duration.
This chapter presents a framework for multi-hazard risk assessment of electric power
systems under seismic and hurricane wind hazards. Two multi-hazard risk assessment
methods are also presented. The first method is a comparative approach using proposed
risk curves due to multi-hazard, while the second method is a cumulative approach based
on the annual probability of system failure. The proposed multi-hazard risk assessment
models can be used to prioritize investment in mitigation strategies by ranking hazards
based on the level of risk they pose in the short- and long-term.
Figure 7.1 shows a flowchart of the proposed framework. In this chapter, the risk
assessment part of the framework (items 1 to 4 of the left side of Figure 7.1) is discussed.
Multi-hazard risk mitigation strategies and their cost-effectiveness are discussed in Chapter
8. The framework is demonstrated using a notional power system assumed to be located in
Charleston, SC, New York, NY, and Seattle, WA. The proposed framework considers the
fragilities of transmission lines and substations. The proposed framework can also be
extended to carry out multi-hazard risk assessment of distribution systems when data for
fragilities of distribution components (lines and poles) subjected to earthquakes, hurricane
wind, falling trees, and flying debris is available.
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SYSTEM DEFINITION
Location, system topology, etc.

1. Hazard Identification:
Identify hazards that may impact the system

Earthquakes

Hurricanes

Probabilistic or scenariobased hazard analysis

2. Component-level Risk Assessment
(a) Hazard analysis: choose probabilistic or
scenario-based hazard analysis
(b) Component vulnerability analysis: quantify
vulnerability of components to hazards

Fragility analysis of transmission lines
and substations

3. System-level Risk Assessment:
Quantify risk to entire system due to each
hazard using indicators such as system
reliability, cost of damage etc.

Topological-based system reliability
evaluation

4. Multi-Hazard Risk Assessment:
Aggregate or compare risks using common
index

Risk comparison/
summation

5. Risk Mitigation:
Identify critical system components and select
mitigation strategies

Evaluate component importance index
Select mitigation strategy

Re-evaluate system reliability
6. Cost-effectiveness evaluation:
Assess effectiveness of mitigation strategy
using cost-benefit analysis, life-cycle cost
analysis etc.

Perform cost analysis
No
Strategy cost-effective?
Yes
Compare with other
strategies?

7. Decision:
Select desired mitigation strategy based on
system reliability and cost consideration

No
FINISH

Figure 7.1 Flowchart of proposed multi-hazard risk assessment framework
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Yes

7.2 Electric Power System
The electric power system adopted to demonstrate the proposed framework is shown in
Figure 7.2 and is based on the electric power system of Shelby County, Tennessee modified
from Shinozuka et al. (1998). It is assumed herein that the system is located in three cities,
namely Charleston, New York, and Seattle. The power system is superimposed on the map
of the three locations using the georeferencing tool in ArcGIS. This allows the coordinates
of each substation or any point within the system to be determined.
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Figure 7.2 Notional electric power system
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The power system consists of high voltage gate stations, medium voltage substations, and
low voltage substations. The gate stations are assumed to be the source nodes or supply
stations in this case since the system doesn’t have generating plants of its own. The medium
and low voltage substations are the demand nodes which are distribution substations that
directly serve customers. Power flow through the network is modeled so that edges
connected to supply nodes are unidirectional while all other edges are bidirectional except
those supplying terminal substations such as L5 and M5 in Figure 7.2. To estimate the
number of transmission structures in each line, the span is assumed to be 800 ft. (Philipson
& Willis, 2006; Davidson et al., 2003).
Number of customers is adopted for use in evaluating system reliability. The number of
customers served by the system in its original location in Shelby county, Tennessee is about
400,000 (Shelby-County, 2015). Based on this information and for the purpose of
demonstrating the proposed framework, all the low voltage substations are equally
assumed to serve 10,000 customers each while the medium voltage substations are assumed
to serve 14,000 customers each. The total number of customers served by the system is
therefore 398,000. Detailed information on the power system is given in Table 7.1.
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Table 7.1 Notional power system information
Description
Number of high voltage gate stations (supply nodes)

8

Number of medium voltage distribution substations (demand nodes)

17

Number of low voltage distribution substations (demand nodes)

16

Approximate area covered by system

2,590 km2

Total number of customers served by system (based on actual numbers
from Shelby-County (2015))

398,000

Number of customers served by low voltage substations

10,000

Number of customers served by medium voltage substations

14,000

Number of transmission lines

66

Span of transmission line support structures

244 m (800 ft.)

Total number of transmission structures

1,715

Location of G1 in Charleston, SC

33oN, 80.2oW

Location of G1 in New York, NY

40.76oN, 73.47oW

Location of G1 in Seattle, WA

47.6oN, 122.3oW

7.3 Hazard Analysis
Hazard analysis for structures and infrastructure systems can be carried out in two ways,
namely probabilistic analysis and scenario-based analysis (Adachi & Ellingwood, 2010;
Li, 2012). Probabilistic analysis considers the aggregated effect of all possible hazard
levels. In a probabilistic analysis, hazard levels are weighted by their respective probability
of occurrence. In a scenario-based approach, the effect of a specific hazard level is
considered (e.g. 200-year return period hurricane or a magnitude 6.5 earthquake).
In the context of multi-hazard analysis where risks due to different hazards are compared
using an index, adopting a scenario-based approach such as comparing worst case scenarios
of various hazards can be biased (Li & Ellingwood, 2009). In such a case, all possible
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intensities of hazards should be considered which makes probabilistic hazard analysis more
suitable for multi-hazard risk assessment. However, application of probabilistic seismic
hazard analysis to spatially distributed infrastructure systems has been shown to be limited
by Adachi and Ellingwood (2010). This is because the spatial variation of intensity for a
severe earthquake is lost in the aggregation process of probabilistic analysis. The
probabilistic approach, however, allows risks to be annualized which is essential in
decision making regarding long-term investment in mitigation strategies. This approach
also provides a way for risk comparison due to different competing hazards. In this chapter,
both probabilistic and scenario-based hazard analysis are considered and discussed. The
limitation of both approaches can be overcome by adopting a probabilistically weighted
deterministic hazard scenarios approach. This will be discussed in Chapter 8.

7.3.1 Seismic Hazard Analysis
To perform probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA), seismic-hazard source and
attenuation models are used. Seismic-hazard source model describes the location,
magnitude and occurrence time of an earthquake while attenuation models describe the
decay of seismic intensity from source to a particular site. The end result of PSHA is a
seismic hazard curve that gives the annual rate of exceedance of a ground motion intensity
measure (e.g., peak ground acceleration or spectral acceleration). The most extensively
used hazard curves are developed by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) based on the
mainshock records of the U.S. (USGS, 2015a; Petersen et al., 2014). The annual rate of
exceedance of seismic intensity measure, IM, is often modeled by a power law expression
such as the one given by Equation (7.1) (Cornell et al., 2002; Sewell et al., 1996;
Kameshwar & Padgett, 2014).
𝑣𝑣(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) = 𝑘𝑘0 (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)−𝑘𝑘
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(7.1)

where 𝑣𝑣(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) is the annual probability of exceeding intensity measure, IM; and 𝑘𝑘0 and 𝑘𝑘

are empirical constants. The power law in Equation (7.1) is linear on a log-log space.
Bradley et al. (2007) demonstrated that the above power law overestimates the hazard
within the low and high-intensity regions of the hazard curve and underestimates the hazard
between the design basis earthquake (DBE) and maximum considered earthquake (MCE)
intensity levels (see Figure 7.3). To remedy such anomaly, Bradley et al. (2007) proposed
a hyperbolic function in a log-log space as given by Equation (7.2).
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 −1
𝑣𝑣� = 𝑎𝑎 ∙ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 �𝑏𝑏 �ln �
�� �
𝑐𝑐

(7.2)

where 𝑣𝑣� is the annual probability of exceeding a certain peak ground acceleration; 𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏 and

𝑐𝑐 are constants determined by fitting the above equation over a hazard curve such as the
one obtained from USGS (2015a).

Figure 7.3 shows the hazard curve plotted using data from USGS (2015a) for a location in
a coastal area of South Carolina. The power model in Equation (7.1) is fitted to the USGS
hazard curve using the method proposed by Jalayer (2003) while the hyperbolic model in
Equation (7.2) is fitted using non-linear least square regression analysis. The constants 𝑘𝑘0

and 𝑘𝑘 in Equation (7.1) are found to be 0.000192 and 1.072, respectively. The constants 𝑎𝑎,

𝑏𝑏, and 𝑐𝑐 in Equation (7.2) are found to be 0.33, 30.02, and 42.36, respectively. It can be
seen from Figure 7.3 that the hyperbolic function is more suited to the curve for the entire
range of seismic intensities. The hyperbolic function is therefore adopted for use in this
research. The steps for the probabilistic seismic hazard analysis are shown in Figure 7.4.
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Figure 7.3 Seismic hazard curve for Charleston, SC (32.8oN 79.9oW)
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Figure 7.4 Probabilistic seismic hazard analysis

In a scenario-based approach, the seismic intensity at various locations away from the
epicenter of a given earthquake is determined using available attenuation models. Toro et
al. (1997) developed a stochastic attenuation relationship from extensive analysis of ground
motion data for central and eastern North America. The result of the study can be directly
applied to hard rock and can be applied to soil sites by using amplification factors. The
proposed attenuation equation is:
ln(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃) = 𝐶𝐶1 + 𝐶𝐶2 (𝑀𝑀 − 6) + 𝐶𝐶3 (𝑀𝑀 − 6)2 − 𝐶𝐶4 ln 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀
− (𝐶𝐶5 − 𝐶𝐶4 )𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 �ln �

𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀
� , 0� − 𝐶𝐶6 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 + 𝜀𝜀𝑒𝑒 + 𝜀𝜀𝑎𝑎
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(7.3)

(7.4)

2
𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 = �𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
+ 𝐶𝐶72

where PGA is the peak ground acceleration in units of g; 𝐶𝐶1 through 𝐶𝐶7 are constants; M is
either moment magnitude or body wave magnitude; 𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 is the closest horizontal distance

to the earthquake rupture in km; and 𝜀𝜀𝑒𝑒 and 𝜀𝜀𝑎𝑎 are measures of epistemic and aleatory
uncertainties respectively and depend on magnitude and distance. This model is adopted
for use in this research.

The 1886 Charleston earthquake which is the strongest earthquake on record to hit South
Carolina is selected for demonstrating the framework. The earthquake occurred on August
31, 1886, and had a magnitude of 7.3 and epicenter at 32.9oN and 80oW shown in Figure
7.2 (USGS, 2015b). The attenuation model given by Equation (7.3) and soil amplification
factors from FEMA (2009) are then used to estimate the PGA at the location of each
component.

7.3.2 Hurricane Hazard Analysis
The probabilistic and scenario hurricane hazard analysis discussed in Chapter 4 is used
here. Figure 7.5 shows the steps for the probabilistic approach. The hazard curves for
Charleston, New York, and Seattle are shown in Figure 7.6. Hurricane Hugo, the strongest
hurricane on record to strike South Carolina, has been selected for the scenario-based
hurricane hazard analysis. Hurricane track data and recorded wind speeds are obtained
from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA, 2015b).

Identify the location
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components (latitude
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return periods from ATC for
each component location

Evaluate Weibull
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Figure 7.5 Probabilistic hurricane analysis
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Figure 7.6 Hurricane hazard curves
Charleston (32.8oN 79.9oW), New York (40.71oN 74oW), and Seattle (47.6oN 122.3oW)

7.4 Component Vulnerability Analysis
The structural components of electric power systems considered in this study are the
substations and transmission structures/lines. Since the objective of this study is to model
multi-hazard risk assessment, the fragilities of the system components are taken from
existing literature.

7.4.1 Substation Fragility
Due to the nature and weight of substation components, substations are rarely damaged by
hurricane winds. Rather, flooding resulting from storm surge is of greater concern for
substations (Brown, 2009). Since only hurricane winds are considered in this research, it
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is assumed that substations are not affected by hurricanes. Substations are however
vulnerable to earthquakes due the presence of brittle components that have considerable
mass (Vanzi, 1996; Eidinger & Kempner, 2012). FEMA (2010) modeled the seismic
fragility of substations subjected to seismic hazard using lognormal distribution and
provided the fragility parameters. The seismic fragility parameters provided are for high
voltage, medium voltage, and low voltage substations. The substations are also classified
based on whether the subcomponents are anchored to resist seismic loads or not.
FEMA (2010) considered five damage states for the seismic fragility of substations. These
are none, slight/minor, moderate, extensive, and complete. These damage states are defined
based on the percentage of subcomponents being damaged rather than power flow within
the substation. In this study, it is assumed that substations in extensive or complete damage
states will lose their functionality and are considered failed (Dueñas‐Osorio et al., 2007).
Since exceeding extensive damage state is a prelude to exceeding complete damage state,
the substations are hence considered failed in extensive damage state. The fragility
parameters for extensive damage of the three classes of substations are shown in Table 7.2
(FEMA, 2010). In Chapter 8, all the damage states will be considered for evaluating the
cost-effectiveness of mitigation strategies.

Table 7.2 Lognormal parameters for seismic fragility of substations with anchored
components
(Damage state: extensive)
Substation

Median PGA (g)

Dispersion

Low voltage

0.45

0.45

Medium voltage

0.35

0.40

High voltage

0.20

0.35

Classification

Figure 7.7 shows the seismic fragilities of the substations for the damage state of extensive
damage based on the lognormal parameters in Table 7.2. The seismic fragilities of the
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substations are calculated with respect to peak ground acceleration (PGA) because facilities
such as substations and distribution circuits are mostly vulnerable to PGA unless they are
located in liquefiable or landslide zones in which case they will sometimes be vulnerable
to peak ground displacement (PGD) (FEMA, 2010).
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Figure 7.7 Seismic fragility curves of substations for extensive damage state

7.4.2 Transmission Line Fragility
Transmission towers are rarely damaged by the actual shaking of the ground during
earthquakes as they are designed for severe loads such as combined wind and ice, extra
loads due to the collapse of adjacent towers and so on. Instead, the damage is mostly due
to foundation failures caused by landslides, ground fracture, and liquefaction. However,
there is a lack of data to include such failures in analytical studies (Shinozuka et al., 2005).
Therefore, it is assumed in this research that the transmission structures are not affected by
earthquakes.
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The fragility of transmission line support structures subjected to wind load depends on
several factors such as variability in tower types, load direction, and the potential for
cascading failure. These factors make analytical fragility analysis of transmission lines
quite complex. Another viable approach is through the use of empirical failure data to plot
the fragility curve of transmission structures. One advantage of transmission structure
fragility developed from empirical data over fragility curves developed using analytical
methods is that in analytical method, it is difficult to combine several failure mechanisms
such as flexural and foundation failure together. In most cases, only one failure mechanism
is considered at a time in analytical fragility analysis. Fragility curves developed based on
empirical data remedy this shortcoming to a greater extent.
Brown (2009) developed a fragility curve for transmission support structures subjected to
hurricane winds based on 10-year storm-related damage data provided by four coastal
utility companies. According to the data, a total of 1,947 transmission structures were
damaged or replaced in the 10-year period. The exponential model fitted to the damage
data is given by Equation (7.5). The fragility curve is shown in Figure 7.8. It should be
noted that the fragility of transmission structures depends on the type of structure as well
as the conductor span. The fragility function given by Equation (7.5) however did not take
these factors into account. Rather, it based on general damage data collected by the utility
companies. Therefore, the adoption of Equation (7.5) here is for the purpose of
demonstrating the proposed framework. Accurate fragility data can be developed by
individual utility companies to guide decision making.
𝑃𝑃(𝐶𝐶 < 𝐷𝐷) = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚{[(2 ∙ 10−7 )𝑒𝑒 0.0834∙𝑣𝑣 ], 1}

(7.5)

where 𝐶𝐶 is capacity; 𝐷𝐷 is demand; and 𝑃𝑃(𝐶𝐶 < 𝐷𝐷) is the probability of failure at a given
wind speed, 𝑣𝑣. For hurricane hazard analysis, all the structures in a single line are assumed
to be subjected to the same wind speed.
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Figure 7.8 Fragility curve of transmission support structures

7.5 Component Risk Assessment
The seismic risk to infrastructure components using the probabilistic seismic hazard
analysis is performed by convolving component fragility with the seismic hazard curve.
The annual probability of exceeding a certain damage state is given by Equation (7.6).
∞

𝑑𝑑𝑣𝑣�
𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 = � 𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅 (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) ∙ �
� 𝑑𝑑(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)
𝑑𝑑(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)
0

(7.6)

where 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 is the annual probability of exceeding a specified damage state; 𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅 (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) is the

fragility function given a certain level of intensity measure, IM, which is modeled with a
lognormal function for substations in this case; and 𝑣𝑣� is the seismic hazard function given
by Equation (7.2).
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For scenario-based seismic hazard analysis, the risk to components of an infrastructure
system is defined as the probability of failure given a specific level of seismic intensity.
The risk is evaluated directly from the fragility curves of the components.
Using the probabilistic hurricane analysis, the risk to infrastructure components is
quantified using the annual probability of failure which is estimated by convolving the
structural fragility with a hurricane wind speed model as:
∞

𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 = � 𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅 (𝑣𝑣)𝑓𝑓𝑣𝑣 (𝑣𝑣)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
0

(7.7)

where FR(v) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the structural fragility given
a wind speed v; and fv(v) is the probability density function (PDF) of the hurricane wind
speed.
For the scenario-based hurricane analysis, the risk to components is defined as the
probability of failure given a specific level of wind speed. The risk is evaluated directly
from the fragility curves of the components.

The results of the components risk analysis are shown in Figure 7.9 for Charleston. It can
be seen from Figure 7.9(a) that the seismic risk to substations increases with increasing
voltage rating. The high voltage gate stations (G1 – G8) are more vulnerable while the low
voltage substations are generally the least vulnerable. This can also be inferred from the
fragility curves of the substations in Figure 7.7. For the seismic risk result shown in Figure
7.9(b) based on the scenario earthquake, the seismic risk depends on both the substation
voltage rating as well as the location of each substation relative to the epicenter of the
earthquake. The component fragility results for the transmission lines subjected to
hurricane winds are given in Figure 7.9(c) & Figure 7.9(d). The fragilities of the lines
depend both on location and length of lines.
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Figure 7.9 Component risk results for Charleston
(a) PSHA, (b) scenario earthquake, (c) probabilistic hurricane analysis, and (d) scenario
hurricane
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7.6 System Reliability Results
System reliability depends on the accessibility of each substation from supply gate stations.
Accessibility here is modeled as the probability of power not being delivered to a substation
which is discussed in Chapter 3. The results of the accessibility of the demand substations
are given in Figure 7.10 for Charleston. It can be seen from Figure 7.10(b) that a lot of the
substations will not be able to receive power following the scenario earthquake as most of
the supply stations (G1 to G8) will likely fail following the earthquake as can be seen from
their fragilities in Figure 7.9(b).
From Figure 7.10(c) & Figure 7.10(d), it can be seen that accessibility of the substations
under hurricane hazard depends largely on the topology of the transmission lines supplying
power to each substation. For instance, M5 has one of the highest probability of power not
delivered in Figure 7.10(c) because, despite the fact that it can be supplied by 5 gate stations
through several routes, its accessibility relies largely on the reliability of line 16.
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Figure 7.10 Accessibility of demand substations in Charleston
(a) PSHA, (b) scenario earthquake, (c) probabilistic hurricane analysis, and (d) scenario
hurricane
147

The result of the system reliability analysis is summarized in Table 7.3 for Charleston. It
can be seen from the table that for both the probabilistic seismic and hurricane hazard
analysis, the system reliability is similar to probabilistic seismic hazard analysis resulting
in a slightly lower reliability. Considering the scenario-based approach, on the other hand,
the scenario earthquake has a much more devastating impact on system reliability (30.27%)
than the scenario hurricane (90.93%). This can be attributed to the fragility of system
components under both hazards. The gate stations and substations have much higher
probabilities of failure under the giving earthquake than the transmission lines have under
the giving hurricane as seen in Figure 7.9(b) & Figure 7.9(d). Another reason has to do
with the fact that the failure of a transmission line will have far less impact on system
reliability than the failure of a substation or most especially supply gate stations. Further
discussion on comparison of the two hazards will follow in the next section.

Table 7.3 Electric power system reliability results for Charleston
Hazard Analysis Type

Hazard Description

System
Reliability (%)

Probabilistic seismic hazard

Aggregated effect of all possible

analysis (annual risk)

seismic hazard levels

Scenario-based seismic hazard

7.3 magnitude earthquake (strongest

analysis (risk due to one event)

earthquake on record to hit SC)

Probabilistic hurricane hazard

Aggregated effect of all possible

analysis (annual risk)

hurricane hazard levels

Scenario-based hurricane hazard

Category 4 hurricane Hugo (strongest

analysis (risk due to one event)

hurricane on record to hit SC)
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99.89
30.27
99.96
90.93

7.7 Multi-Hazard Risk Assessment
7.7.1 Risk Comparison Based on Risk Curves
For comparison of seismic and hurricane risks, it is imperative to use some kind of a
common risk indicator. In this research, system reliability is used. Here, the concept of a
multi-hazard risk curve is introduced. Such a risk curve shows a plot of system reliabilities
against corresponding return periods (or exceedance probabilities). This allows direct
quantitative comparison of the risks for the range of return periods covered by both hazards.
To construct the multi-hazard risk curves, several return periods (or annual probabilities of
exceeding various hazard levels) are selected and their corresponding PGA and wind speed
at locations of all substations and lines calculated. System reliability corresponding to each
hazard level (PGA and wind speed) is then evaluated. The multi-hazard risk curves of the
power system in Charleston, New York, and Seattle are shown in Figure 7.11.

149

Return Period (Years)

10000

Seismic
Hurricane

1000

100
0

20

40

60

System Reliability (%)
(a)

1000000

100

Seismic
Hurricane

100000

Return Period (Years)

80

10000
1000
100
0

20

40

60

System Reliability (%)
(b)

1000000

100

Seismic
Windstorm

100000

Return Period (Years)

80

10000

1000

100
0

20

40

60

System Reliability (%)
(c)

80

Figure 7.11 Multi-hazard risk curves
(a) Charleston, (b) New York, (c) Seattle
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From Figure 7.11(a), it can be seen that at higher return periods (lower exceedance
probabilities) greater than about 460 years, the risk is clearly dominated by seismic hazard
in Charleston. For instance, at a return period of 700 years, the system reliability due to
seismic hazard is 12% compared to 62% due to hurricane hazard. It can also be seen that a
2000-year return period earthquake will cause a complete shutdown of the system (0%
reliability) as compared to a 10,000-year return period hurricane that will cause the same
impact.
For more frequent events with return periods less than 460 years, it can be seen from Figure
7.11(a) that hurricane hazard has more impact on the system than the seismic hazard. Both
hazards have the same effect on system reliability at a return period of about 460 years.
From Figure 7.11(b), it can be seen that the pattern in New York is similar to that in
Charleston with seismic hazard dominating the risk at return periods higher than 2,200
years. Compared to Charleston, however, it can be seen that both the seismic and hurricane
risks are lower in New York.
Looking at the multi-hazard risk curve for Seattle in Figure 7.11(c), it can be seen that
earthquake is clearly the dominant hazard at all return periods. Windstorms seem to pose
very little risk to the system in this location. For instance, at a return period of 1000 years,
the system reliability is about 1% for the corresponding seismic hazard level while it is
98% for windstorms. At lower return periods, 200 years, for example, the system reliability
is 78% and 99% for seismic and storm hazards, respectively.
The information gathered from the multi-hazard risk curves is valuable in decision making
regarding risk mitigation investment as it gives information on the impact of both lowprobability high-consequence events as well as frequent events on system reliability
(Ellingwood & Wen, 2005).
The wind speeds used to develop the hurricane curves in Figure 7.11 were obtained from
ATC (2015) as mentioned earlier, which were developed based on hurricane simulations
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by Vickery et al. (2000b) in which 20,000 hurricane years were simulated. Therefore, it
should be noted that the maximum simulated year of 1,000,000 years shown in Figure 7.11
is for demonstrating the change of system reliability vs return period of seismic and
hurricane hazards.
Risk comparison can also be made based on stipulated design hazard level. The design
wind speed is the wind speed with a return period of 50 years (2% exceedance annually)
as suggested by ASCE-74 (2009). The design PGA is the PGA with traditionally a return
period of 475 years (ASCE, 2005; Li & Ellingwood, 2009). The design hazard levels and
the corresponding system reliabilities are shown in Table 7.4. Note that the PGA and wind
speeds in Table 4 are those for the locations of G1 and line 13, respectively, and are shown
to give an indication of the general variation of the hazards in the three locations.
It can be seen from Table 7.4 that for Charleston, the design seismic hazard level has a
higher impact than hurricane hazard with corresponding system reliabilities of 76.8% and
99.8%, respectively. Both design hazard levels have a similar impact on the system in New
York while, in Seattle, design seismic hazard level has far greater impact than hurricane
hazard with corresponding system reliabilities of 13.9% and 99.9%, respectively.
Note that the variation of system reliability between the three locations especially when
considering seismic hazard is the fact that while design hazard levels vary (for example,
design PGA is 0.303g in Seattle as compared to 0.042g in New York), the power system,
in this case, is exactly the same in all three locations. In practice, structural components of
the system will be designed for the appropriate hazard level in each location.
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Table 7.4 Multi-hazard risk comparison based on stipulated design hazard level
(PGA and wind speed are for location of G1 and line 13, respectively)
Seismic Hazard

Hurricane Hazard

PGA (g) (475-yr

System

Wind (m/s) (50-yr

System

return period)

Reliability

return period)

Reliability

Charleston

0.199

76.8

43

99.8

New York

0.042

100

39

99.9

Seattle

0.303

13.9

37

99.9

Location

7.7.2 Multi-Hazard Risk Based on Annual Probability of System Failure
The comparisons based on multi-hazard risk curves in the previous section is conditional,
as the system reliability evaluations are based on scenario-based hazard analysis. Here, the
comparison is made based on the aggregated effect of all possible hazard levels which is
the basis for probabilistic hazard analysis. The system reliability results calculated based
on the annual probability of damage to system components in the three locations are given
in Table 7.5. The annual probability of system failure, defined as the complement of system
reliability is plotted in Figure 7.12. The results show that in Charleston and Seattle, seismic
hazard has a greater effect on the annual measure of system reliability, unlike in New York
where hurricane hazard has a slightly higher effect. Considering the combined effect of
both hazards, the system has a higher annual probability of failure in Seattle followed by
Charleston and New York.
Even though hurricanes and earthquakes are independent non-concurrent hazards,
annualizing the risk (measured as system unreliability in this case) allows for the
summation of the risks due to both hazards. For example, in the case of Charleston, there
is a 0.11 annual probability of system failure due to earthquakes and 0.04 annual
probability of system failure due to hurricanes. The total annual probability of system
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failure due to both hazards is thus 0.15. It should be noted that the risks due to both hazards
cannot be summed in the case of comparison based on scenario hazard.

Table 7.5 Multi-hazard risk comparison based on annual probability of damage of
components
Charleston

Risk Indicator
System reliability

Annual probability of system
failure (%)

(%)

New York

Seattle

Seismic

Hurricane Seismic Hurricane Seismic Hurricane

99.89

99.96

Seismic

0.25

99.98

99.97

99.80

99.97

Hurricane/Storm

0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
Charleston

New York

Seattle

Figure 7.12 Annual probability of system failure

The similarity in the impact of the two hazards on system reliability in Table 7.5 is because
all hazard levels are weighted by the probabilities of their occurrence. Consequently, even
though a high magnitude earthquake can cause severe damage to the system, for example,
the probability of its occurrence is low. Similarly, a low-intensity hurricane with a high
probability of occurrence will cause slight damage to the system. Note that the annual
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probability of system failure is “by average”, which means a hazard event could
dramatically change it as seen in the scenario-based result in Table 7.3.

7.8 Conclusions
A multi-hazard risk assessment framework has been presented in this chapter for
considering the impact of seismic and hurricane hazards on electric power systems. A more
comprehensive risk assessment that takes into account the potential impact of all possible
natural hazards on power systems will help to guide pre-disaster preparation as well as
decision making regarding cost-effective mitigation strategies. A notional electric power
system assumed to be located in Charleston, SC, New York, NY, and Seattle, WA was
used to demonstrate the proposed framework. Multi-hazard risk curves developed using a
topological-based system reliability indicator were used to compare the two hazards.
Furthermore, system reliability evaluated based on stipulated design hazard levels as well
as the annual probability of damage to structural components of the system were also used
for risk comparison.
The case study considered shows that multi-hazard risk assessment enables the comparison
and/or aggregation of different risks to electric power systems and can reveal the
contribution of each hazard to the overall risk to the system. The case study also illustrates
the importance of considering low-probability high-consequence events in disaster
mitigation decisions. Based on the results obtained, mitigation efforts should be considered
to reduce the potential impact of such events. However, the cost-effectiveness of deploying
such mitigation measures should be evaluated and is the topic for the next chapter.
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8. Multi-Hazard Risk Mitigation Framework 5
8.1 Introduction
Decision making regarding mitigation of multiple hazards differs from that of single hazard
mitigation in the sense that before the level or type of mitigation strategy is selected, a
decision needs to be made on which of the various competing hazards deserves greater
attention. This is compounded by the fact that there are limited resources available for
mitigation of risks from competing hazards. For example, by 2020, the investment gaps for
distribution and transmission infrastructure are estimated to be $57 billion and $37 billion,
respectively (ASCE, 2013). Therefore, both identification and prioritization of risks are
essential for decision making regarding investment in mitigation strategies.
Multi-hazard assessment and mitigation were investigated for residential construction (Li
& Ellingwood, 2009), bridges (Kameshwar & Padgett, 2014), and commercial buildings
(Wen & Kang, 2001). However, there have not been studies on mitigation strategies for
electric power systems. Existing studies on mitigation strategies for electric power systems
focus on single hazards (e.g. Romero et al. (2015), Chang (2003), Shinozuka et al. (2005),
Salman et al. (2015)). However, investment in long-term mitigation of risks needs to take
into account all possible hazards that can affect the system over its entire lifespan.
Therefore, there is a need to investigate the cost-effectiveness of mitigation strategies in
reducing the overall risks to infrastructure that are vulnerable to multiple hazards. This
requires a comprehensive multi-hazard risk-based assessment.
As resources for risk mitigation strategies are limited, any framework for multi-hazard risk
mitigation should attempt to identify risk-critical parts of a system that when strengthened,
will have a greater impact on overall system performance. To determine critical parts of a

5
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system for resource allocation, some form of component importance measure is required.
This, in turn, requires evaluating a measure of system reliability.
This chapter presents the second part of the framework in Chapter 7 to study the
effectiveness of multi-hazard risk mitigation strategies for electric power systems subjected
to hurricanes and earthquakes. Unlike in Chapter 7, probabilistic and scenario-based hazard
analysis are combined into a probabilistically weighted deterministic hazard scenarios
model that consider both spatial variation in hazard intensity as well as probabilistic nature
of hazard occurrence. A new component importance measure that considers multi-element
failure in a networked system is also proposed. Cost-effectiveness of various mitigation
strategies is investigated through life cycle cost analysis. The framework is demonstrated
using the same notional electric power network in Chapter 7. However, in this case, two
locations: Charleston, SC, and New York, NY are used. Seattle is not considered here due
to lack of data to perform hurricane simulation which is necessary for the probabilistically
weighted deterministic scenarios approach.

8.2 Hazard Analysis
As discussed earlier, application of probabilistic hazard analysis to spatially distributed
infrastructure systems has been shown to be limited (Adachi & Ellingwood, 2010). This is
because the spatial variation of intensity for a severe hazard event is lost in the aggregation
process of probabilistic analysis. Furthermore, in carrying out cost-effectiveness analysis,
estimation of revenue loss and direct economic losses to society due to power outage
depends on power outage duration following a specific event. Scenario-based approach, on
the other hand, cannot capture all possible hazard levels in an area. In such a case, a
probabilistically weighted deterministic hazard scenarios approach can be employed. This
entails selecting a suite of hazard events under which system performance can be measured.
The risk assessment is then carried out by weighing each hazard event with its respective
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probability of occurrence. Consequently, the probabilistic nature of hazard occurrence and
spatial variation of hazard intensities are reconciled.

8.2.1 Seismic Hazard Analysis
To model the seismic risk in the two chosen locations, a suite of earthquake scenarios with
their corresponding annual probabilities of occurrence is required. The aim is to select
enough earthquake scenarios to closely replicate the seismic hazard curves obtained from
USGS (2015a). The scenario earthquakes, in this case, are selected from a catalog of
earthquakes for Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) compiled in the Central and
Eastern United States – Seismic Source Characterization (CEUS – SSC) for Nuclear
Facilities report (EPRI et al., 2012). The scenarios are selected to represent all seismic
source zones in the area, as well as the range of damaging earthquakes that are possible in
the area as suggested by Chang et al. (2000). Nine and eight scenario earthquakes from a
shortlist are selected for Charleston and New York, respectively, from the CEUS-SSC
report. The selection is made so as to cover all possible hazard levels as accurate as possible
and also to reduce computational effort.
The selected scenario earthquakes from CEUS-SSC are from historical records and might
not represent the entire risk in a given location, i.e., earthquake events of higher magnitude
than those recorded are possible. Therefore, the maximum probable earthquake (MPE)
from de-aggregation analysis of earthquakes from USGS (2008) at a risk level of 2% in 50
years is also included in the list of scenario earthquakes for Charleston. The MPE
corresponding to a risk level of 2% in 50 years and 1% in 200 years are selected for New
York. The MPEs account for future events of higher magnitudes as MPE is defined as the
largest predicted earthquake a fault is capable of generating (Robert, 2002). This makes a
total of 10 scenario earthquakes for both locations as shown in Table 8.1.
For each scenario earthquake, the peak ground acceleration (PGA) at any location within
the power network is evaluated using the attenuation relationship developed by Toro et al.
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(1997). An initial annual probability of exceeding the calculated PGA level is assigned so
as to closely match the hazard curve from USGS (2015a) at a particular site. The annual
probability of exceedance is then revised iteratively to minimize the error between the
actual hazard curve from USGS (2015a) and the hazard curve based on the chosen scenario
earthquakes.
The locations of the 8 gate stations (G1 – G8) are used as control points to adjust the annual
probabilities of exceedance. This is because if only one location is used to assign the
probabilities, the resulting scenarios and their corresponding probabilities might not
accurately model the hazard curves in other locations. Using 8 control points will ensure
that the resulting scenarios and their corresponding probabilities can model the hazard in
the entire area covered by the electric power system. Figure 8.1 shows the hazards curves
for the locations of G1, G5, and G8 for Charleston and New York. It can be seen that the
hazard curves based on the selected scenario earthquakes match the actual hazard curves
from USGS (2015a).
Note that the annual probability of exceedance assigned to each seismic event or PGA level
is cumulative of the probabilities of occurrence of events that will produce the same level
of PGA or higher. Therefore, the probability of occurrence of an event is found by
subtracting the appropriate annual probabilities of exceedance as shown in Table 8.1.
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Table 8.1 Selected scenario earthquakes and their annual probabilities of occurrence
Charleston
Epicenter

Magnitude

New York
Epicenter

Annual prob.

Annual prob.

of exceedance

of occurrence

Lat.

Long.

Magnitude

Annual prob.

Annual prob. of

of exceedance

occurrence

160

Lat.

Long.

33.75

81.38

4.5

0.021

0.006

40.79

74.25

3.1

0.0225

0.0085

34.01

80.8

5.2

0.015

0.006

40.8

74

2.7

0.0140

0.0010

32.9

80

4.0

0.009

0.003

40.1

74.5

4.4

0.0130

0.0015

33.4
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8.2.2 Hurricane Hazard Analysis
For hurricane hazard, the hurricane simulation model used in Chapter 5 is also used here.
The flow chart of the simulation model is shown again in Figure 8.2 for convenience. The
required parameters for the hurricane simulation in South Carolina are taken from Huang
et al. (2001a) and shown in Table 8.2. The parameters for New York City are found by
fitting probability distributions to histograms of the parameters from Lin et al. (2010). It
should be noted that while the simulation parameters for South Carolina from Huang et al.
(2001a) are obtained from records of historical hurricanes, the parameters for New York
from Lin et al. (2010) are based on simulated hurricanes due to lack of adequate historical
data for New York.
Wind speed decay after landfall due to friction and reduction in storm’s moisture for
Charleston and New York is modeled using the model developed by Kaplan and DeMaria
(1995) and Kaplan and DeMaria (2001), respectively. As the location of the power system
is within approximately 50 miles of the coast in both locations, each hurricane is assumed
to travel in a straight line from landfall to when it will pass through the study area. This
assumption has been shown to be reasonable for areas within 50 miles of the coast (Brown,
2009). The simulation is carried out for 10,000 hurricane seasons.
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Figure 8.2 Hurricane simulation model flow chart
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Table 8.2 Statistics of hurricane simulation parameters
Distribution

Variable

Distribution parameters
South Carolina

New York

Annual frequency, λ

Poisson

0.306

0.26

Approach angle, θ (degrees)

Normal/Uniform

μ = 2.19

0 – 75

σ = 42.77
Central pressure difference

Weibull

Translation velocity

Lognormal

u = 51.12

u = 32.34

k = 3.155

k = 2.85

λ = 1.787

λ = 2.545

ζ = 0.513

ζ = 0.437

For each hurricane, the maximum wind speeds at the middle of each transmission line are
recorded as the hurricane passes through the study region. The maximum wind speed at
the location of G1 is also recorded based on which the annual probability of exceedance is
assigned to each recorded wind speed so as to match the resulting hazard curve with that
obtained from ASCE 7-10 model which can be accessed from ATC (2015) for any location.
Figure 8.3 shows a plot of the hazard curves at the location of G1 using wind speeds from
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Figure 8.3 Hurricane hazard curves
(a) G1 – Charleston (b) G1 – NY
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Using the probabilistically weighted deterministic hazard scenarios approach, the annual
probability of failure of any system component can be calculated using Equation (8.1).
𝑛𝑛

𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 = � Pr(𝐹𝐹|𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖) ∙ Pr(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖)

(8.1)

𝑖𝑖=1

where 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 is the annual probability of failure of a component; Pr(𝐹𝐹|𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖) is the

probability of failure of the component given the occurrence of hazard event i; Pr(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖)
is the annual probability of occurrence of hazard event i; and n is the total number of hazard
events. Note that Equation (8.1) assumes independence between hazard events occurrence.

8.3 Component Vulnerability
Fragilities of substations and transmission structures discussed in the previous chapter are
used here. However, in the original system, the substations are assumed to have standard
(unanchored components). The fragility parameters of the three classes of substations are
shown in Table 8.3 (FEMA, 2010). All four damage states will be considered in the cost
analysis section. However, for the purpose of demonstrating other parts of the framework,
it is assumed that substations in extensive damage state will lose their functionality and are
considered failed (Dueñas‐Osorio et al., 2007).
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Table 8.3 Lognormal parameters for seismic fragility of substations with standard
components
Substation
Classification

Low voltage

Medium voltage

High voltage

Damage State

Median PGA (g)

Dispersion

Slight/minor

0.13

0.65

Moderate

0.26

0.50

Extensive

0.34

0.40

Complete

0.74

0.40

Slight/minor

0.10

0.60

Moderate

0.20

0.50

Extensive

0.30

0.40

Complete

0.50

0.40

Slight/minor

0.09

0.50

Moderate

0.13

0.40

Extensive

0.17

0.35

Complete

0.38

0.35

8.4 Multi-Hazard Risk Assessment
As explained in the previous chapter, multi-hazard risk assessment of independent nonconcurrent hazards such as earthquakes and hurricanes is usually carried out through
comparative approach using a common index. This is feasible because risk is not measured
in hazard-specific units but in damage or loss-specific units such as damage to properties
or disruption to economic activities (Kappes et al., 2012). The common risk indicator
adopted here is system reliability (or unreliability). This allows direct quantitative
comparison of the risks for the range of return periods (or annual probabilities of
exceedance) covered by both hazards. Figure 8.4 shows the multi-hazard risk curves for
the power system in the 2 locations for selected hazard levels.
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Figure 8.4 Multi-hazard risk curves
(a) Charleston, SC (b) New York, NY
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It can be seen from Figure 8.4(a) that at lower annual exceedance probabilities in
Charleston, the risk due to seismic hazard is higher than that from hurricane hazard. For
example, the annual probabilities of exceeding a system unreliability of 80% are about
0.0012 and 0.0008 for seismic and hurricane hazards, respectively. At higher annual
exceedance probabilities, the risk due to hurricane hazard is higher. In other words, there
is a higher probability that seismic hazard will cause major disruption to the system than
hurricane hazard while there is a higher probability that hurricanes will cause minor
disruptions to the system.
In the case of New York, it can be seen from Figure 8.4(b) that risk due to hurricane hazard
is higher for the entire range of data plotted. In general, it can be seen that risk to the system
due to both hurricane and seismic hazards is higher in Charleston than New York. For
example, the annual probabilities of exceeding a system unreliability of 6% due to
hurricane hazard are about 0.0045 and 0.0017 for Charleston and New York, respectively.
Similarly, the probabilities due to the seismic hazard are 0.0045 and 0.0009 for Charleston
and New York, respectively.
Even though hurricanes and earthquakes are independent non-concurrent hazards,
annualizing the risk (measured as system unreliability in this case) can make the summation
of risk due to both hazards feasible. Risk can be annualized by weighing each hazard level
with its annual probability of occurrence. This is important when it comes to evaluating
the cost-effectiveness of mitigation strategies as will be discussed later on.
For the sake of comparison, the probabilistic method used to plot the multi-hazard risk
curves in Figure 7.11 in the previous chapter is used to plot the curves for the range of
return periods in Figure 8.4. The comparison for Charleston is shown in Figure 8.5. It can
be seen that risk curves from the two methods are similar. Relatively, the probabilistically
weighted deterministic scenarios approach overestimates the risk in some sections of the
curves. The comparison for New York is shown in Figure 8.6 where the probabilistically
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weighted deterministic scenarios approach results in higher risk than the probabilistic
analysis.
The advantage of the probabilistic analysis used in the previous chapter is that it considers
the entire range of hazard levels. However, the hazard levels corresponding to different
return period at different locations does not necessarily occur at the same time or during
the same hazard event. This is why the spatial variation of hazard intensity is lost in the
aggregation process. The probabilistically weighted deterministic scenarios approach on
the other hand models the spatial variation of hazard intensity during each event. However,
due to the limitation on computational effort, the number of hazard events that can be
considered is limited. Consequently, the approach might not cover the entire range of
possible hazard levels.
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8.5 Component Importance Measure
Mitigation strategies for distributed infrastructure systems such as electric power systems
invariably involve strengthening system components (substations and transmission line
support structures in this case). Strengthening an entire system may, however, not be costeffective as some components have a greater effect on overall system reliability than others.
Decisions on investment in mitigation strategies can be better made if the impact of
strengthening different components on system reliability can be quantified. This can be
achieved using some form of a measure of component importance.
One of the most widely used measures of component importance is Risk Achievement
Worth (RAW). RAW is an indicator of two measures, (i) the ‘worth’ of a component in
achieving the current level of system reliability, and (ii) the importance of maintaining or
improving the current reliability of a component. RAW of each component, i, is given by
Equation (8.2) (Rausand & Høyland, 2004).

𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑖𝑖) =

1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 (𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 = 1)
1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆

𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛𝑛

(8.2)

where 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 (𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 = 1) is the system reliability when component i has failed while 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 is the

reliability of the original system. The risk achievement worth of all the substations and
transmission lines in the system is presented in Figure 8.7 for the system in Charleston
using annual probabilities of component failures.
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Figure 8.7 Risk achievement worth of components in Charleston
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It can be seen from Figure 8.7(a) that the RAW of the substations in each class is very
similar. All gate stations (G1 – G8) have RAW of about 1.2, medium voltage substations
(M1 – M17) have RAW of about 24.4 (with two exceptions), and low voltage substations
(L1 – L16) have RAW of about 17.8. The lack of variation in RAW for each substation
class is due to the redundancy in the system. For example, the gate stations should have
had the largest RAW considering the fact that they are the supply stations, however, there
is always more than one gate station supplying power to each demand substation.
Consequently, failure of any one gate station will have a minimal impact on system
reliability.
Looking at the demand substations (low and medium voltage), their RAW is very similar
for each class because there is always an alternative path for power delivery from gate
stations to demand stations even if a substation along a certain path of power delivery fails.
Hence, failure of any demand substation will only cut-off power to the customers directly
connected to it. The only exception is M3 and M14. This is because looking at Figure 7.2,
it can be seen that power delivery to M4 depends on the reliability of M3 because there is
no alternative path from any gate station to M4. Hence, failure of M3 will not only cut-off
power to customers directly connected to it, but also to customers connected to M4.
Similarly, power delivery to L5 depends on M14. A similar observation can be made from
Figure 8.7(b) for transmission lines where lines such as 12 and 26 have higher RAW
because of lack of redundancy to the substations they serve.
In general, it can be seen that RAW (and other similar component importance measures
that consider the failure of single elements such as Risk Reduction Worth (RRW)) is not
an effective measure of component importance in a complex system with high redundancy
such as the power system considered in this case. This is because failure or removal of a
single component will not significantly impact system reliability because the failure of the
system or a significant part of the system is caused by combinations of failure of several
components which make up the various minimal cut sets of the system.
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A better measure of component importance for redundant systems such as the power
system in this study should take into account the number of minimal cuts that a component
affects. The Fussel-Vesely importance measure takes this into account by defining
component importance as a ratio of the probability of failure of at least one minimal cut
containing the component in question at time t to the probability that the system is failed
at time t (Fussell, 1975). In other words, the component contributes to system failure when
a minimal cut set containing the component failed. This is, however, applicable to binary
systems that can be defined as either functioning or not. That is, it applies to systems where
the failure of at least one minimal cut set leads to overall system failure. In the case of
electric power networks with several load points, failure of power delivery to one
substation or one minimal cut set does not imply system failure. This implies that the
system has several functional states.
To overcome the above shortcomings, the following component importance index is
proposed:

𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 =

1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆

𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛𝑛

(8.3)

where 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 is the importance index of component 𝑖𝑖; 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 is the average system reliability

among all scenarios where a minimal cut set containing component 𝑖𝑖 is failed; and 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 is
the reliability of the original system. The proposed component importance index models
multi-element failure which is required to bring about overall system failure in a networked

system. This is important as natural hazards such as earthquakes usually results in the
failure of multiple elements at a time. Hence, the proposed index models the likelihood that
a combination of failed elements that contain the element in question contributes to overall
system failure. 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 takes into account the fact that a component can appear in several

minimal cut sets that govern power delivery to several subsystems or substations. Figure
8.8(a) & Figure 8.8(b) show the importance index of substations and transmission lines in
the system, respectively, using the proposed measure.
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From Figure 8.8(a), it can be seen that the substations with the lowest importance index (Ii
< 20) are L4, L5, L6, L8, L14, and L16. This is because their failure does not affect power
delivery to other substations. All the gate stations show relatively high importance index
as they are the supply stations and failure of a combination of gate stations will cut power
supply to several demand stations. Looking at Figure 8.8(b), it can be seen that transmission
lines with Ii < 20 are lines whose failure will not affect power delivery to more than one
substation. Transmission lines such as lines 33 and 40 whose failure, especially in
combination with other lines, will cut-off power supply to several substations have
relatively higher Ii.

8.6 Multi-Hazard Mitigation Strategies
Seven mitigation strategies have been selected to demonstrate the proposed framework,
based on the result of component importance measure above. These are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Strengthening substations with 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 > 100 (7 substations = 17%)
Strengthening substations with 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 > 70 (16 substations = 39%)

Strengthening transmission lines with 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 > 100 (7 lines = 11%)
Strengthening transmission lines with 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 > 80 (24 lines = 36%)
Strengthening substations and transmission lines with 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 > 100

Strengthening substations with 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 > 70 and transmission lines with 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 > 80
Strengthening entire system (substations and transmission lines)

The first 6 strategies are selected to represent different levels of targeted hardening of the
system. The last mitigation strategy is chosen to investigate the effectiveness of targeted
hardening as opposed to hardening the entire system.
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Strengthening substations involve substituting standard components with anchored/seismic
components. While the current requirement for substation component design called for
anchored components, a lot of existing substations are composed of standard unanchored
components (Knight & Kempner Jr, 2009a). The fragility of anchored substations is taken
from FEMA (2005) in which it is modeled with lognormal distribution with parameters
given in Table 8.4.

Table 8.4 Lognormal parameters for seismic fragility of substations with anchored
components
Substation
Classification

Low voltage

Medium voltage

High voltage

Damage State

Median PGA (g)

Dispersion

Slight/minor

0.15

0.70

Moderate

0.29

0.55

Extensive

0.45

0.45

Complete

0.90

0.45

Slight/minor

0.15

0.60

Moderate

0.25

0.50

Extensive

0.35

0.40

Complete

0.70

0.40

Slight/minor

0.11

0.50

Moderate

0.15

0.45

Extensive

0.20

0.35

Complete

0.47

0.40

Strengthening transmission lines involve strengthening existing transmission line support
structures to conform with the current National Electrical Safety Code (NESC) standard
which requires all transmission structures over 60 ft. to be designed for extreme wind and
ice loadings (IEEE, 2012). The fragility function for upgraded transmission structures
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developed based on damage data from utility companies is given by Equation (8.4) (Brown,
2009).
𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚{[(2 ∙ 10−8 )𝑒𝑒 0.0834∙𝑣𝑣 ], 1}

(8.4)

where 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 is the probability of failure of a transmission support structure at a given wind
speed, 𝑣𝑣.

The fragility curves of existing transmission structures using Equation ((7.5) and upgraded
transmission structures using Equation ((8.4) are plotted in Figure 8.9.
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Figure 8.9 Fragilities curves of existing and hardened transmission structures
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8.7 Evaluation of Cost-Effectiveness through Life-cycle Cost
Analysis
To investigate the effectiveness of mitigation strategies and prioritize investment, a
decision-supporting tool is required to estimate costs and benefits, as well as the economic
efficiency of mitigation policies. In this study, the net discounted benefit is used as a
decision-support tool to estimate the benefit of the proposed mitigation strategies. The net
discounted benefit is evaluated by calculating and discounting the costs and benefits arising
over time, and the difference taken. The total costs and benefits are calculated through a
life-cycle cost analysis over the remaining lifespan of the system. The benefit is the
reduction in damages due to mitigation, while the cost is the cost of implementing the
mitigation strategy. A fixed discount rate is used to convert costs over time to their
equivalent present value. If the net discounted benefit is positive (benefits exceed costs),
then the mitigation strategy is considered effective.
The various costs considered in the life cycle cost analysis are discussed below:
i. Mitigation cost: this is the cost of implementing a specific mitigation strategy which
is assumed to be carried out in the first year of analysis.
ii. Maintenance cost: this is the cost of periodic maintenance performed by the utility
company on the substation and transmission lines. The total maintenance cost for each
component for the entire analysis period is given by Equation (8.5).

𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚 = � � 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡) ∙ (1 + 𝜆𝜆)−𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡

𝑖𝑖
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(8.5)

where 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 is the annual maintenance cost for element i at year t; and λ is the discount
rate.

iii.

Repair cost: this is the cost of repairing damage to the system after an earthquake or
hurricane. For damage to substations due to earthquakes, the annual repair cost for
each substation is given by Equation (8.6) which is based on the theorem of total
probability.
𝐷𝐷

𝑛𝑛

𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = � � � Pr(𝑑𝑑|𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖) ∙ Pr(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖) ∙ 𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑 ∙ (1 + 𝜆𝜆)−𝑡𝑡

(8.6)

𝑡𝑡 𝑑𝑑=1 𝑖𝑖=1

where 𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 is the annual repair cost per substation; Pr(𝑑𝑑|𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖) is the probability
of occurrence of damage state d given the occurrence of seismic event i; Pr(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖)

is the annual probability of occurrence of seismic event i; 𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑 is the cost of repairing

the substation in damage state d; D is the total number of damage states; and n is the
total number of seismic events.
For damage to transmission lines after hurricanes, the repair cost is the cost of
replacing failed transmission structures. Failed structures are replaced with new ones
of the same class. The repair cost for a line for the entire lifespan of the system is
given by Equation (8.7).
𝑛𝑛

𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = � � Pr(𝐹𝐹𝑠𝑠 |𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖) ∙ Pr(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖) ∙ 𝑁𝑁 ∙ 𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟 ∙ (1 + 𝜆𝜆)−𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡

(8.7)

𝑖𝑖=1

where 𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 is the repair cost of transmission line; Pr(𝐹𝐹𝑠𝑠 |𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖) is the probability of

failure of a structure given hurricane event i; Pr(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖) is the annual probability
of occurrence of hurricane event i; 𝑁𝑁 is the total number of structures in a line; and

𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟 is the unit repair cost of structures in a line. Note that unlike substations,
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transmission structures and lines are modeled with only one damage state which is
defined as failure.
iv.

Revenue loss: this is the cost incurred by the utility company due to the interruption
in power supply caused by earthquakes and hurricanes. It is a function of unmet
demand, the time to restore the system after an event, and the unit cost of electricity.
For failure of substations due to seismic hazard, the unmet demand for a substation
is given by Equation (8.8).
𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟

𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷 = � 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡) ∙ 𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

(8.8)

𝑡𝑡=0

where 𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷 is the unmet demand; 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡) is the demand on substation i at time t; 𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡) is

the unit price of electricity at time t; 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟 is the time to repair the substation. The time

to repair substations depends on the type and damage level of the substation. The
revenue loss due to the failure of a substation is then given by Equation (8.9).
𝐷𝐷

𝑛𝑛

𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = � � �(𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷 |𝑑𝑑 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖) ∙ Pr(𝑑𝑑|𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖) ∙ Pr(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖) ∙ (1 + 𝜆𝜆)−𝑡𝑡

(8.9)

𝑡𝑡 𝑑𝑑=1 𝑖𝑖=1

where 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 is the total revenue loss due to failure of substation; (𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷 |𝑑𝑑 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖) is

the unmet demand given damage state d and event i; Pr(𝑑𝑑|𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖) is the probability
of occurrence of damage state d given the occurrence of seismic event i; Pr(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖)
is the annual probability of occurrence of seismic event i.

For transmission line failure due to hurricanes, failure of a single transmission line
does not necessarily cut power to customers if there are other routes available for
power to reach a particular substation. Hence, revenue loss due to hurricane hazard
is calculated by considering the failure of all transmission lines supplying power to a
substation. The unmet demand for a substation due to the failure of transmission lines
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is also calculated using Equation (8.8), where 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟 is the time to repair the transmission

lines in this case. The revenue loss for a substation due to the failure of transmission
lines is then calculated using Equation (8.10).
𝑛𝑛

𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = � �(𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷 |𝐹𝐹 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖) ∙ Pr(𝐹𝐹|𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖) ∙ Pr(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖) ∙ (1 + 𝜆𝜆)−𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡

(8.10)

𝑖𝑖=1

where 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 is the annual revenue loss due to failure of transmission lines; (𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷 |𝐹𝐹 ∙

𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖) is the unmet demand given failure of all lines and event i; Pr(𝐹𝐹|𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖)

is the probability of failure of all transmission lines supplying power to a substation
given the occurrence of hurricane event i; Pr(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖) is the annual probability of
occurrence of hurricane event i.

Pr(𝐹𝐹|𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖) = Pr(𝐿𝐿1 ∩ 𝐿𝐿2 ∩ … ∩ 𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘 |𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖)

(8.11)

Pr(𝐿𝐿1 ∩ 𝐿𝐿2 ∩ … ∩ 𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘 ) is the probability of failure of all transmission lines supplying
power to a substation, where the failures are assumed to be independent.
v.

Societal economic loss: this is the direct economic loss to customers resulting from
the interruption in power supply. For damage to substations due to earthquakes, the
economic loss for a substation during a seismic event is given by Equation (8.12).
𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟

𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿 = � 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

(8.12)

𝑡𝑡=0

where 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡) is the monetary loss per hour; 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟 is repair time of the substation. The total
societal economic loss for each substation is then given by Equation (8.13).
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𝑛𝑛

𝐷𝐷

𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = � � �(𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿 |𝑑𝑑 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖) ∙ Pr(𝑑𝑑|𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖) ∙ Pr(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖) ∙ (1 + 𝜆𝜆)−𝑡𝑡

(8.13)

𝑡𝑡 𝑑𝑑=1 𝑖𝑖=1

where 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 is the total societal economic loss due to failure of substation; (𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿 |𝑑𝑑 ∙

𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖) is the expected economic loss given damage state d and event i;
Pr(𝑑𝑑|𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖) is the probability of occurrence of damage state d given the
occurrence of seismic event i; Pr(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖) is the annual probability of occurrence of
seismic event i.

As in the case of revenue loss, failure of one transmission line due to hurricane might
not necessarily lead to a power outage and economic loss to customers. Hence, the
failure of all lines connected to a substation is considered. The economic loss for a
substation due to the failure of lines is given by Equation (8.14).
𝑛𝑛

𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = � �(𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿 |𝐹𝐹 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖) ∙ Pr(𝐹𝐹|𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖) ∙ Pr(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖) ∙ (1 + 𝜆𝜆)−𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡

(8.14)

𝑖𝑖=1

where 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 is the annual societal loss due to failure of transmission lines; (𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿 |𝐹𝐹 ∙

𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖) is the economic loss given failure of all lines and event i; Pr(𝐹𝐹|𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖) is

the probability of failure of all transmission lines supplying power to a substation
given the occurrence of hurricane event i; Pr(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖) is the annual probability of
occurrence of hurricane event i.

The remaining service life of the system, i.e., the period of time over which the life cycle
cost analysis is performed is assumed to be 50 years. Information regarding cost, time to
repair failed elements, economic loss per customer, and average power consumptions are
given in Table 8.5. It is acknowledged that the relevant data for cost analysis will vary from
region to region and utility companies should use their own data when performing the
analysis. The data in Table 8.5 is adopted to demonstrate the proposed framework. Low
voltage substations are assumed to contain one 25 MVA transformer, medium voltage
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substations are assumed to contain two 25 MVA transformers, while high voltage
substation are assumed to contain four 75 MVA transformers. It is also assumed that 1%
of all customers served are commercial customers, 0.01% are industrial customers while
the rest are residential customers.
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Table 8.5 Life cycle cost analysis parameters
Parameters

Value

Source

Mitigation cost for transmission lines

$60,000/structure

Brown (2009)

$120,000/structure

Brown (2009)

Annual maintenance cost (transmission lines)

$40/mile

Brown (2009)

Unit price of electricity, p

$0.11/kWh

Xu and Brown (2008b)

Economic loss (residential)

$2.70/h

LaCommare and Eto (2006)

Economic loss (commercial)

$886/h

LaCommare and Eto (2006)

Economic loss (industrial)

$3,253/h

LaCommare and Eto (2006)

Average consumption (residential)

1.5kW/h

EIA (2013)

Average consumption (commercial)

10.1kW/h

EIA (2013)

Average consumption (industrial)

39.4kW/h

EIA (2013)

Transmission line repair time

3 days

Romero et al. (2015)

Substation repair time (minor/slight damage)

1 day

FEMA (2010)

Substation repair time (moderate damage)

3 days

FEMA (2010)

Substation repair time (extensive damage)

7 days

FEMA (2010)

Substation repair time (complete damage)

30 days

FEMA (2010)

Cost of low voltage substation

$2.8 million

Balducci et al. (2006)

Cost of medium voltage substation

$5.6 million

Balducci et al. (2006)

Cost of high voltage substation

$33.7 million

Balducci et al. (2006)

Mitigation cost for substations

2% of cost

Assumed

Cost of transmission structure replacement
under storm condition

Substation

repair

cost

(damage

state:

slight/minor)

Assumed based on definition of
5% of cost

damage states from FEMA
(2010)

Substation repair cost (damage state: moderate)

40% of cost

Same as above

Substation repair cost (damage state: extensive)

70% of cost

Same as above

Substation repair cost (damage state: complete)

100% of cost

Same as above

Annual maintenance cost (low voltage)

$30,000

Assumed

Annual maintenance cost (medium voltage)

$60,000

Assumed

Annual maintenance cost (high voltage)

$90,000

Assumed

Discount rate

4%
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Bastidas-Arteaga and Stewart
(2015)

The results of the life cycle cost analysis are presented in Table 8.6 & Table 8.7. The net
benefit, as well as the net benefit excluding societal economic losses, are plotted in Figure
8.10 & Figure 8.11. It can be seen that the mitigation strategies reduce the repair cost,
revenue loss, and the societal economic losses. Looking at the results for Charleston in
Table 8.6 and Figure 8.10, it can be seen that only strategies 1 and 2, which entails
hardening only substations, resulted in positive net benefit when societal economic losses
are considered. Recall that strategy 1 entails strengthening 7 substations or 17% of the total
substations while strategy 2 entails strengthening 16 substations or 39% of all substations.
It can be seen from Table 8.6 and Figure 8.10 that strategy 2 yields more benefit than
strategy 1. Strategy 7, which entails hardening the entire system, resulted in the highest
reduction in losses. For example, the societal economic losses reduced from about $93
million for the unhardened system to about $59 million for strategy 7. However, the high
cost of implementing the mitigation strategy outweighs the total benefit which renders the
strategy the most cost ineffective.
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Table 8.6 Cost analysis results for Charleston, SC ($1000s)
Unhardened
system

Strategy 1

Strategy 2

Strategy 3

Strategy 4

Strategy 5

Strategy 6

Mitigation
Maintenance
Repair
Revenue loss
Societal economic loss

49,830
24,703
1,127
93,282

3,594
49,830
23,083
1,062
87,900

6,064
49,830
21,495
1,007
83,376

8,940
49,830
24,655
1,120
92,718

36,780
49,830
24,505
1,112
92,051

12,534
49,830
23,035
1,055
87,336

42,844
49,830
21,297
993
82,145

111,092
49,830
19,881
714
59,050

LCC
LCC w/o societal loss
Net benefit (NB)
NB w/o societal loss

168,942
75,661
-

165,470
77,569
3,473
-1,909

161,773
78,397
7,169
-2,737

177,263
84,546
-8,321
-8,885

204,279
112,228
-35,336
-36,567

173,791
86,454
-4,848
-10,794

197,109
114,964
-28,167
-39,304

240,566
181,516
-71,624
-105,856

Strategy 7

Cost Category

Strategy 7
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Table 8.7 Cost analysis results for New York, NY ($1000s)
Cost Category

Unhardened
system

Strategy 1

Strategy 2

Strategy 3

Strategy 4

Strategy 5

Strategy 6

Mitigation
Maintenance
Repair
Revenue loss
Societal economic loss

49,830
3,322
67
5,582

3,594
49,830
2,862
66
5,496

6,064
49,830
2,617
64
5,315

8,940
49,830
3,297
67
5,505

36,780
49,830
3,219
66
5,444

12,534
49,830
2,837
65
5,418

42,844
49,830
2,514
63
5,177

111,092
49,830
2,232
27
2,236

LCC
LCC w/o societal loss
Net benefit (NB)
NB w/o societal loss

58,802
53,220
-

61,848
56,353
-3,046
-3,133

63,890
58,576
-5,089
-5,356

67,639
62,134
-8,837
-8,914

95,340
89,896
-36,538
-36,675

70,685
65,267
-11,883
-12,047

100,428
95,251
-41,627
-42,031

165,418
163,181
-106,616
-109,961

Strategy 1

Strategy 2

Strategy 3

Strategy 4

Strategy 5

Strategy 6

Strategy 7

20,000

Net benefit ($1,000s)

0
-20,000
-40,000
-60,000
-80,000
-100,000

Net Benefit
NB w/o Societal loss

-120,000

Figure 8.10 Net benefit of mitigation strategies (Charleston, SC)

Strategy 1

Strategy 2

Strategy 3
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Strategy 5

Strategy 6

Strategy 7

0

Net benefit ($1,000s)

-20,000

-40,000

-60,000

-80,000

Net Benefit
NB w/o Societal loss

-100,000

-120,000

Figure 8.11 Net benefit of mitigation strategies (New York, NY)
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On the other hand, strategies 3 and 4, which entails hardening only transmission lines, are
not cost effective in Charleston. This is because, based on the costs in Table 8.5, it is far
more expensive to harden transmission lines than substations. With resources for
mitigation strategies usually limited, it will be far more rewarding, economically, to invest
in strengthening substations against seismic hazard in this case than strengthening
transmission lines against hurricane hazard.
It can also be seen from Table 8.6 and Figure 8.10 that if the societal economic losses are
not included in the analysis, none of the mitigation strategies is cost effective in Charleston,
with the highest net benefit being -$1.9 million for strategy 1. The decision to include
societal economic losses will depend on the entity carrying out the cost analysis. Privately
owned utility companies might not consider societal economic losses in their analysis.
Municipal utilities owned by city governments, on the other hand, will likely consider all
aspects of the costs.
Comparing Charleston and New York, it can be seen that while some of the mitigation
strategies are cost effective in Charleston, none is cost effective in New York. This is
because both the seismic and hurricane hazard risks are lower in New York than
Charleston. This is evident from the total life cycle cost (LCC) of the system in the two
locations. For example, the LCC in Charleston for the unhardened system is about $169
million, while the corresponding LCC in New York is about a third of that (about $59
million). This implies that the system will be subjected to considerably higher risk from
earthquakes and hurricanes in Charleston.
The mitigation strategies are largely ineffective, economically, due to the high cost of the
mitigation strategies. As stated earlier, all the costs adopted in Table 8.5 are for
demonstrating the proposed framework and might not be reflective of the actual costs in a
particular location.
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If the discount rate of 4% in Table 8.5 is reduced by half to 2%, i.e., the present value of
future cost is increased, then mitigation strategies 1 and 2 are cost effective in Charleston
with higher net benefit than using a discount rate of 4% as seen in Figure 8.12. For example,
the net benefit of strategy 1 increased from about $3.5 million to about $6.5 million for
discount rates of 4% and 2%, respectively. Even with a discount rate of 2%, none of the
mitigation strategies is cost effective in New York as seen in Figure 8.13.
It is interesting to note that if the cost of mitigation for substations, which is assumed as
2% of substation cost in Table 8.5, is changed to 5% of substation cost, none of the
mitigation strategies is cost effective in both locations with a discount rate of 4%.

Strategy 1

Strategy 2

Strategy 3

Strategy 4

Strategy 5

Strategy 6

Strategy 7

20,000

Net benefit ($1,000s)

0
-20,000
-40,000
-60,000
-80,000
-100,000

Net Benefit
NB w/o Societal loss

-120,000

Figure 8.12 Net benefit of mitigation strategies with 2% discount rate (Charleston, SC)
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Figure 8.13 Net benefit of mitigation strategies with 2% discount rate (New York, NY)

8.8 Conclusions
A framework for evaluating the effectiveness of multi-hazard risk mitigation strategies for
electric power systems is presented. The framework consists of hazard analysis modeling
through probabilistically weighted deterministic scenarios approach, component
importance measure that considers multi-element failure, as well as a probabilistic lifecycle cost analysis model. The comprehensive framework can be used to take into account
multiple hazards that can impact a system during its lifetime. The framework is
demonstrated using a notional electric power network assumed to be located in Charleston,
SC, and New York, NY.
The developed framework can be used by decision makers to prioritize investment on
mitigation strategies in a case of competing hazards and limited resources. For example, it
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was shown based on the case study considered that it will be more cost effective to invest
in seismic risk mitigation of substations in Charleston than it is to invest in hurricane risk
mitigation of transmission lines.
It can be concluded that the cost effectiveness of multi-hazard risk mitigation strategies
depends on the level of risk on the system in any given location. For regions with relatively
moderate seismic and hurricane risks such as Charleston, certain mitigation strategies can
be cost effective. For regions such as New York where both the seismic and hurricane
hazard risks are relatively low, mitigation strategies might not be attractive, economically.
However, mitigation strategies can lead to improvement in system reliability which can
positively impact customer satisfaction and reduce power outage to critical facilities during
disasters.
It can also be concluded based on the case study that whole scale hardening of a system is
not cost effective. Rather, targeted hardening that entails identifying critical components
of the system should be considered by utility companies. Critical components can be
identified based on their impact on overall system reliability using the proposed component
importance measure, or criticality can be evaluated based on facilities connected or served
by a component.
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9. Summary, Conclusions, Applications, and Future Work
9.1 Summary
This research developed a framework for system-level risk assessment and management
for electric power systems subjected to hurricanes and earthquakes. Parts of the framework
include a topological-based system reliability model, probabilistic and scenario-based
hazard analysis, climate change modeling, component vulnerability, component
importance measure, multi-hazard risk assessment method, and cost analysis. Notional
electric power systems assumed to be located in various regions of the U.S. were used to
demonstrate the proposed framework. Several risk mitigation strategies were also proposed
and their efficiency and cost-effectiveness studied. The research and its contributions are
summarized below.
1. A topological-based system reliability method was developed for both radial
topology typical for distribution systems as well as networked topology typical for
transmission systems. This was done by formulating the accessibility of system
components using reliability block diagrams, fault tree diagrams, and enumeration
of minimal cut sets in a networked system.
2. A framework for targeted hardening of distribution systems subjected to hurricanes
was presented. The framework can be used to identify critical parts of the systems
for risk mitigation strategies. The framework was demonstrated using a distribution
system assumed to be located in Florida.
3. The potential impact of climate change on hurricane hazard was modeled through
a hurricane simulation model that allows the variation in both intensity and
frequency to be considered.
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4. A multi-hazard risk assessment approach for electric power systems subjected to
hurricanes and earthquakes was presented. A comparative approach using risk
curves as well as a cumulative approach based on annualized risk were proposed.
5. A component importance measure appropriate for networked systems was
proposed. The proposed measure considers multi-element failure to take into
account redundancy in transmission networks as well as widespread damage
observed during natural hazards.
6. A probabilistic-based cost analysis approach for multi-hazard risk assessment was
presented to take into account the uncertainties in both hazard occurrence and
damage estimation.
7. Several risk mitigation strategies were proposed and their efficiency in improving
system reliability as well as their cost-effectiveness was evaluated.

9.2 Conclusions
Major conclusions and findings from the proposed framework and the case studies
considered are summarized below.
1. The limitation of the topological-based system reliability method depends on the
type of risk mitigation strategy being considered. For example, in the case of risk
mitigation using stronger support structures for distribution and transmission
systems, or anchoring substations, the system exist as it is and its engineering
properties such as voltage are not changed. Consequently, the topological-based
approach can appropriately model the damage in the system which is basically
related to structural component strength. In other mitigation strategies, however,
such as constructing new distribution lines to connect feeders from different
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substations, the applicability of the topological-based model is limited. Power flow
analysis is required to determine whether a given substation can supply power to
additional customers not in its primary area as well as check other factors such as
voltage drop which can be prohibiting for the mitigation strategy.
2. Implementing risk mitigation strategies to entire systems is usually not costeffective. Identifying and strengthening critical components of a system can be
cost-effective and should be considered by utility companies.
3. Designing and building stronger systems at the construction stage can be more costeffective than strengthening existing systems. As such, natural hazard risk
mitigation strategies should be considered at the design stage of new systems.
4. Societal economic losses can constitute a huge percentage of total losses after a
hazard event. Results from the risk assessment of all levels of power systems and
all types of mitigation strategies considered point to the considerable impact of
power outages to the economy. Policy makers and especially municipal utility
companies owned by governments should consider such losses in any risk
mitigation studies.
5. Considerable uncertainty exists in climate modeling and the impact of climate
variation on hurricane hazard. As such, a scenario-based approach should be
adopted by utility companies to study what might happen under different climate
scenarios.
6. Multi-hazard risk assessment and management for electric power systems can be
carried out using probabilistically weighted deterministic hazard scenarios
approach. While this approach might not consider the entire range of possible
hazard levels, it does allow the modeling of spatial variation of hazard intensity for
distributed infrastructure systems.
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7. Finally, it can be noted from the formulations and results that considerable
uncertainties exist in all stages of risk assessment of infrastructure systems
subjected to natural hazards. From hazard occurrence, to damage quantification, to
consequence analysis, aleatory and epistemic uncertainties exist. The aim,
therefore, as summarized astutely by the quote below, is to find a basis for damage
reduction.

“Only if we accept that complete prevention is ultimately unattainable, our
rethinking of disasters leads us towards a policy of long-term loss reduction.
And for this type of mitigation policy, the precise measure of risks (prediction
of damages; assessment of uncertainty or complexity) might not be necessary,
or even important. The crucial point is to provide the basis for damage
reduction, i.e., to identify which areas are subject to different levels of
potential damage and which factors determine such damage. This, in turn, can
be used to identify the actions that must be taken to reduce future damage,
even if we cannot quantify them exactly.” - Weichselgartner (2001)

9.3 Applications and Recommendations for Future Study
In general, the proposed framework can be used for pre-disaster preparation, mitigation,
and post-disaster response planning. The specific ways in which the framework can help
achieve these are summarized below.
1. The proposed framework incorporates uncertainties inherent in risk due to natural
hazards by adopting a probabilistic-based approach in hazard analysis, component
vulnerable, and quantification of risk through a probabilistic system reliability
measure. As such, the framework can be used as a tool for risk assessment to
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evaluate existing power systems or proposed new systems considering various
sources of uncertainties.
2. The framework can also be used at the design stage to investigate the costeffectiveness of building a more reliable system than otherwise required.
3. The framework can be used to determine critical parts of the system to strengthen,
compare the cost-effectiveness of various mitigation strategies, and prioritize risk
from competing hazards.
4. Identification of critical systems components based on system topology can help
decision making regarding post-disaster repairs which can lead to improvement in
resilience.
5. The framework can also be used to make post-disaster decisions regarding whether
to restore the system to its original state or to replace failed components with
stronger, more reliable ones.
The present research has also helped to identify the following areas for future studies:
1. Electric power systems are critical to the operation of many infrastructure systems.
Therefore, risk mitigation strategies employed for electric power systems will
inevitably improve the performance of other infrastructure systems during natural
hazard events. As such, cost savings from such improvement can be incorporated
in future studies of the cost-effectiveness of mitigation strategies.
2. While the proposed framework can help with post-disaster response planning, a
comprehensive method for systematic restoration of electric power systems is
needed to improve resilience. Such method should consider not only component
importance but restoration times and repair crew allocations.
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3. While the current study focused on hurricanes and earthquakes which are
independent and non-concurrent hazards, there is a need to develop a framework
for risk assessment of concurrent and/or dependent hazards such as earthquakes and
tsunamis, and hurricanes and storm surge.
4. In this study, aging of wood distribution poles was considered. However, aging and
deterioration of other system components need to be considered in a long-term risk
assessment approach. This requires testing and data collection to be able to quantify
deterioration in component strength and how it affects system functionality as well
as costs.
5. Other natural hazards such as ice storms, floods, tornados etc. also pose a great
threat to electric power systems across the world. Modeling of such hazards and the
risk they pose needs to be explored.
6. Finally, a methodology for community resilience can be developed through an
integrated risk assessment that considers the complex interdependent nature of
modern infrastructure systems.
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